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Rozo Checkout MCP server

io.github.RozoAI/checkoutRozoAIstreamable-httpv0.2.1Scanned

Pay OpenRouter and Coinbase payment links with USDC, USDT, ETH, BNB, POL, SOL or BTC Lightning.

10 tools: 8 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 8 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 9
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

8 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Rozo Checkout MCP server can do

The Rozo Checkout MCP server is published by the GitHub account RozoAI. It has 10 tools. It can create or change data (8 tools: supported_coins, quote_invoice, create_deposit_order, funding_capabilities and 4 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

9 tools bring in text other people can write (quote_invoice, create_deposit_order, payment_status and 6 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (quote_invoice and create_deposit_order).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (long-description and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.2.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
  • create_deposit_orderCreates a one-time deposit order; you pay from your own wallet.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_deposit_order" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Creates a one-time deposit order; you pay from your own wallet. Returns the deposit address (or Lightning invoice), the exact amount to send (also in base units with the token decimals), any required memo, the expiry and the rozoPaymentId. This server holds no keys and sends nothing. Send exactly the amount, on exactly that chain and token, before expiresAt. An unfunded order simply expires at no cost. For a native coin the result also carries quoteExpiresAt (the end of the price lock, which expiresAt equals): send the exact coin amount before it. Native coins (ETH on Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum; BNB on BNB Chain; POL on Polygon; SOL on Solana) are exact-out like Lightning: the order states the exact coin amount, priced at the current rate plus an FX spread on top of the service fee, and that price holds only until quoteExpiresAt. Native orders are capped at $3500 of callerPays (service fee included) per invoice (native ETH on Ethereum needs at least $1), and a native coin is offered only when quote_invoice lists it for that invoice. ZEC on Zcash (Beta) is not available through this server: send a payer holding ZEC to https://checkout.rozo.ai/zec.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create a deposit order
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • funding_capabilitiesWhat the keyless ROZO Funding API supports right now: whether stellar_onboarding is on, the source chains and USDC assets, the Stellar USDC output, the usdGas options (XLM amounts)…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What the keyless ROZO Funding API supports right now: whether stellar_onboarding is on, the source chains and USDC assets, the Stellar USDC output, the usdGas options (XLM amounts) and per-order limits. Read-only, creates nothing. Fees come from the quote (fees and totals): never assume a fee. The receiving Stellar address signs ONE transaction (only when it is new or has no USDC trustline). The one-time deposit address is the same on Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum and Polygon; USDC or USDT is accepted 1:1. Follow deposit.amountPolicy: exact or missing means pay the EXACT deposit amount; any_amount uses the suggested amount and returned min/max bounds. Pay once, before payBefore. This server never holds keys: your own wallet pays and signs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Stellar wallet funding capabilities
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • quote_invoiceAnswers what a specific OpenRouter top-up or other AI service invoice charges, whether it can still be paid through Rozo Checkout, and which coins can pay it.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Answers what a specific OpenRouter top-up or other AI service invoice charges, whether it can still be paid through Rozo Checkout, and which coins can pay it. Takes the payment link URL and returns the merchant, invoice amount, callerPays (the total USD charged: invoice plus the Rozo service fee; also callerPaysAtomicUsdc in 6-decimal units), the breakdown original (invoice face value), serviceFee and feeBps (fee rate in basis points, 100 = 1%), the link expiry, payability and supportedSources: the coins THIS invoice can be paid with. The exact amount to send in a given coin, which adds bridge and network fees, or the FX spread on a native coin, on top of callerPays, comes from create_deposit_order. Offer a native coin (ETH, BNB, POL, SOL) only when it appears in supportedSources. Creates nothing and moves no funds.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Quote an AI service invoice
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • stellar_wallet_create_orderTurn an approved quote into a payable order.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "stellar_wallet_create_order" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Turn an approved quote into a payable order. Returns fundingId (keep it private: it is the only handle to the order), the one-time deposit address, the suggested amount and amountPolicy with minAcceptedAmount/maxPricedAmount when any_amount, payBefore and the accepted chains and tokens. orderId is your own reference: the server derives the upstream order id and Idempotency-Key from quoteId plus orderId, so it only has to be unique among your own orders. Retrying with the same quoteId and orderId returns the same order instead of a second one. Creates an order but moves no funds; an unpaid order expires at no cost. Fees come from the quote (fees and totals): never assume a fee. The receiving Stellar address signs ONE transaction (only when it is new or has no USDC trustline). The one-time deposit address is the same on Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum and Polygon; USDC or USDT is accepted 1:1. Follow deposit.amountPolicy: exact or missing means pay the EXACT deposit amount; any_amount uses the suggested amount and returned min/max bounds. Pay once, before payBefore. This server never holds keys: your own wallet pays and signs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create a Stellar wallet funding order
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • stellar_wallet_get_signing_requestWhen an order shows sign_stellar_onboarding, build the one transaction the receiving address must sign (creates the account if needed, adds the USDC trustline, claims the USDC, del…Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "stellar_wallet_get_signing_request" says "get": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 2,154 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...itting). This server never sees your key. Then call stellar_wallet_submit_signed."