Tabularium MCP server
io.github.SQLazy/tabulariumSQLazystreamable-httpv0.5.5Scanned
Agent memory and a signed spending ledger: pay any x402 API, keep a provable receipt.
8 tools: 7 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 6
- Can send data out · 2
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
7 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Tabularium MCP server can do
The Tabularium MCP server is published by the GitHub account SQLazy. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (7 tools: tabularium_menu, tabularium_head, tabularium_write, tabularium_renew and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (tabularium_snapshot_tables); 6 tools bring in text other people can write (tabularium_write, tabularium_read, tabularium_renew and 3 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (tabularium_snapshot_fetch and tabularium_snapshot_tables). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.5.5.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
tabularium_exportPaid ($0.01 USDC on Base, x402).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid ($0.01 USDC on Base, x402). Full signed history and current values, verifiable offline. Agent memory: export the full signed history and current values of the paying wallet's persistent key-value store, for backup or proof. The export verifies offline against the public key in /menu, with no trust in the server. The optional since parameter returns only newer entries.. Settles before it runs (a free check refuses a call that would fail). Call once without payment to get the price, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tabularium_headFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Free: signed head (seq + hash, no values), state and expiry for a wallet's workspace
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
tabularium_renewPaid ($0.25 USDC on Base, x402).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid ($0.25 USDC on Base, x402). Extend the workspace by 30 days from the later of now or its expiry. Agent memory: keep the paying wallet's persistent key-value store for 30 more days, counted from the later of now or its current expiry. A free pre-check rejects a wallet with no workspace before any charge.. Settles before it runs (a free check refuses a call that would fail). Call once without payment to get the price, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
tabularium_snapshot_fetchPaid ($0.005 USDC on Base, x402).Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "tabularium_snapshot_fetch" says "snapshot": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "tabularium_snapshot_fetch" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "tabularium_snapshot_fetch" says "snapshot": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid ($0.005 USDC on Base, x402). Read a web page as markdown as a person sees it, hidden text flagged, with a signed record. Reads a web page as clean markdown, as a person sees it: hidden text and invisible Unicode are kept out of the text and flagged with a prompt-injection verdict. Also reads PDF, Word and Excel files as markdown. Includes an Ed25519-signed record (final URL, time, status, sha256 of body and text) that verifies offline. Charged only for 2xx pages and documents it can read; refused URLs cost nothing.. Charged only if it succeeds. Call once without payment to get the price, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
tabularium_snapshot_tablesPaid ($0.005 USDC on Base, x402).Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "tabularium_snapshot_tables" says "snapshot": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "tabularium_snapshot_tables" says "snapshot" and "table": it reads databases.
- private-dataThe input names a table (input.max_tables), and the tool reads: it reads databases.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "tabularium_snapshot_tables" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "tabularium_snapshot_tables" says "snapshot": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid ($0.005 USDC on Base, x402). The tables in a web page, PDF, Word, Excel or CSV file, as JSON, with a signed record. Returns the tables in a web page, PDF, Word, Excel or CSV file as JSON: caption, header row and rows of cells. Rows hidden from people are skipped. Includes the same Ed25519-signed record as fetch, over the exact JSON returned. Charged only when at least one table comes back; a page without tables costs nothing.. Charged only if it succeeds. Call once without payment to get the price, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
tabularium_writePaid ($0.003 USDC on Base, x402).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tabularium_write" says "write": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid ($0.003 USDC on Base, x402). Append a value under a key in the paying wallet's workspace. Agent memory: save a value under a key in a persistent key-value store owned by the paying wallet. The first write opens a 30-day workspace. Memory survives restarts, new machines and hand-offs between agents. Every write is hash-chained and signed (Ed25519), so the history verifies offline. Values up to 64 KB; failed writes are not charged.. Charged only if it succeeds. Call once without payment to get the price, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
tabularium_readPaid ($0.002 USDC on Base, x402).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tabularium_read" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid ($0.002 USDC on Base, x402). Latest value for a key, with its chain entry. Agent memory: read the latest value for a key from the paying wallet's persistent key-value store, with its signed hash-chain entry. Reads keep working through the 90-day grace period after the term ends. A missing key returns 404 and is not charged.. Charged only if it succeeds. Call once without payment to get the price, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
12 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write6
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__tabularium__tabularium_snapshot_tables"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 10, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 7
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://tabularium.matt-3e0.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including tabularium_menu (write), tabularium_head (write), tabularium_write (write), tabularium_renew (write), tabularium_export (write) and 2 more
Posture changes
- Nov 10, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 7
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "tabularium_snapshot_fetch" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "tabularium_snapshot_fetch" says "snapshot": a word for reading.
The server marks "tabularium_snapshot_tables" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "tabularium_snapshot_tables" says "snapshot": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 added, 1 changed.+1 added~1 changedView diff
- Added:tabularium_snapshot_tablesChanges things
- Changed:tabularium_snapshot_fetchChanges thingsdescription
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 7.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 7
Install
Pinned to version 0.5.5. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http tabularium https://tabularium.matt-3e0.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http tabularium https://tabularium.matt-3e0.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__tabularium__tabularium_read"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__tabularium__tabularium_menu",
"mcp__tabularium__tabularium_head",
"mcp__tabularium__tabularium_write",
"mcp__tabularium__tabularium_renew",
"mcp__tabularium__tabularium_export",
"mcp__tabularium__tabularium_snapshot_fetch",
"mcp__tabularium__tabularium_snapshot_tables"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tabularium. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__tabularium__tabularium_write untrusted-input
- mcp__tabularium__tabularium_read untrusted-input
- mcp__tabularium__tabularium_renew untrusted-input
- mcp__tabularium__tabularium_export untrusted-input
- mcp__tabularium__tabularium_snapshot_fetch untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__tabularium__tabularium_snapshot_tables private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.SQLazy/tabularium/verify?hash=5e294cefe68d3145925a5341c85f5fd172b19ad7b6c13f994969bd841d3b1b29" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5e294cefe68d, from Nov 16, 2026, 10:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.SQLazy/tabularium/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.SQLazy/tabularium)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 3, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
Tabularium MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Tabularium MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Tabularium MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Tabularium MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Tabularium MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 7 write, 1 read. tabularium_menu, tabularium_head, tabularium_write, tabularium_renew, tabularium_export, tabularium_snapshot_fetch, tabularium_snapshot_tables and tabularium_read.
Does the Tabularium MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Tabularium MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): tabularium_snapshot_fetch and tabularium_snapshot_tables.
Has the Tabularium MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 16, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.