data-breach-detector MCP server
io.github.beepboop2025/data-breach-detectorbeepboop2025streamable-httpv0.3.2Scanned
Read-only breach intel, full history 2007-today: reports THAT an org was breached, never the data.
7 tools: 4 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 6
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the data-breach-detector MCP server can do
The data-breach-detector MCP server is published by the GitHub account beepboop2025. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: check_exposure, breach_timeline, breach_stats and assess_threat), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
6 tools bring in text other people can write (breach_news, check_exposure, breach_history and 3 more).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.3.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
assess_threatClassify a piece of security text you supply — an advisory, alert or forum post — into a threat level, matched categories, financial-target flags, a confidence score and a recommen…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Classify a piece of security text you supply — an advisory, alert or forum post — into a threat level, matched categories, financial-target flags, a confidence score and a recommended action. Pure local analysis: it collects nothing, stores nothing and reaches no network; the text never leaves the server. Use it to triage findings surfaced by breach_news or from your own monitoring.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Threat-text triage
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
breach_statsAggregate the full breach archive into analyst-grade statistics: incidents and accounts exposed per year, per source, per exposed data type, per threat level, or per ransomware act…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Aggregate the full breach archive into analyst-grade statistics: incidents and accounts exposed per year, per source, per exposed data type, per threat level, or per ransomware actor — plus the five largest incidents ever recorded. Use it to answer 'how has breach volume trended since 2015', 'which ransomware groups have the most victims' or 'how often are passwords part of a breach'. Aggregate counts only; no leaked records.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Breach archive statistics
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
breach_timelineBuild the incident-by-incident CHRONOLOGY of one organization across every source and all history, with judgment on top: first and latest incident, incidents per year, whether the …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Build the incident-by-incident CHRONOLOGY of one organization across every source and all history, with judgment on top: first and latest incident, incidents per year, whether the organization is a repeat victim, worst threat level and total accounts ever exposed. Those summary fields cover EVERY incident on record. The timeline list carries a window of them, oldest first within the window, defaulting to the most recent limit incidents and paging backwards with offset, so an organization with a long history shows its current state first rather than only its ancient one. Repeat victimhood is a forward-looking risk signal: organizations named more than once have demonstrably not closed the gap. Metadata only; never the leaked data. For a yes/no presence check use check_exposure.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Entity breach timeline
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
check_exposureAnswer whether a domain, company or brand appears in public breach or ransomware DISCLOSURES across ALL history (2007 → today): yes/no with mention count, worst threat level, total…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Answer whether a domain, company or brand appears in public breach or ransomware DISCLOSURES across ALL history (2007 → today): yes/no with mention count, worst threat level, total accounts exposed across matches, the exposed data TYPES, and the matching disclosure metadata — never the exposed records themselves. This is a triage signal built from disclosure feeds, not proof of compromise; confirm through authorized channels before acting. For the incident-by-incident chronology of one entity, use breach_timeline; for a recent-news sweep, use breach_news. mentions, the aggregates and the data types always cover every match; matches carries one page of them, sized by limit and walked with offset.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Entity exposure check
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
breach_historySearch the FULL historical breach archive — every incident this server knows about, back to 2007: HaveIBeenPwned's verified breach directory, the 2020-2025 ransomwatch leak-site ar…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the FULL historical breach archive — every incident this server knows about, back to 2007: HaveIBeenPwned's verified breach directory, the 2020-2025 ransomwatch leak-site archive (~16k victims), the RansomLook live tracker and SEC 8-K Item 1.05 filings. Filter by keyword, year range, sector, exposed data type or minimum scale; order by date or size. Returns disclosure metadata only, never breach contents. Use this for questions like 'what were the biggest breaches of 2013' or 'which airlines have ever been hit by ransomware'.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Historical breach search
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
breach_newsRead recent breach and ransomware DISCLOSURES from public threat-intel feeds (HaveIBeenPwned, the RansomLook live leak-site tracker and SEC 8-K Item 1.05 filings), newest first.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...a, and a redaction pass strips anything credential-shaped before it is returned. Use s..."
Description, as the server wrote it Read recent breach and ransomware DISCLOSURES from public threat-intel feeds (HaveIBeenPwned, the RansomLook live leak-site tracker and SEC 8-K Item 1.05 filings), newest first. Every row is metadata only — entity, date, scale, exposed data TYPES, threat level and source — never the leaked data, and a redaction pass strips anything credential-shaped before it is returned. Use sector to narrow to an industry keyword; for one specific organization use check_exposure; for all-time history use breach_history.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Recent breach disclosures
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
feed_sourcesList the public disclosure feeds this server aggregates, how many disclosures are cached per source, each source's newest item and an honest staleness flag, plus cache ages.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...arbitrary fetching or crawling, no credential or PII output. Check this first if anot..."
Description, as the server wrote it List the public disclosure feeds this server aggregates, how many disclosures are cached per source, each source's newest item and an honest staleness flag, plus cache ages. Takes no arguments. Also states the scope plainly: public feeds only — no .onion access, no arbitrary fetching or crawling, no credential or PII output. Check this first if another tool's answer looks thin: a stale live feed is a finding, not background noise.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Feed sources & health
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write6
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:02 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://breach.seiche.info/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including check_exposure (write), breach_timeline (write), breach_stats (write), assess_threat (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infobreach_news
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...a, and a redaction pass strips anything credential-shaped before it is returned. Use s..."
- Infofeed_sources
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...arbitrary fetching or crawling, no credential or PII output. Check this first if anot..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http data-breach-detector https://breach.seiche.info/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http data-breach-detector https://breach.seiche.info/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__data-breach-detector__breach_news",
"mcp__data-breach-detector__breach_history",
"mcp__data-breach-detector__feed_sources"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__data-breach-detector__check_exposure",
"mcp__data-breach-detector__breach_timeline",
"mcp__data-breach-detector__breach_stats",
"mcp__data-breach-detector__assess_threat"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as data-breach-detector. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__data-breach-detector__breach_news untrusted-input
- mcp__data-breach-detector__check_exposure untrusted-input
- mcp__data-breach-detector__breach_history untrusted-input
- mcp__data-breach-detector__breach_timeline untrusted-input
- mcp__data-breach-detector__breach_stats untrusted-input
- mcp__data-breach-detector__feed_sources untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.beepboop2025/data-breach-detector/verify?hash=a78607c07e01f8a0ee9ab1044e785282c90aafcbcd2c2ed431c2bb5fe78395fa" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a78607c07e01, from Nov 16, 2026, 11:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.beepboop2025/data-breach-detector/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.beepboop2025/data-breach-detector)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:23 UTC.
data-breach-detector MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the data-breach-detector MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the data-breach-detector MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the data-breach-detector MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the data-breach-detector MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 4 write, 3 read. check_exposure, breach_timeline, breach_stats, assess_threat, breach_news, breach_history and feed_sources.
Does the data-breach-detector MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the data-breach-detector MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the data-breach-detector MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.