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yieldhunter MCP server

io.github.agentsherpa/yieldhunteragentsherpastreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Risk-adjusted stablecoin yield ranks for other agents. Research only. Never holds keys or executes.

6 tools: 2 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the yieldhunter MCP server can do

The yieldhunter MCP server is published by the GitHub account agentsherpa. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: health and score_opportunity), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

5 tools bring in text other people can write (list_yields, score_opportunity, compare_opportunities and 2 more).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • healthLiveness and capability check for yieldhunter (yieldhunter.eth).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Liveness and capability check for yieldhunter (yieldhunter.eth). Returns service status, schemaVersion, scoringVersion, feature flags, and the list of available tools. Use this first to verify connectivity. If yields+pegs vintage is missing or at/over YH_STALE_DEGRADE_SECONDS (default 2h), health may refresh DefiLlama market caches once (same adapters as list_yields; not a list_yields tool call). Kill switch on: health still answers, refresh skipped. Research estimates only — non-custodial; never holds keys or executes transactions. Copy-paste path starts here, then list_yields. Example input: {}

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • score_opportunityCompute the full multi-factor risk-adjusted score for a single opportunity from list_yields.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compute the full multi-factor risk-adjusted score for a single opportunity from list_yields. Chain: pass list_yields opportunities[].id as poolId, opportunityId, or id (same DefiLlama pool UUID; id is the canonical list field). Returns APY breakdown (base/reward/total), factor scores with rationales, net yield after gas/bridge, exitRisk heuristic (TVL vs notional + liq conf only; medium ≠ small pool; not queues/caps/transfer whitelist/eligibility/on-chain withdraw; do not treat low as free exit when knownIssues mention transfer/eligibility), warnings, and sources. sourceChainKey is ethereum|base|arbitrum only — unknown keys (foo, solana) are VALIDATION_ERROR; no invented bridge fee. Research estimates only — non-custodial. Example (any one id field): { "id": "43641cf5-a92e-416b-bce9-27113d3c0db6", "horizonDays": 30, "notionalUsd": 10000 } Also accepts poolId or opportunityId with the same value.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • compare_opportunitiesSide-by-side comparison of 2–5 opportunities by risk-adjusted score.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "compare_opportunities" says "compare": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Side-by-side comparison of 2–5 opportunities by risk-adjusted score. Pass list_yields opportunities[].id values as poolIds or opportunityIds. Returns ranked list, compact comparison table fields (including protocolSlug for get_protocol_risk), winnerId, and rationale bullets (including when raw APY leader differs from risk-adjusted winner). sourceChainKey is ethereum|base|arbitrum only (unknown → VALIDATION_ERROR; no invented bridge fee). Research only — non-custodial. Example: { "poolIds": ["pool-id-a", "pool-id-b", "pool-id-c"], "horizonDays": 30 }

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • explain_scoreAgent-readable explanation of why an opportunity received its risk-adjusted score.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "explain_score" says "explain": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Agent-readable explanation of why an opportunity received its risk-adjusted score. Chain: pass list_yields opportunities[].id as poolId, opportunityId, or id (aliases for the same key). Returns a summary paragraph, factor bullets with weighted contributions, net-yield notes, an exitRisk heuristic line (liquidity-only — not on-chain withdraw or transfer/eligibility; medium often confidence-driven, not pool size; extra bullet when knownIssues note transfer restrictions), plus id and protocolSlug (same as list_yields; pass protocolSlug to get_protocol_risk). sourceChainKey is ethereum|base|arbitrum only (unknown → VALIDATION_ERROR; no invented bridge fee). Prefer this when you need to justify a ranking to a human or another agent. Research only — non-custodial. Example: { "opportunityId": "43641cf5-a92e-416b-bce9-27113d3c0db6", "horizonDays": 30 } Also accepts poolId or id with the same value.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_protocol_riskProtocol-level risk card (age, audit signals, curated known issues, category, score 0–100).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_protocol_risk" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "issue": it reads issues, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Protocol-level risk card (age, audit signals, curated known issues, category, score 0–100). Chain: pass list_yields opportunities[].protocolSlug as protocol or protocolSlug. Display names also resolve case- and space-insensitively via DefiLlama protocol metadata (e.g. "Compound V3" → compound-v3, "Curve" → curve-dex, "Euler V2" → euler-v2). Unknown names return NOT_FOUND naming the field, with example {"protocolSlug":"aave-v3"} and up to 3 closest slugs. Higher score = lower protocol risk. Uses curated priors plus DefiLlama metadata when available. Research only — non-custodial. Example: { "protocol": "aave-v3" } Also accepts protocolSlug or a display name such as "Compound V3".

