SolGuard Solana Token-2022 Scanner & Safe-Swap Router MCP server
io.github.Tradelord223/solguard-mcpTradelord223streamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Solana Token-2022 honeypot scanner, 1-SOL slippage probe & Jito MEV-safe swap router.
3 tools: 3 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the SolGuard Solana Token-2022 Scanner & Safe-Swap Router MCP server can do
The SolGuard Solana Token-2022 Scanner & Safe-Swap Router MCP server is published by the GitHub account Tradelord223. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: solana_token_forensic_audit, build_jito_safe_swap and build_jito_safe_exit), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (solana_token_forensic_audit, build_jito_safe_swap and build_jito_safe_exit).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
build_jito_safe_exitEmergency Dump / Safe-Exit (Token -> SOL): builds an unsigned Solana v0 VersionedTransaction via Jupiter v1 + Jito bundleOnly=true MEV protection, APPENDING the 65 bps (or 45/20 bp…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Emergency Dump / Safe-Exit (Token -> SOL): builds an unsigned Solana v0 VersionedTransaction via Jupiter v1 + Jito bundleOnly=true MEV protection, APPENDING the 65 bps (or 45/20 bps partner referral) atomic SOL fee AFTER Jupiter unwraps WSOL so wallets with near-zero free SOL pay the fee directly out of SOL sale proceeds.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Build Unsigned Post-Unwrap Jito Safe-Exit
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
build_jito_safe_swapBuilds an unsigned Solana v0 VersionedTransaction via Jupiter v1 + atomic 65 bps SolGuard fee transfer + Jito bundleOnly=true MEV protection (supports side='buy' SOL->Token after a…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.inputMint.default contains a 43-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.inputMint.default: "So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112"
Description, as the server wrote it Builds an unsigned Solana v0 VersionedTransaction via Jupiter v1 + atomic 65 bps SolGuard fee transfer + Jito bundleOnly=true MEV protection (supports side='buy' SOL->Token after anti-rug verification, or side='sell' Token->SOL post-unwrap Safe-Exit).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Build Unsigned Jito Safe-Swap (v0 Transaction)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
solana_token_forensic_auditLive Solana Mainnet forensic honeypot & real-slippage audit: checks mintAuthority, freezeAuthority, Token-2022 extensions (permanentDelegate, transferHook, pausableConfig, nonTrans…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Live Solana Mainnet forensic honeypot & real-slippage audit: checks mintAuthority, freezeAuthority, Token-2022 extensions (permanentDelegate, transferHook, pausableConfig, nonTransferable, transferFeeConfig), DexScreener liquidity, and live Jupiter v1 1.0 SOL -> Token -> SOL round-trip impact in bps.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Audit Solana Token Forensics & Slippage
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- no
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- not observed
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: solguard-protocol.pages.dev does not resolve.
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The input schema at properties.inputMint.default contains a 43-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.inputMint.default: "So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112"
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http solguard https://solguard-protocol.pages.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http solguard https://solguard-protocol.pages.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__solguard__solana_token_forensic_audit",
"mcp__solguard__build_jito_safe_swap",
"mcp__solguard__build_jito_safe_exit"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as solguard. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__solguard__solana_token_forensic_audit untrusted-input
- mcp__solguard__build_jito_safe_swap untrusted-input
- mcp__solguard__build_jito_safe_exit untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Tradelord223/solguard-mcp/verify?hash=b3dabe81c1f47cb05989130528462cf1027d833d03f7f58f10f38d16a9ed438d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b3dabe81c1f4, from Nov 12, 2026, 22:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Tradelord223/solguard-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Tradelord223/solguard-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 12, 2026, 22:17 UTC.
SolGuard Solana Token-2022 Scanner & Safe-Swap Router MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the SolGuard Solana Token-2022 Scanner & Safe-Swap Router MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the SolGuard Solana Token-2022 Scanner & Safe-Swap Router MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the SolGuard Solana Token-2022 Scanner & Safe-Swap Router MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the SolGuard Solana Token-2022 Scanner & Safe-Swap Router MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 3 write. solana_token_forensic_audit, build_jito_safe_swap and build_jito_safe_exit.
Does the SolGuard Solana Token-2022 Scanner & Safe-Swap Router MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the SolGuard Solana Token-2022 Scanner & Safe-Swap Router MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the SolGuard Solana Token-2022 Scanner & Safe-Swap Router MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.