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pkgxray MCP server

io.github.adamsjack711-ux/pkgxrayadamsjack711-uxstreamable-httpv1.2.2-registry.1Scanned

Pre-install security scans for npm packages, MCP servers, and AI agents with cited verdict evidence.

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the pkgxray MCP server can do

The pkgxray MCP server is published by the GitHub account adamsjack711-ux. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: audit_agent_extension_supply_chain and check_npm_package_metadata), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (check_npm_package_metadata).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.2.2-registry.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • audit_agent_extension_supply_chainStatically inspect up to 16 KiB across 16 supplied source files.2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...a verified package artifact. Never send credentials or private source without permission."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.sourceFiles.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.sourceFiles.description: "...source you are permitted to share, with credentials removed."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Statically inspect up to 16 KiB across 16 supplied source files. Does not download or execute packages. Results cover only the supplied evidence, not a verified package artifact. Never send credentials or private source without permission.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • check_npm_package_metadataCheck registry metadata and OSV advisories for one exact public npm version.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check registry metadata and OSV advisories for one exact public npm version. Does not inspect package source, verify provenance, install or execute code. An advisory-free result is still REVIEW, not installation approval.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 10, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.pkgxray.ca/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including audit_agent_extension_supply_chain (write), check_npm_package_metadata (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.2.2-registry.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http pkgxray https://mcp.pkgxray.ca/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http pkgxray https://mcp.pkgxray.ca/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__pkgxray__audit_agent_extension_supply_chain",
      "mcp__pkgxray__check_npm_package_metadata"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as pkgxray. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__pkgxray__check_npm_package_metadata untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.adamsjack711-ux/pkgxray/verify?hash=1d2ccdd6fa6046249a7bac499d7523813ece6f606d86b26f216b0ff9090ef9f1" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1d2ccdd6fa60, from Nov 10, 2026, 00:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.adamsjack711-ux/pkgxray/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.adamsjack711-ux/pkgxray
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.adamsjack711-ux/pkgxray.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.adamsjack711-ux/pkgxray)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 00:17 UTC.

pkgxray MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the pkgxray MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the pkgxray MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the pkgxray MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the pkgxray MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. audit_agent_extension_supply_chain and check_npm_package_metadata.

Does the pkgxray MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the pkgxray MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the pkgxray MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 10, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.