PickleCheck MCP server
io.github.PickleCheck/picklecheckPickleCheckstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Scam, x402 endpoint and payment checks for AI trading agents on Base. Free calls daily, then x402.
3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the PickleCheck MCP server can do
The PickleCheck MCP server is published by the GitHub account PickleCheck. It has 3 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (verify_payment) and create or change data (2 tools: scam_check and endpoint_check), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (scam_check, endpoint_check and verify_payment); 1 tool can send data out of your system (endpoint_check).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
verify_paymentVerify an on-chain payment from its transaction hash on Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum, Solana or Bitcoin (chain is detected if omitted).Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "verify_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "verify_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "verify_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify an on-chain payment from its transaction hash on Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum, Solana or Bitcoin (chain is detected if omitted). Returns status and verified. pending, unknown and not_found answers are not charged. Free: 1 a day per IP (counted across the HTTP routes and MCP), then $0.003 per call via x402.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Payment check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
endpoint_checkCheck whether an x402 endpoint is safe to pay: it looks at what the endpoint asks you to pay and to whom and compares that with its history.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether an x402 endpoint is safe to pay: it looks at what the endpoint asks you to pay and to whom and compares that with its history. It never pays the endpoint. Unreachable endpoints and bad input are not charged. Free: 1 a day per IP (counted across the HTTP routes and MCP), then $0.005 per call via x402.
Annotations the server declares
- title: x402 endpoint check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
scam_checkCheck a Base token (0x address) or URL for scam and rug risk before buying, or a wallet against the sanctions, USDC-blacklist and known-scam-deployer lists.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a Base token (0x address) or URL for scam and rug risk before buying, or a wallet against the sanctions, USDC-blacklist and known-scam-deployer lists. Returns action OK | CAUTION | AVOID | VERIFY_MORE with the facts behind it and a ready-to-show summary. null means unknown, never safe. Free: 3 a day per IP (counted across the HTTP routes and MCP), then $0.008 per call via x402.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Scam check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 404
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 404.
Posture changes
- Nov 19, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnverify_payment
The server marks "verify_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "verify_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 404; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:scam_checkChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http picklecheck https://picklecheck.onrender.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http picklecheck https://picklecheck.onrender.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__picklecheck__scam_check",
"mcp__picklecheck__endpoint_check",
"mcp__picklecheck__verify_payment"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as picklecheck. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__picklecheck__scam_check untrusted-input
- mcp__picklecheck__endpoint_check untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__picklecheck__verify_payment untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.PickleCheck/picklecheck/verify?hash=a0f4792f12b839281bbf3c33d74f94adbab0f50f9c861b6b8703c406a7cc94b0" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a0f4792f12b8, from Nov 10, 2026, 00:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.PickleCheck/picklecheck/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.PickleCheck/picklecheck)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 28, 2026, 18:17 UTC.
PickleCheck MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the PickleCheck MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the PickleCheck MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the PickleCheck MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: verify_payment.
What tools does the PickleCheck MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write. verify_payment, scam_check and endpoint_check.
Does the PickleCheck MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the PickleCheck MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): endpoint_check.
Has the PickleCheck MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 10, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.