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Cloudhil MCP server

io.github.Tetef/cloudhilTetefstreamable-httpv0.8.2Scanned

Flash pre-built STM32/LPC ELFs on real Nucleo/Discovery boards over HTTPS. Does not compile.

4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone and 2 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 1 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Cloudhil MCP server can do

The Cloudhil MCP server is published by the GitHub account Tetef. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: flash_elf) and do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_feedback). 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_job); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_job); 1 tool can send data out of your system (send_feedback). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 0.8.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • flash_elfFlash a pre-built ELF you compiled locally (see AGENTS.md hello/).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Flash a pre-built ELF you compiled locally (see AGENTS.md hello/). Pass the binary as elf_base64, or elf_url on https. Do not pass a filesystem path. Requires a Pay With Prompt voucher (merchant cloudhil, 10 credits = 1 flash). Cloudhil verifies it server-side before programming. Returns result.mailbox (NNOK 0x4E4E4F4B) and result.uart. nucleo-n6 and lpc55569-evk require .elf. Oneshot ≤20s then erase. Needs a Cloudhil account (Connect / OAuth).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Flash ELF on a real MCU
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • send_feedbackPOST waitlist kind=agent.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "send_feedback" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "send_feedback" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    POST waitlist kind=agent. Put ALL product feedback in note (max 500). No firmware, no secrets, no voucher. No account required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Send product feedback
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_jobGET flash job status and result (uart, mailbox, erased).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_job" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "mailbox": it reads mail.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "mailbox": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    GET flash job status and result (uart, mailbox, erased). Needs the same Cloudhil account that flashed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get flash job result
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • list_boardsList Cloudhil MCU benches (id, commercial name, flashable, probe, host online).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_boards" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List Cloudhil MCU benches (id, commercial name, flashable, probe, host online). No account required.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List benches
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__cloudhil__send_feedback"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 11, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://cloudhil.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://cloudhil.com
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://cloudhil.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including flash_elf (destructive), send_feedback (irreversible)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.8.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http cloudhil https://cloudhil.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http cloudhil https://cloudhil.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__cloudhil__list_boards",
      "mcp__cloudhil__get_job"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__cloudhil__send_feedback"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__cloudhil__flash_elf"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as cloudhil. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__cloudhil__get_job private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__cloudhil__send_feedback outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Tetef/cloudhil/verify?hash=281ed2126d125e0709aaed0e232a0802a65803a86d0c77f199aafdefd0d32f3b" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 281ed2126d12, from Nov 11, 2026, 00:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Tetef/cloudhil/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.Tetef/cloudhil
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.Tetef/cloudhil.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Tetef/cloudhil)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 11, 2026, 00:18 UTC.

Cloudhil MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Cloudhil MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Cloudhil MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: flash_elf.

Can the Cloudhil MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: send_feedback.

What tools does the Cloudhil MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 2 read. flash_elf, send_feedback, list_boards and get_job.

Does the Cloudhil MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Cloudhil MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_feedback.

Has the Cloudhil MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.