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ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server

io.github.ZKStamp/proof100ZKStampstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

Shielded proof-of-existence timestamps on BitcoinZ (zk-SNARKs). Free trial: 3 proofs.

3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server can do

The ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server is published by the GitHub account ZKStamp. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: timestamp_fingerprint and timestamp_text), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • timestamp_fingerprintCreate a private, dated proof that a file or data existed, without sending the data.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a private, dated proof that a file or data existed, without sending the data. Use this when you already have the SHA-256 fingerprint (hash) of a file; for a short text, use timestamp_text instead. Compute the hash locally over the exact bytes (for example: sha256sum MyFile.pdf) and pass the 64-character hex string. The fingerprint is written into the encrypted memo of a shielded (zk-SNARK) BitcoinZ transaction, sent to a new address made for this proof only; the block timestamp dates it. Takes about 10 to 60 seconds and uses 1 proof from the account (requires the account key in the Authorization header). Returns ok, txid, viewing_key, explorer link and proofs_left. Tell the user to keep the txid and viewing_key: together they let anyone verify this one proof with ZCheck, and reveal nothing else. On error (invalid fingerprint, invalid key, no proofs left, send failed) no proof is used.
  • timestamp_textCompute the SHA-256 fingerprint of a short text on the Proof-100 server (the text is not stored), then write that fingerprint privately on the BitcoinZ blockchain.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compute the SHA-256 fingerprint of a short text on the Proof-100 server (the text is not stored), then write that fingerprint privately on the BitcoinZ blockchain. Returns the fingerprint, the transaction ID and a viewing key for this one proof. Keep the viewing key: with the txid it reveals this proof only. Uses 1 proof.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • check_balanceShow how many Proof-100 proofs are left and the two BTCZ deposit addresses for buying more: deposit_address (shielded zs, fully private) and t_deposit_address (transparent, for exc…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "show": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Show how many Proof-100 proofs are left and the two BTCZ deposit addresses for buying more: deposit_address (shielded zs, fully private) and t_deposit_address (transparent, for exchanges and t-only wallets like Coinomi; the payment is visible on the blockchain, the proofs stay shielded). 500,000 BTCZ to either (or both together) = 100 proofs after 2 confirmations.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 27, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://proof.zketernity.app/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including timestamp_fingerprint (write), timestamp_text (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http proof100 https://proof.zketernity.app/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http proof100 https://proof.zketernity.app/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__proof100__check_balance"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__proof100__timestamp_fingerprint",
      "mcp__proof100__timestamp_text"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as proof100. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ZKStamp/proof100/verify?hash=ecd408976170c269fc3f17860a2be8e21757750f08bc1ba03af3e901fe35089e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash ecd408976170, from Nov 9, 2026, 16:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ZKStamp/proof100/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.ZKStamp/proof100
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.ZKStamp/proof100.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ZKStamp/proof100)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 27, 2026, 17:17 UTC.

ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server have?

3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. timestamp_fingerprint, timestamp_text and check_balance.

Does the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the ZKStamp Proof-100 MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 9, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.