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "stellar_wallet_get_signing_request" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "stellar_wallet_get_signing_request" says "get": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    When an order shows sign_stellar_onboarding, build the one transaction the receiving address must sign (creates the account if needed, adds the USDC trustline, claims the USDC, delivers XLM). Returns signingRequestId, the unsigned XDR, networkPassphrase, a readable operations list and expiresAt (at most 5 minutes). Sign it with the receiver wallet YOU control (Stellar SDK, Freighter, any wallet); do not modify it. Check the operations first, and decode the XDR locally to confirm it matches them exactly. The transaction source must NOT be your address (it is a ROZO channel account, so ROZO pays the network fee). Allowed, nothing else: ROZO-sourced beginSponsoringFutureReserves and createAccount for your address; from your address, changeTrust for USDC (issuer GA5ZSEJYB37JRC5AVCIA5MOP4RHTM335X2KGX3IHOJAPP5RE34K4KZVN), endSponsoringFutureReserves, claimClaimableBalance, and at most one payment: the sponsor fee in USDC to ROZO claim custody GBLTI2TTQXUAYNKGCQ63YA55KTFEAOQJ3DPBPELNPWCJVE76ADWMXUAE; and a ROZO-sourced XLM payment to your address. Any other operation type or source (setOptions, extra payments): refuse. Amounts: the claimed USDC (gross) equals the current stable leg minimumAmount (order.legs, after repricing) plus the sponsor fee; the sponsor fee is fixed at quote time (0.0000001 USDC with a paid usdGas tier, the quoted stellar_sponsor_fee with usdGas "0", no fee payment if the address needed no onboarding); the XLM payment equals the native (XLM) leg minimumAmount. The XDR shows only the claimable balance id; its amount is in the operations list and on Horizon /claimable_balances/{id}. The hash of the locally decoded transaction (tx.hash() as hex) must equal the txHash of this signing request. Every ROZO-sourced operation and the transaction source must be one of funding_capabilities rozoAccounts (reserveSponsor, xlmPayer, transactionSources). Do not echo fundingId into logs. Expired, or submit failed: just call this tool again; it supersedes the old request and returns a fresh XDR (only refused while a signed one is still submitting). This server never sees your key. Then call stellar_wallet_submit_signed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get the Stellar transaction to sign
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • stellar_wallet_quotePrice sending USDC/USDT from Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum or Polygon to USDC on a Stellar address.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Price sending USDC/USDT from Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum or Polygon to USDC on a Stellar address. If the address is new or has no USDC trustline, the same plan opens the account, adds the trustline and (with usdGas) gives XLM, in one transaction the address signs once. Returns quoteId and planDigest (needed by stellar_wallet_create_order), the USDC and XLM amounts the receiver gets, every fee line and totals, and whether a signature will be needed. Valid about 10 minutes. Read-only: no deposit address, nothing reserved. usdGas: "0" no XLM, "0.5" or "1" buys XLM (see funding_capabilities for amounts); omitted = the server default. Fees come from the quote (fees and totals): never assume a fee. The receiving Stellar address signs ONE transaction (only when it is new or has no USDC trustline). The one-time deposit address is the same on Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum and Polygon; USDC or USDT is accepted 1:1. Follow deposit.amountPolicy: exact or missing means pay the EXACT deposit amount; any_amount uses the suggested amount and returned min/max bounds. Pay once, before payBefore. This server never holds keys: your own wallet pays and signs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Quote: fund a Stellar wallet
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • stellar_wallet_submit_signedSubmit the XDR your own wallet signed for a signing request.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "stellar_wallet_submit_signed" says "submit": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submit the XDR your own wallet signed for a signing request. This is the claim: the account, trustline, USDC and XLM land in that one transaction. Submitting the same signed XDR again is safe (idempotent). Accepts only the signed transaction envelope, never a secret key. "submitted" is not delivery: poll stellar_wallet_order_status until completed. If it answers template_expired or failed, call stellar_wallet_get_signing_request again and sign the new XDR.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Submit the signed Stellar transaction
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • supported_coinsAnswers which cryptocurrencies and chains can pay an OpenRouter credit top-up or another AI service invoice through Rozo Checkout: USDC and USDT on Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Ar…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Answers which cryptocurrencies and chains can pay an OpenRouter credit top-up or another AI service invoice through Rozo Checkout: USDC and USDT on Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Arbitrum and Solana; USDC on Base and Stellar; native ETH (Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum), BNB, POL and SOL; BTC over Lightning. Returns each chain id, token symbol and token decimals. Static list, needs no payment link and makes no network call; quote_invoice reports which of these a specific invoice accepts. Native coins (ETH on Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum; BNB on BNB Chain; POL on Polygon; SOL on Solana) are exact-out like Lightning: the order states the exact coin amount, priced at the current rate plus an FX spread on top of the service fee, and that price holds only until quoteExpiresAt. Native orders are capped at $3500 of callerPays (service fee included) per invoice (native ETH on Ethereum needs at least $1), and a native coin is offered only when quote_invoice lists it for that invoice. ZEC on Zcash (Beta) is not available through this server: send a payer holding ZEC to https://checkout.rozo.ai/zec.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Supported coins
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • payment_statusCheck a Rozo order by rozoPaymentId: whether the deposit arrived, bridging/payout progress, and whether the OpenRouter or other AI service invoice settled.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "payment_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a Rozo order by rozoPaymentId: whether the deposit arrived, bridging/payout progress, and whether the OpenRouter or other AI service invoice settled. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Payment status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • stellar_wallet_order_statusRead a funding order by fundingId: status, pendingActions (sign_stellar_onboarding means the receiver must sign), the deposit, and each leg (USDC, XLM) with its own status, deliver…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "stellar_wallet_order_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a funding order by fundingId: status, pendingActions (sign_stellar_onboarding means the receiver must sign), the deposit, and each leg (USDC, XLM) with its own status, delivered amount and tx hash. Read-only. Poll about every 15 seconds; completed only when every leg is confirmed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Stellar wallet funding order status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:00 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
8
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.rozo.ai/mcp?src=registry: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including supported_coins (write), quote_invoice (write), create_deposit_order (write), funding_capabilities (write), stellar_wallet_quote (write) and 3 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn1 info
  • The server marks "stellar_wallet_get_signing_request" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "stellar_wallet_get_signing_request" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The description is 2,154 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...itting). This server never sees your key. Then call stellar_wallet_submit_signed."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
  2. Tools4 changed.~4 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http checkout https://mcp.rozo.ai/mcp?src=registry
claude mcp add --transport http checkout https://mcp.rozo.ai/mcp?src=registry

