RugShield 402 MCP server
io.github.ak10082247-max/rugshield-402ak10082247-maxstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Real-time token contract safety scanner and honeypot auditor via x402 on Base.
14 tools: 9 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 14
- Can send data out · 0
- 3 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
9 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the RugShield 402 MCP server can do
The RugShield 402 MCP server is published by the GitHub account ak10082247-max. It has 14 tools. It can create or change data (9 tools: check_honeypot, rugshield_pre_swap_scan, rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verify, rugshield_audit_swap_simulation_proof and 5 more), but cannot delete data. 5 tools only read.
14 tools bring in text other people can write (analyze_liquidity, check_honeypot, rugshield_pre_swap_scan and 11 more).
The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
14 tools
Changes things 9Claude Code: ask
check_honeypotInstant honeypot verification and transfer fee detection for autonomous AI trading agents.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Instant honeypot verification and transfer fee detection for autonomous AI trading agents. Cost: 0.010 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_audit_cross_chain_bridge_riskAudits canonical Base bridge and CCIP/LayerZero endpoints for message replay vulnerabilities, unbacked wrapped collateral, and admin multisig latency.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Audits canonical Base bridge and CCIP/LayerZero endpoints for message replay vulnerabilities, unbacked wrapped collateral, and admin multisig latency. Cost: 0.050 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verifyVerifies LP token ownership across Uncx, Team.Finance, and Aerodrome slipstream pools to prove liquidity cannot be pulled.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verify" says "lock": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verify" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verify" says "lock": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Verifies LP token ownership across Uncx, Team.Finance, and Aerodrome slipstream pools to prove liquidity cannot be pulled. Cost: 0.050 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_audit_swap_simulation_proofExecutes state-override simulation of $1k, $10k, and $50k swap orders on Base Mainnet, calculating exact slippage, gas overhead, and MEV frontrun exposure.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "execute": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "rugshield_audit_swap_simulation_proof" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "execute": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Executes state-override simulation of $1k, $10k, and $50k swap orders on Base Mainnet, calculating exact slippage, gas overhead, and MEV frontrun exposure. Cost: 0.100 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_pre_swap_scanSimulates buy/sell orders via state overrides to detect honeypots, compute exact transfer taxes in bps, and verify pool liquidity depth.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Simulates buy/sell orders via state overrides to detect honeypots, compute exact transfer taxes in bps, and verify pool liquidity depth. Cost: 0.010 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_profiler_address_current_balanceProfiles any Solana or Base wallet address for current token balances, USD valuation, historical win-rate, and drainer/OFAC taint.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Profiles any Solana or Base wallet address for current token balances, USD valuation, historical win-rate, and drainer/OFAC taint. Cost: 0.010 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_risk_institutional_token_reportGenerates an end-to-end cryptographic audit report covering bytecode decompilation, honeypot tax simulation, LP lock proofs, holder clusters, and bridge risk.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "rugshield_risk_institutional_token_report" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generates an end-to-end cryptographic audit report covering bytecode decompilation, honeypot tax simulation, LP lock proofs, holder clusters, and bridge risk. Cost: 0.150 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_smart_money_netflowTracks institutional and high-win-rate whale wallet net inflows and outflows across Solana SPL and Base ERC-20 tokens.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Tracks institutional and high-win-rate whale wallet net inflows and outflows across Solana SPL and Base ERC-20 tokens. Cost: 0.010 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_token_screenerScreens trending Solana (Pump.fun/Raydium) and Base (Aerodrome/Uniswap V3) tokens with pre-verified honeypot, tax, and liquidity depth metrics.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Screens trending Solana (Pump.fun/Raydium) and Base (Aerodrome/Uniswap V3) tokens with pre-verified honeypot, tax, and liquidity depth metrics. Cost: 0.010 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
analyze_liquidityVerifies DEX LP token locking, vesting schedules, pool liquidity depth, and unwrap risks across Aerodrome and Uniswap.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "analyze_liquidity" says "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Verifies DEX LP token locking, vesting schedules, pool liquidity depth, and unwrap risks across Aerodrome and Uniswap. Cost: 0.020 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_audit_holder_cluster_mapAnalyzes on-chain funding origins for the top 50 token holders to detect sybil clusters, dev dump risks, and wash-trading rings.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyzes on-chain funding origins for the top 50 token holders to detect sybil clusters, dev dump risks, and wash-trading rings. Cost: 0.050 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_smart_money_dex_tradesReturns real-time DEX trades executed by labeled smart-money and whale wallets on Solana and Base with pre-trade honeypot verification.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns real-time DEX trades executed by labeled smart-money and whale wallets on Solana and Base with pre-trade honeypot verification. Cost: 0.010 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_tgm_holdersReturns top-10/top-50 holder distribution, LP lock percentage, and coordinated sybil cluster detection for any Solana or Base token.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns top-10/top-50 holder distribution, LP lock percentage, and coordinated sybil cluster detection for any Solana or Base token. Cost: 0.010 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
