Skip to content

RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server

io.github.allooloo/rco-recordsallooloostreamable-httpv2.6.6Scanned

The record of what the agent relied on: a signed, chained receipt per cleared read. Verify by id.

5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server can do

The RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server is published by the GitHub account allooloo. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: write_receipt, get_statement and issue_auditor_key), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_statement); 1 tool can send data out of your system (get_statement).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 2.6.6.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • get_statementA signed statement of your slice for a month (month: YYYY-MM) or a date range (from, to: YYYY-MM-DD, to exclusive): count, first and last seq, slice digest, the chain tip at issue,…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_statement" says "get": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "issue": it reads issues, which other people can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "get_statement" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_statement" says "get": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    A signed statement of your slice for a month (month: YYYY-MM) or a date range (from, to: YYYY-MM-DD, to exclusive): count, first and last seq, slice digest, the chain tip at issue, Ed25519 signature by Allooloo. Authorization: Bearer <customer key>.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • issue_auditor_keyIssue a read-only sub-key on your own slice for your auditor (list_receipts and get_statement only).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Issue a read-only sub-key on your own slice for your auditor (list_receipts and get_statement only). Authorization: Bearer <customer key>. The key value is returned once.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • write_receiptWrite one v1 receipt for a read a gate has cleared.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "write_receipt" says "write": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Write one v1 receipt for a read a gate has cleared. Authenticated: Authorization: Bearer <writer token>. Idempotent on (writer, subject, subject_type, market, rule_version, cleared_at, answer_hash). Returns the receipt.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • list_receiptsYour own receipts only — the rows whose caller is your customer key — by seq range (from_seq, to_seq, after_seq) or date range (from, to: YYYY-MM-DD, to inclusive), limit ≤ 500.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_receipts" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Your own receipts only — the rows whose caller is your customer key — by seq range (from_seq, to_seq, after_seq) or date range (from, to: YYYY-MM-DD, to inclusive), limit ≤ 500. Authorization: Bearer <customer key>. Refuses without a key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • verify_receiptReturn one receipt by id (rco:… for v1, dec_… for v0) with the verification result (hash, id, signature) and the public key (JWK) that checks it.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return one receipt by id (rco:… for v1, dec_… for v0) with the verification result (hash, id, signature) and the public key (JWK) that checks it. Public.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 30, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.rco-records.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including write_receipt (write), get_statement (write), issue_auditor_key (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "get_statement" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_statement" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 2.6.6. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http rco-records https://mcp.rco-records.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http rco-records https://mcp.rco-records.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__rco-records__verify_receipt",
      "mcp__rco-records__list_receipts"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__rco-records__write_receipt",
      "mcp__rco-records__get_statement",
      "mcp__rco-records__issue_auditor_key"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as rco-records. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__rco-records__get_statement untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.allooloo/rco-records/verify?hash=991019c0ef6277a003de5666763a5a07733f21e8f8874a48aabab1a8b6e18525" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 991019c0ef62, from Nov 13, 2026, 02:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.allooloo/rco-records/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.allooloo/rco-records
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.allooloo/rco-records.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.allooloo/rco-records)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 02:17 UTC.

RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server have?

5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. write_receipt, get_statement, issue_auditor_key, verify_receipt and list_receipts.

Does the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_statement.

Has the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.