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__checkout__payment_status",
      "mcp__checkout__stellar_wallet_order_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__checkout__supported_coins",
      "mcp__checkout__quote_invoice",
      "mcp__checkout__create_deposit_order",
      "mcp__checkout__funding_capabilities",
      "mcp__checkout__stellar_wallet_quote",
      "mcp__checkout__stellar_wallet_create_order",
      "mcp__checkout__stellar_wallet_get_signing_request",
      "mcp__checkout__stellar_wallet_submit_signed"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as checkout. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 9 rules
  • mcp__checkout__quote_invoice untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__checkout__create_deposit_order untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__checkout__payment_status untrusted-input
  • mcp__checkout__funding_capabilities untrusted-input
  • mcp__checkout__stellar_wallet_quote untrusted-input
  • mcp__checkout__stellar_wallet_create_order untrusted-input
  • mcp__checkout__stellar_wallet_order_status untrusted-input
  • mcp__checkout__stellar_wallet_get_signing_request untrusted-input
  • mcp__checkout__stellar_wallet_submit_signed untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.RozoAI/checkout/verify?hash=ddae6582b0d3095079e58561e745b59c2f19a6e7a7f9fe0d2ca798cb7f73c562" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash ddae6582b0d3, from Nov 16, 2026, 04:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.RozoAI/checkout/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.RozoAI/checkout
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.RozoAI/checkout.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.RozoAI/checkout)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:21 UTC.

Rozo Checkout MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Rozo Checkout MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Rozo Checkout MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Rozo Checkout MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Rozo Checkout MCP server have?

10 tools: 8 write, 2 read. supported_coins, quote_invoice, create_deposit_order, funding_capabilities, stellar_wallet_quote, stellar_wallet_create_order, stellar_wallet_get_signing_request, stellar_wallet_submit_signed and 2 more.

Does the Rozo Checkout MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Rozo Checkout MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): quote_invoice and create_deposit_order.

Has the Rozo Checkout MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 16, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.