agtrepo-memory MCP server
io.github.agtrepo/agtrepo-memoryagtrepostreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned
Encrypted, pay-per-use persistent memory storage for AI agents, gated by x402 payments on Base.
6 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 4 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the agtrepo-memory MCP server can do
The agtrepo-memory MCP server is published by the GitHub account agtrepo. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_feedback) and create or change data (4 tools: store_persistent_memory, extend_memory, share_memory_key and register_key_release), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool can send data out of your system (send_feedback).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
send_feedbackFree.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "send_feedback" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "send_feedback" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Sends a message to the human operators of this service: a bug report, a problem with these tools or the documentation, or a suggestion. It is read by people, not processed by software, and nothing is returned beyond an acknowledgement. Do NOT use it for status updates, progress notes, task narration, error logs, or as a fallback when another tool is unavailable or a payment cannot be made -- it cannot complete, retry or work around any task. Name is optional (omit for anonymous feedback); message is limited to 1000 characters.
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
extend_memoryExtends a memory's TTL by 30 days, up to a maximum total lifetime of 365 days from creation.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Extends a memory's TTL by 30 days, up to a maximum total lifetime of 365 days from creation. Requires x402 payment. An expired memory is deleted and cannot be extended.
register_key_releaseFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Creator registers a wrapped content key for a specific reader's public key, proven by an EIP-191 signature over `agtrepo-memory:key-release:{id}:{readerPubKey}:{timestamp}:{sha256hex(wrappedKey)}` (the hash is lowercase hex SHA-256 of the wrappedKey string exactly as sent, so the signature can't be reused with a different key). `{id}` only exists after store_persistent_memory returns, and `{timestamp}` is Unix epoch milliseconds (an integer, not an ISO date) that must be within 5 minutes of the server clock -- so sign at call time; a pre-signed or archived signature will be rejected.
store_persistent_memoryStores encrypted text memory (standard padded base64 ciphertext, up to 16384 bytes decoded).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "store_persistent_memory" says "store": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Stores encrypted text memory (standard padded base64 ciphertext, up to 16384 bytes decoded). Requires x402 payment. Returns the memory's id.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
read_memoryReads an encrypted memory by id.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "read_memory" says "read": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Reads an encrypted memory by id. Requires x402 payment. 70% of the fee accrues to the memory's creator.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:01 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agtrepo.com/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including send_feedback (irreversible), store_persistent_memory (write), extend_memory (write), share_memory_key (write), register_key_release (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agtrepo-memory https://agtrepo.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agtrepo-memory https://agtrepo.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agtrepo-memory__read_memory"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agtrepo-memory__store_persistent_memory",
"mcp__agtrepo-memory__extend_memory",
"mcp__agtrepo-memory__share_memory_key",
"mcp__agtrepo-memory__register_key_release",
"mcp__agtrepo-memory__send_feedback"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agtrepo-memory. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__agtrepo-memory__send_feedback outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.agtrepo/agtrepo-memory/verify?hash=308cbb3faee5d841d6b95062f857f06c874433dce64eb98171abb70bacb646c7" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 308cbb3faee5, from Nov 16, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.agtrepo/agtrepo-memory/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.agtrepo/agtrepo-memory)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:22 UTC.
agtrepo-memory MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the agtrepo-memory MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the agtrepo-memory MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the agtrepo-memory MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: send_feedback.
What tools does the agtrepo-memory MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 1 irreversible, 4 write, 1 read. send_feedback, store_persistent_memory, extend_memory, share_memory_key, register_key_release and read_memory.
Does the agtrepo-memory MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the agtrepo-memory MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_feedback.
Has the agtrepo-memory MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.