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_yieldsRank stablecoin yield opportunities on Ethereum, Base, and Arbitrum using multi-factor **risk-adjusted** scoring (not raw APY).Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_yields" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 3,682 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...With factor breakdown: { "assets": ["USDC"], "limit": 5, "includeFactors": true }"

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Rank stablecoin yield opportunities on Ethereum, Base, and Arbitrum using multi-factor **risk-adjusted** scoring (not raw APY). chains/chainIds: those three only (aliases eth/ETH/Ethereum, arb/ARB, BASE) — any unsupported or blank value (solana, optimism, "") is VALIDATION_ERROR, not a silent default-universe fallback. sourceChainKey: same keys/aliases; blank or unknown keys are VALIDATION_ERROR (bridge cost is not estimated). Default ranking is risk-adjusted score, not highest APY. For headline yield order, use sortBy=net_apy. Default is risk-adjusted ranking with balanced weights. Optional params are policy controls for visiting agents. Default when omitted: sortBy=risk_adjusted, sortOrder=desc, riskAppetite=balanced (v1.1 weights), no minScore, no category filter, diversity=soft (max 2 markets per protocol in presented top-k). Primary composite key: compositeRiskAdjusted (protocol risk, depeg/counterparty, liquidity, yield quality base vs incentive, net yield after gas/bridge). Opportunities may include stability signals: apyChange24h is pool-level DefiLlama apyPct1D when present as a number (including 0 = observed flat change); null/missing means unknown/not provided for that pool (e.g. some Pendle markets) — not the same as 0, never invent 0; tvlChange24hPct is protocol-level DefiLlama change_1d (shared across markets of the same protocol — not this pool's TVL flow; missing stays null); large APY jumps warn only. Also exitRisk/exitRiskReason (size-vs-pool liquidity heuristic only: pool TVL vs notionalUsd + liquidity confidence — not on-chain withdraw, not queue/cap/pause/lockup, not transfer whitelist/eligibility/redemption, not an execution gate; unknown ≠ safe; medium often means liquidity confidence medium, not “small pool”; low is strict; when knownIssues mention transfer/eligibility do not treat low as free exit; soft warnings on high/unknown, plus low/medium if those issues are present; does not change default risk-adjusted ranking). Optional policy knobs: sortBy (risk_adjusted|net_apy|gross_apy|tvl), sortOrder, riskAppetite (conservative|balanced|aggressive), minScore (0–100 after appetite; practical bands ~≥85 treasury default, ≥80 selective; 90 is rare/very strict — a few top L2 blue-chips may clear it), categories / excludeCategories (lending|rwa|other), diversity (soft|off — default top prefers protocol diversity; set off for every market from one protocol), includeFactors (boolean, default false — when true each opportunity has scores.factors compact map without a second tool call), maxRewardShare (0–1 optional incentive-share gate only — max reward/total; e.g. 0.3 treasury, 0.25 stricter; unknown share excluded when set; does not remove high base-only APY farms — pair with minScore/riskAppetite/excludeCategories for capital preservation). Prefer this when capital preservation and sustainable yield matter more than headline APY. Research only — never executes transactions or holds keys. Copy-paste path (after health {}): { "assets": ["USDC"], "sortBy": "risk_adjusted" } Then contrast #1 vs #2 (risk-adjusted winner vs next row — often higher rate / thinner liquidity / other chain). Do not contrast against the max-APY row in the ten. Examples: (a) Treasury/conservative: { "riskAppetite": "conservative", "minScore": 85, "excludeCategories": ["rwa"], "maxRewardShare": 0.3, "minTvlUsd": 10000000, "limit": 10 } (b) Default research (v1.1): { "assets": ["USDC"], "sortBy": "risk_adjusted" } (c) Yield-seeking: { "sortBy": "net_apy", "riskAppetite": "aggressive", "chains": ["base"], "assets": ["USDC"], "limit": 15 } (d) With factor breakdown: { "assets": ["USDC"], "limit": 5, "includeFactors": true }

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:01 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://yieldhunter-agent-production.up.railway.app/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including health (write), score_opportunity (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info
  • The description is 3,682 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...With factor breakdown: { "assets": ["USDC"], "limit": 5, "includeFactors": true }"

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http yieldhunter https://yieldhunter-agent-production.up.railway.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http yieldhunter https://yieldhunter-agent-production.up.railway.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__yieldhunter__list_yields",
      "mcp__yieldhunter__compare_opportunities",
      "mcp__yieldhunter__explain_score",
      "mcp__yieldhunter__get_protocol_risk"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__yieldhunter__health",
      "mcp__yieldhunter__score_opportunity"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as yieldhunter. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__yieldhunter__list_yields untrusted-input
  • mcp__yieldhunter__score_opportunity untrusted-input
  • mcp__yieldhunter__compare_opportunities untrusted-input
  • mcp__yieldhunter__explain_score untrusted-input
  • mcp__yieldhunter__get_protocol_risk untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.agentsherpa/yieldhunter/verify?hash=72ebc466718ddbda464efadab5efe7b46753ab69b4504cb071a14e4a5d0b92d6" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 72ebc466718d, from Nov 16, 2026, 08:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.agentsherpa/yieldhunter/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.agentsherpa/yieldhunter
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.agentsherpa/yieldhunter.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.agentsherpa/yieldhunter)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:22 UTC.

yieldhunter MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the yieldhunter MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the yieldhunter MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the yieldhunter MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the yieldhunter MCP server have?

6 tools: 2 write, 4 read. health, score_opportunity, list_yields, compare_opportunities, explain_score and get_protocol_risk.

Does the yieldhunter MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the yieldhunter MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the yieldhunter MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 2, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.