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VibeScale MCP server

io.github.Ranqint/vibescaleRanqintstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

For app builders in Israel: pre-launch checks for leaked keys, Supabase RLS, exposed env vars.

3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 2 findings, 1 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the VibeScale MCP server can do

The VibeScale MCP server is published by the GitHub account Ranqint. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: lint_supabase_rls and check_env_exposure), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

2 tools read private data (scan_app_launch_readiness and lint_supabase_rls); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (scan_app_launch_readiness); 1 tool can send data out of your system (scan_app_launch_readiness). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 2 findings, 1 of them high severity (annotation-conflict and sensitive-path). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • check_env_exposureTakes environment variable NAMES (never values) and says, for each one, whether the build tool ships it to every visitor (VITE_, NEXT_PUBLIC_, EXPO_PUBLIC_, REACT_APP_, PUBLIC_, GA…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to ".env".

      Matched text

      description: "...re. Use when someone asks whether their .env or API keys are exposed in a Lovable, B..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Takes environment variable NAMES (never values) and says, for each one, whether the build tool ships it to every visitor (VITE_, NEXT_PUBLIC_, EXPO_PUBLIC_, REACT_APP_, PUBLIC_, GATSBY_, NUXT_PUBLIC_) and whether its name looks like a server secret that must not be there. Use when someone asks whether their .env or API keys are exposed in a Lovable, Bolt, Vite, Next.js or Expo app. Send names only; if a value is included it is dropped and not stored. Explanations are in Hebrew.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check which environment variables reach the browser
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • lint_supabase_rlsReads Supabase SQL (migrations or a schema dump) as text and lists tables in exposed schemas without row level security, RLS with no policy, policies that allow everything or read …Reads private data1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.sql), which can change anything it can reach.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "sql": it reads databases.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "lint_supabase_rls" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reads Supabase SQL (migrations or a schema dump) as text and lists tables in exposed schemas without row level security, RLS with no policy, policies that allow everything or read user_metadata, policies without a role, write grants to anon, SECURITY DEFINER functions and views, new tables without a grant, and public storage buckets, each with SQL that fixes it. Use when someone asks whether their Supabase database is locked down, or before launching an app that uses Supabase. The SQL is never executed or stored; policy logic (who should see what) is not judged. Findings are in Hebrew.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check Supabase SQL for row level security gaps
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • scan_app_launch_readinessReads one public web app the way a browser does (its HTML, the same-site scripts it loads and any source maps they point to) and reports what any visitor can already see: server se…Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "secret": it reads secrets.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reads one public web app the way a browser does (its HTML, the same-site scripts it loads and any source maps they point to) and reports what any visitor can already see: server secret keys shipped to the browser (Supabase service_role, OpenAI, Anthropic, Stripe, AWS, GitHub, SendGrid, Resend; shown masked), a published source map, no HTTPS, and missing Content-Security-Policy, HSTS or frame protection. Use when someone built an app with Lovable, Base44, Bolt, Cursor, Replit or similar and asks whether it is safe to launch or whether a key leaked. It does not sign in, guess paths or query the app's database. Findings are in Hebrew.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Scan a live web app for leaked keys and missing protections
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__vibescale__scan_app_launch_readiness"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://vibe.elya-studio.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including lint_supabase_rls (write), check_env_exposure (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high1 warn
  • The description refers to ".env".

    Matched text

    description: "...re. Use when someone asks whether their .env or API keys are exposed in a Lovable, B..."

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "lint_supabase_rls" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http vibescale https://vibe.elya-studio.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http vibescale https://vibe.elya-studio.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__vibescale__scan_app_launch_readiness",
      "mcp__vibescale__lint_supabase_rls",
      "mcp__vibescale__check_env_exposure"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as vibescale. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__vibescale__scan_app_launch_readiness private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__vibescale__lint_supabase_rls private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Ranqint/vibescale/verify?hash=8ec6e9738797c839c42d05dd01d4e60b535f31b8b49838c7c12d2012157657b0" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 8ec6e9738797, from Nov 14, 2026, 20:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Ranqint/vibescale/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.Ranqint/vibescale
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.Ranqint/vibescale.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Ranqint/vibescale)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 14, 2026, 20:17 UTC.

VibeScale MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the VibeScale MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the VibeScale MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the VibeScale MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the VibeScale MCP server have?

3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. lint_supabase_rls, check_env_exposure and scan_app_launch_readiness.

Does the VibeScale MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the VibeScale MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): scan_app_launch_readiness.

Has the VibeScale MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.