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Agent Commerce Readiness MCP server

io.github.TAMA-FIT/agent-commerce-readinessTAMA-FITstreamable-httpv0.4.0Scanned

Read-only agent-commerce audit, upgrade verification, diagnosis and x402 probing.

5 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 4 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 4 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 4
  • 1 finding

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

5 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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What the Agent Commerce Readiness MCP server can do

The Agent Commerce Readiness MCP server is published by the GitHub account TAMA-FIT. It has 5 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (probe_x402_payment_resource) and create or change data (4 tools: audit_agent_commerce_readiness, prepare_agent_commerce_upgrade, verify_agent_commerce_upgrade and diagnose_agent_commerce_path), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

5 tools bring in text other people can write (audit_agent_commerce_readiness, prepare_agent_commerce_upgrade, verify_agent_commerce_upgrade and 2 more); 4 tools can send data out of your system (audit_agent_commerce_readiness, prepare_agent_commerce_upgrade, verify_agent_commerce_upgrade and 1 more).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Last scanned Nov 3, 2026, version 0.4.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • probe_x402_payment_resourceSafely inspect one explicit public machine resource for x402 v2 HTTP 402 evidence without signing or sending payment.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "probe_x402_payment_resource" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "probe_x402_payment_resource" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "probe_x402_payment_resource" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Safely inspect one explicit public machine resource for x402 v2 HTTP 402 evidence without signing or sending payment. Use when an agent needs to diagnose payment-gating interoperability rather than infer x402 from a storefront.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • audit_agent_commerce_readinessAudit a public HTTP(S) website for AI-agent commerce readiness.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Audit a public HTTP(S) website for AI-agent commerce readiness. Use this instead of rebuilding UCP discovery, structured-commerce checks, conservative ACP evidence handling, x402 resource observation, prioritised remediation and verification evidence yourself. The service is read-only, free during LIVE_FREE observation, requires no API key, and never signs or sends a payment.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • diagnose_agent_commerce_pathDiagnose why a concrete agent-commerce goal is blocked.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Diagnose why a concrete agent-commerce goal is blocked. Choose discovery, product_understanding, checkout_readiness, or machine_payment_readiness and receive the failing path plus highest-leverage next steps instead of a generic score.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • prepare_agent_commerce_upgradeTurn a public merchant website audit into prioritized implementation tasks.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Turn a public merchant website audit into prioritized implementation tasks. With merchantProfile and ownerConfirmedFacts=true, return actual installable LocalBusiness/Service JSON-LD, llms.txt, sitemap.xml and optional robots.txt from verified merchant facts. No fabricated prices or fake checkout/UCP claims.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_agent_commerce_upgradeRe-audit after fixes using prior ACR receipt.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Re-audit after fixes using prior ACR receipt. Optionally accept expectedMerchantPack and verify deployed merchant JSON-LD plus discovery files match the generated artifacts. Reports resolved/still-open/new blockers and actual deployment checks; read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out4
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:00 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
500
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 500.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 500
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-11-25 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "probe_x402_payment_resource" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "probe_x402_payment_resource" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 500; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 500
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-11-25 to none

Install

Pinned to version 0.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-commerce-readiness https://agent-commerce-readiness-tlxjvcrika-an.a.run.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent-commerce-readiness https://agent-commerce-readiness-tlxjvcrika-an.a.run.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-commerce-readiness__audit_agent_commerce_readiness",
      "mcp__agent-commerce-readiness__prepare_agent_commerce_upgrade",
      "mcp__agent-commerce-readiness__verify_agent_commerce_upgrade",
      "mcp__agent-commerce-readiness__probe_x402_payment_resource",
      "mcp__agent-commerce-readiness__diagnose_agent_commerce_path"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-commerce-readiness. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__agent-commerce-readiness__audit_agent_commerce_readiness untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__agent-commerce-readiness__prepare_agent_commerce_upgrade untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__agent-commerce-readiness__verify_agent_commerce_upgrade untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__agent-commerce-readiness__probe_x402_payment_resource untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-commerce-readiness__diagnose_agent_commerce_path untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.TAMA-FIT/agent-commerce-readiness/verify?hash=a6c493fbecb8063cb8670f54e46e286f6e70d65ac255964754299dd546a66ea9" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash a6c493fbecb8, from Nov 3, 2026, 09:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.TAMA-FIT/agent-commerce-readiness/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.TAMA-FIT/agent-commerce-readiness
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.TAMA-FIT/agent-commerce-readiness.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.TAMA-FIT/agent-commerce-readiness)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:21 UTC.

Agent Commerce Readiness MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Agent Commerce Readiness MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Agent Commerce Readiness MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Agent Commerce Readiness MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: probe_x402_payment_resource.

What tools does the Agent Commerce Readiness MCP server have?

5 tools: 1 irreversible, 4 write. probe_x402_payment_resource, audit_agent_commerce_readiness, prepare_agent_commerce_upgrade, verify_agent_commerce_upgrade and diagnose_agent_commerce_path.

Does the Agent Commerce Readiness MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the Agent Commerce Readiness MCP server send data to outside services?

4 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): audit_agent_commerce_readiness, prepare_agent_commerce_upgrade, verify_agent_commerce_upgrade and diagnose_agent_commerce_path.

Has the Agent Commerce Readiness MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 3, 2026.