Web3 Systemic Agent MCP server
io.github.RafaCoelho33/web3-systemic-agentRafaCoelho33streamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Web3 security & DAO auditor: free bytecode/honeypot/Snapshot tools + x402 Gemini LLM deep audit.
4 tools: 4 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Web3 Systemic Agent MCP server can do
The Web3 Systemic Agent MCP server is published by the GitHub account RafaCoelho33. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: scan_contract_selectors, check_token_honeypot, scan_dao_proposals and deep_semantic_audit), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
4 tools bring in text other people can write (scan_contract_selectors, check_token_honeypot, scan_dao_proposals and 1 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
check_token_honeypotStage 1 Free static bytecode scanner for honeypot indicators on DEX tokens: blacklist manipulation (isBlacklisted, setBlacklist), arbitrary transfer taxes / 100% sell fee traps, tr…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Stage 1 Free static bytecode scanner for honeypot indicators on DEX tokens: blacklist manipulation (isBlacklisted, setBlacklist), arbitrary transfer taxes / 100% sell fee traps, trading freeze backdoors, and selfdestruct opcodes.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check Token Honeypot & Tax Traps
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
deep_semantic_auditStage 2 Deep Semantic LLM Security and Governance Audit.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Stage 2 Deep Semantic LLM Security and Governance Audit. Performs deterministic on-chain gatekeeping followed by structured Gemini LLM evaluation over natural language proposal claims vs bytecode and calldata reality. Requires $0.05 USDC x402 micropayment on Base Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Deep Semantic LLM Governance & Contract Audit (x402)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
scan_contract_selectorsStage 1 Free deterministic inspection of smart contract bytecode on Base or EVM chains.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Stage 1 Free deterministic inspection of smart contract bytecode on Base or EVM chains. Discovers 4-byte function selectors and flags high-risk administrative capabilities (ownership transfer, proxy upgrade, unconstrained minting, selfdestruct).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Scan Smart Contract Bytecode & Selectors
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
scan_dao_proposalsStage 1 Free scanner for recent Snapshot DAO governance proposals (Arbitrum, Aave, ENS).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Stage 1 Free scanner for recent Snapshot DAO governance proposals (Arbitrum, Aave, ENS). Extracts on-chain target addresses and calldata execution payloads to detect governance takeover attempts and discrepancies.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Scan Snapshot DAO Governance Proposals
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 9, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://web3-systemic-agent.onrender.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_contract_selectors (write), check_token_honeypot (write), scan_dao_proposals (write), deep_semantic_audit (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools4 changed.~4 changedView diff
- Changed:check_token_honeypotChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:deep_semantic_auditChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:scan_contract_selectorsChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:scan_dao_proposalsChanges thingsannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http web3-systemic-agent https://web3-systemic-agent.onrender.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http web3-systemic-agent https://web3-systemic-agent.onrender.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__web3-systemic-agent__scan_contract_selectors",
"mcp__web3-systemic-agent__check_token_honeypot",
"mcp__web3-systemic-agent__scan_dao_proposals",
"mcp__web3-systemic-agent__deep_semantic_audit"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as web3-systemic-agent. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__web3-systemic-agent__scan_contract_selectors untrusted-input
- mcp__web3-systemic-agent__check_token_honeypot untrusted-input
- mcp__web3-systemic-agent__scan_dao_proposals untrusted-input
- mcp__web3-systemic-agent__deep_semantic_audit untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.RafaCoelho33/web3-systemic-agent/verify?hash=039ae94d05b1e7ae1192c24b472db0f8996ae7bab35c93b72d307fac98e82ff6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 039ae94d05b1, from Nov 11, 2026, 23:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.RafaCoelho33/web3-systemic-agent/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.RafaCoelho33/web3-systemic-agent)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 11, 2026, 23:17 UTC.
Web3 Systemic Agent MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Web3 Systemic Agent MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Web3 Systemic Agent MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Web3 Systemic Agent MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Web3 Systemic Agent MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 write. scan_contract_selectors, check_token_honeypot, scan_dao_proposals and deep_semantic_audit.
Does the Web3 Systemic Agent MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Web3 Systemic Agent MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Web3 Systemic Agent MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 11, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.