Mind Upload AI meta harness MCP server
io.github.Voidborn-Industries/minduploadVoidborn-Industriesstreamable-httpv1.19.0Scanned
Your AI mind directs coding agents; work reviewed against your memories: Claude Code, Codex, Cursor
8 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 4 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 8
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Mind Upload AI meta harness MCP server can do
The Mind Upload AI meta harness MCP server is published by the GitHub account Voidborn-Industries. It has 8 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: review_pending_memory and disconnect) and create or change data (4 tools: consult_mind, review_work, share_evidence and remember). 2 tools only read.
8 tools bring in text other people can write (consult_mind, review_work, share_evidence and 5 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 4 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.19.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
disconnectEnd this Mind Upload connection and the owner approval behind it.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it End this Mind Upload connection and the owner approval behind it. Only when the owner asks to disconnect.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
review_pending_memoryApprove, reject or rewrite one pending memory, only as the owner decides.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "approve": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Approve, reject or rewrite one pending memory, only as the owner decides. Needs the "review pending memories" permission.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
consult_mindAsk the owner's Mind Upload consciousness, an AI built from the owner's own memories, values and way of thinking, how they would approach this task.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Ask the owner's Mind Upload consciousness, an AI built from the owner's own memories, values and way of thinking, how they would approach this task. Call it before any task that will change files or run a commit, push, release, deploy, migration or deletion, and again when a consequential decision changes the plan. It can add what the owner stored in Mind Upload and your instructions do not hold: their priorities, the tradeoffs they accept, past mistakes and what “done” means to them. Put the goal, constraints, options and your proposed approach in one question; it cannot read your files, so share screenshots, recordings or audio as evidence files (evidence_files, or share_evidence and then evidence_ids). On success it returns decision, a reply in that consciousness's own words and in the language of the question, and consciousness, naming who answered, plus the analysis status of each evidence file or media link. The reply is advice, not permission. Skip it only for questions that change nothing.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
rememberSave a note, decision or fact into the owner's consciousness, when the owner asks.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "save": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Save a note, decision or fact into the owner's consciousness, when the owner asks. It waits for their review unless they auto-keep. Needs the "save memories" permission.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
review_workBefore you tell the user that a task which changed files, or ran a commit, push, release, deploy, migration or deletion, is done, call review_work with the original request, the di…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Before you tell the user that a task which changed files, or ran a commit, push, release, deploy, migration or deletion, is done, call review_work with the original request, the diff excerpts and the test output you observed; if review_work is unavailable or fails, say plainly that no Mind Upload review ran. It asks the owner's Mind Upload consciousness to review the work against the original request, the evidence you supply, and the rules and past mistakes it remembers. Supply the original request, the actual result or diff excerpts, and the verification output you observed; it cannot read files or run tests, so a claim that tests passed is not evidence. Share screenshots, recordings or audio of the result as evidence files (evidence_files, or share_evidence and then evidence_ids), not inside the evidence text. user_request, work and evidence share one size limit with the review instructions the connector adds: about 6,400 characters together after JSON escaping, less with media links. An oversized call is refused before anything is sent. On success it returns review, findings by severity in the language of the user request, naming what it finds missing or wrong, and consciousness, naming who answered, plus the analysis status of each evidence file or media link. That reply is an opinion, not approval: investigate each finding, fix what is real, and review the changed work under a new review_id. Call it once per finished task, and again after material fixes.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
connection_statusShow which Mind Upload account approval and consciousnesses this connection uses, its status, and how to disconnect or revoke it.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "connection_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Show which Mind Upload account approval and consciousnesses this connection uses, its status, and how to disconnect or revoke it.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_pending_memoriesList memories waiting for the owner's review, so the owner can go through them with you.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_pending_memories" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it List memories waiting for the owner's review, so the owner can go through them with you. Needs the "review pending memories" permission.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write8
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 6
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://mcp.mindupload.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://mcp.mindupload.app
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (2 destructive, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.mindupload.app/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including review_pending_memory (destructive), disconnect (destructive), consult_mind (write), review_work (write), share_evidence (write) and 1 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:consult_mindChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:review_workChanges thingsdescription
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:consult_mindChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:review_workChanges thingsdescription
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:consult_mindChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:review_workChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Tools4 added, 2 changed.+4 added~2 changedView diff
- Added:list_pending_memoriesOnly reads
- Added:rememberChanges things
- Added:review_pending_memoryDeletes or cancels
- Added:share_evidenceChanges things
- Changed:consult_mindChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:review_workChanges thingsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.19.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http mindupload https://mcp.mindupload.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http mindupload https://mcp.mindupload.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__mindupload__list_pending_memories",
"mcp__mindupload__connection_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__mindupload__consult_mind",
"mcp__mindupload__review_work",
"mcp__mindupload__share_evidence",
"mcp__mindupload__remember"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__mindupload__review_pending_memory",
"mcp__mindupload__disconnect"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mindupload. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 8 rules
- mcp__mindupload__consult_mind untrusted-input
- mcp__mindupload__review_work untrusted-input
- mcp__mindupload__share_evidence untrusted-input
- mcp__mindupload__remember untrusted-input
- mcp__mindupload__list_pending_memories untrusted-input
- mcp__mindupload__review_pending_memory untrusted-input
- mcp__mindupload__connection_status untrusted-input
- mcp__mindupload__disconnect untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.Voidborn-Industries/mindupload/verify?hash=18b5db4e4d4600338410bfac3c27fb2fcdf587b3a04aa4a403a8e3196c61c63a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 18b5db4e4d46, from Nov 21, 2026, 05:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Voidborn-Industries/mindupload/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.Voidborn-Industries/mindupload)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 05:17 UTC.
Mind Upload AI meta harness MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Mind Upload AI meta harness MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Mind Upload AI meta harness MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: review_pending_memory and disconnect.
Can the Mind Upload AI meta harness MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Mind Upload AI meta harness MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 2 destructive, 4 write, 2 read. review_pending_memory, disconnect, consult_mind, review_work, share_evidence, remember, list_pending_memories and connection_status.
Does the Mind Upload AI meta harness MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Mind Upload AI meta harness MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Mind Upload AI meta harness MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 4 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.