RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server
io.github.allooloo/rco-recordsallooloostreamable-httpv2.6.6Scanned
The record of what the agent relied on: a signed, chained receipt per cleared read. Verify by id.
5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server can do
The RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server is published by the GitHub account allooloo. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: write_receipt, get_statement and issue_auditor_key), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_statement); 1 tool can send data out of your system (get_statement).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 2.6.6.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
get_statementA signed statement of your slice for a month (month: YYYY-MM) or a date range (from, to: YYYY-MM-DD, to exclusive): count, first and last seq, slice digest, the chain tip at issue,…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_statement" says "get": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "issue": it reads issues, which other people can write.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "get_statement" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_statement" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it A signed statement of your slice for a month (month: YYYY-MM) or a date range (from, to: YYYY-MM-DD, to exclusive): count, first and last seq, slice digest, the chain tip at issue, Ed25519 signature by Allooloo. Authorization: Bearer <customer key>.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
issue_auditor_keyIssue a read-only sub-key on your own slice for your auditor (list_receipts and get_statement only).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Issue a read-only sub-key on your own slice for your auditor (list_receipts and get_statement only). Authorization: Bearer <customer key>. The key value is returned once.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
write_receiptWrite one v1 receipt for a read a gate has cleared.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "write_receipt" says "write": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Write one v1 receipt for a read a gate has cleared. Authenticated: Authorization: Bearer <writer token>. Idempotent on (writer, subject, subject_type, market, rule_version, cleared_at, answer_hash). Returns the receipt.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
list_receiptsYour own receipts only — the rows whose caller is your customer key — by seq range (from_seq, to_seq, after_seq) or date range (from, to: YYYY-MM-DD, to inclusive), limit ≤ 500.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_receipts" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Your own receipts only — the rows whose caller is your customer key — by seq range (from_seq, to_seq, after_seq) or date range (from, to: YYYY-MM-DD, to inclusive), limit ≤ 500. Authorization: Bearer <customer key>. Refuses without a key.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
verify_receiptReturn one receipt by id (rco:… for v1, dec_… for v0) with the verification result (hash, id, signature) and the public key (JWK) that checks it.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Return one receipt by id (rco:… for v1, dec_… for v0) with the verification result (hash, id, signature) and the public key (JWK) that checks it. Public.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 30, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.rco-records.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including write_receipt (write), get_statement (write), issue_auditor_key (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnget_statement
The server marks "get_statement" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_statement" says "get": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:write_receiptChanges thingsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 2.6.6. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http rco-records https://mcp.rco-records.ai/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http rco-records https://mcp.rco-records.ai/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__rco-records__verify_receipt",
"mcp__rco-records__list_receipts"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__rco-records__write_receipt",
"mcp__rco-records__get_statement",
"mcp__rco-records__issue_auditor_key"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as rco-records. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__rco-records__get_statement untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.allooloo/rco-records/verify?hash=991019c0ef6277a003de5666763a5a07733f21e8f8874a48aabab1a8b6e18525" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 991019c0ef62, from Nov 13, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.allooloo/rco-records/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.allooloo/rco-records)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 02:17 UTC.
RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. write_receipt, get_statement, issue_auditor_key, verify_receipt and list_receipts.
Does the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_statement.
Has the RCO Records - Record of Cleared Orders MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.