Skip to content

Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server

io.github.aiguardrail/backendaiguardrailstreamable-httpv1.0.5Scanned

Deterministic pre-trade risk checks for AI agents on Robinhood Chain. Returns allow/warn/deny.

6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 5 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 3 findings

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

5 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server can do

The Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server is published by the GitHub account aiguardrail. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: evaluate_trade, evaluate_trade_paid, check_token_safety, simulate_balance and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_token_safety and get_supported_assets).

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Last scanned Nov 3, 2026, version 1.0.5.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • check_token_safetyHoneypot / contract safety check for any ERC-20 token.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Honeypot / contract safety check for any ERC-20 token. Returns a severity classification (safe / warn / danger), the specific risk factors detected, and the result of a simulated sell. When severity=danger, the next `evaluate_trade` for the same contract is automatically denied regardless of any other checks. This is a heuristic bytecode + simulation check, not a formal audit. Use it before trading unknown tokens, memecoins, or any contract that is absent from the official Robinhood Chain registry. It is safe to call repeatedly; no transaction is ever sent.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check Token Safety
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • evaluate_tradePre-trade risk check for a proposed trade.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "evaluate_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "evaluate_trade" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Pre-trade risk check for a proposed trade. Call this BEFORE executing any trade and treat a "deny" decision as a hard stop. Evaluated at a fixed Tier 1 ceiling ($5,000 notional). For higher limits, use `evaluate_trade_paid` (Tier 2, $25,000) which settles an x402 payment on-chain.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Evaluate Trade (Free)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • evaluate_trade_paidPre-trade risk check gated by an x402 payment.2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "evaluate_trade_paid" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...required — the on-chain payment is the credential. FLOW ---- 1. Call WITHOUT payment_pro..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "evaluate_trade_paid" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_trade_paid" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Pre-trade risk check gated by an x402 payment. Evaluated as COLR Tier 2: $25,000 notional ceiling, 10/25 per-minute rate limits. No COLR holdings are required — the on-chain payment is the credential. FLOW ---- 1. Call WITHOUT payment_proof → the tool returns a `PaymentRequiredOutput` describing the on-chain payment (network, asset, amount, payTo, resource). 2. Settle the payment on-chain using an x402-capable client. The facilitator returns a proof string. 3. Call again with `payment_proof=<proof>` → the tool forwards the proof to the guardrail's x402-paid endpoint and returns a full `EvaluateTradeOutput` with `tier=2`.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Evaluate Trade (x402 Paid, Tier 2)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • simulate_balanceSimulate a wallet's ERC-20 balance after a hypothetical trade using eth_call state override.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Simulate a wallet's ERC-20 balance after a hypothetical trade using eth_call state override. Read-only: no transaction is ever sent.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Simulate Balance
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • verify_audit_trailVerify the tamper-evident audit trail for a wallet's past guardrail decisions.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify the tamper-evident audit trail for a wallet's past guardrail decisions.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify Audit Trail
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_supported_assetsList every asset in the guardrail's official Robinhood Chain registry, with its canonical contract address.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_supported_assets" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List every asset in the guardrail's official Robinhood Chain registry, with its canonical contract address.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Supported Assets
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:01 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
no
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
not observed
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: api.collarguardrail.com does not resolve.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 503 to none
  2. Nov 6, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 503
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn1 info
  • The server marks "evaluate_trade" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_trade" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "evaluate_trade_paid" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "evaluate_trade_paid" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...required — the on-chain payment is the credential. FLOW ---- 1. Call WITHOUT payment_pro..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 503 -> none.View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 503 to none
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 503; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 503
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.5. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http backend https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http backend https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__backend__get_supported_assets"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__backend__evaluate_trade",
      "mcp__backend__evaluate_trade_paid",
      "mcp__backend__check_token_safety",
      "mcp__backend__simulate_balance",
      "mcp__backend__verify_audit_trail"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as backend. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__backend__check_token_safety untrusted-input
  • mcp__backend__get_supported_assets untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.aiguardrail/backend/verify?hash=c75648214ac9ba2b4ed6091be7bfb9ccf89711ed582596b3e88cf39d7ce860b2" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c75648214ac9, from Nov 3, 2026, 00:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.aiguardrail/backend/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.aiguardrail/backend
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.aiguardrail/backend.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.aiguardrail/backend)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:22 UTC.

Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server have?

6 tools: 5 write, 1 read. evaluate_trade, evaluate_trade_paid, check_token_safety, simulate_balance, verify_audit_trail and get_supported_assets.

Does the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 3, 2026.