rugshield_tgm_who_bought_soldAnalyzes who bought and sold a specific Solana or Base token over the last 24h, segmented by Smart Money, Whales, Fresh Wallets, and Dev Clusters.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyzes who bought and sold a specific Solana or Base token over the last 24h, segmented by Smart Money, Whales, Fresh Wallets, and Dev Clusters. Cost: 0.010 USDC on Base & Solana Mainnet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write14
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- analyze_liquidity
- check_honeypot
- rugshield_audit_cross_chain_bridge_risk
- rugshield_audit_holder_cluster_map
- rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verify
- rugshield_audit_swap_simulation_proof
- rugshield_pre_swap_scan
- rugshield_profiler_address_current_balance
- rugshield_risk_institutional_token_report
- rugshield_smart_money_dex_trades
- rugshield_smart_money_netflow
- rugshield_tgm_holders
- and 2 more
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:01 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 9
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://rugshield-402.onrender.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (9 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://rugshield-402.onrender.com/mcp: tools/list returned 14 tools to an anonymous client, including check_honeypot (write), rugshield_pre_swap_scan (write), rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verify (write), rugshield_audit_swap_simulation_proof (write), rugshield_audit_cross_chain_bridge_risk (write) and 4 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verify" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verify" says "lock": a word for a change.
The server marks "rugshield_audit_swap_simulation_proof" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "execute": a word for a change.
The server marks "rugshield_risk_institutional_token_report" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
- Changed:rugshield_audit_cross_chain_bridge_riskChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:rugshield_audit_holder_cluster_mapOnly readsdescription
- Changed:rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verifyChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:rugshield_audit_swap_simulation_proofChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:rugshield_risk_institutional_token_reportChanges thingsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http rugshield-402 https://rugshield-402.onrender.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http rugshield-402 https://rugshield-402.onrender.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__rugshield-402__analyze_liquidity",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_audit_holder_cluster_map",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_smart_money_dex_trades",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_tgm_who_bought_sold",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_tgm_holders"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__rugshield-402__check_honeypot",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_pre_swap_scan",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verify",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_audit_swap_simulation_proof",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_audit_cross_chain_bridge_risk",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_risk_institutional_token_report",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_token_screener",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_smart_money_netflow",
"mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_profiler_address_current_balance"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as rugshield-402. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 14 rules
- mcp__rugshield-402__analyze_liquidity untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__check_honeypot untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_pre_swap_scan untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verify untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_audit_holder_cluster_map untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_audit_swap_simulation_proof untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_audit_cross_chain_bridge_risk untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_risk_institutional_token_report untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_token_screener untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_smart_money_netflow untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_smart_money_dex_trades untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_tgm_who_bought_sold untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_tgm_holders untrusted-input
- mcp__rugshield-402__rugshield_profiler_address_current_balance untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ak10082247-max/rugshield-402/verify?hash=6f20ecf1513509c2ee2d9e47d39a537f59630565ae9502f10d752fe9aadefdda" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 6f20ecf15135, from Nov 16, 2026, 09:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ak10082247-max/rugshield-402/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ak10082247-max/rugshield-402)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:22 UTC.
RugShield 402 MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the RugShield 402 MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 14 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the RugShield 402 MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the RugShield 402 MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the RugShield 402 MCP server have?
- 14 tools: 9 write, 5 read. check_honeypot, rugshield_pre_swap_scan, rugshield_audit_liquidity_lock_verify, rugshield_audit_swap_simulation_proof, rugshield_audit_cross_chain_bridge_risk, rugshield_risk_institutional_token_report, rugshield_token_screener, rugshield_smart_money_netflow and 6 more.
Does the RugShield 402 MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the RugShield 402 MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the RugShield 402 MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 16, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.