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Undertow market liquidity and exit-cost tools MCP server

io.github.beepboop2025/undertowbeepboop2025streamable-httpv1.14.0Scanned

Dated exit evidence, depth, tiers and gold cash scenarios. No executable quotes or trade authority.

17 tools: 16 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 16 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

16 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Undertow market liquidity and exit-cost tools MCP server can do

The Undertow market liquidity and exit-cost tools MCP server is published by the GitHub account beepboop2025. It has 17 tools. It can create or change data (16 tools: crypto_exit_check, crypto_funding_cost, crypto_portfolio_stress, depth_episodes and 12 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 3 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.14.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

17 tools

Changes things 16Claude Code: ask
  • crypto_exit_checkFour BTC sell sizes by rung/bracket.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Four BTC sell sizes by rung/bracket. Withholds stale/future, uncovered or unconverted venues. Fees excluded; no trade clearance.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Crypto exit sizes and freshness
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • crypto_funding_costInput perpetual funding/fees, net carry, linear break-even.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Input perpetual funding/fees, net carry, linear break-even. Constant-rate scenario, not forecast.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Perpetual funding and fees
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • crypto_portfolio_stressLinear input shocks, 20 exposures: P&L/equity, asset/venue concentration.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Linear input shocks, 20 exposures: P&L/equity, asset/venue concentration. Symbols label scenarios. No liquidation/probability model.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Stress a crypto portfolio
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • depth_episodesBTC depth-collapse onset/trough/recovery under preregistered rules.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    BTC depth-collapse onset/trough/recovery under preregistered rules. Zero differs from missing. Subscriber exit_desk_full: ETH.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Realized depth collapses
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • exit_atlasFirst-party stablecoin supply and depeg flags, exit doors, dollar curve, fees, exchange reserves.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    First-party stablecoin supply and depeg flags, exit doors, dollar curve, fees, exchange reserves. Gaps stay gaps. Research only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Exit Atlas: doors, supply, fees
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • exit_costBTC nearest-rung sell estimates; interpolated bid-depth bands.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    BTC nearest-rung sell estimates; interpolated bid-depth bands. Fees excluded; not executable. Sizes/freshness: crypto_exit_check.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Exit cost at your size, per venue
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • gold_cash_realisationGold sale/cash gates from inputs: decimal kg, fineness (0,1], USD/troy-oz bid, USD fees, currency/USD FX (USD=1), aware ISO clocks.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Gold sale/cash gates from inputs: decimal kg, fineness (0,1], USD/troy-oz bid, USD fees, currency/USD FX (USD=1), aware ISO clocks. Arithmetic and withheld-cash reasons only; no fetch, storage, execution or verified balance.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Gold sale, FX and cash scenario
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • latest_articleLatest published editorial: title/full text/URL/clock/quality receipt.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Latest published editorial: title/full text/URL/clock/quality receipt. No args or generated prose. Missing text/failed receipt errors. Board: liquidity_tiers.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Published editorial
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • liquidity_tiersNine segment tiers, Seiche funding, measure counts, replay/withholding reasons.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Nine segment tiers, Seiche funding, measure counts, replay/withholding reasons. PARTIAL: missing history/unpassed replay, never calm.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Full board: tiers + funding
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • market_corpus_contextCorpus coverage/rights/clocks.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Corpus coverage/rights/clocks. No summary pagination; other views: records/total/next_offset. Retrieval age is not observation freshness. Readings: liquidity_tiers.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Corpus coverage and source clocks
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • research_networkCross-product metadata, clocks, rights, next steps.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Cross-product metadata, clocks, rights, next steps. Follow next_offset. Unavailable: retrieval/contract/size failure. Local counts: market_corpus_context. No shared score or authority.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Connected research
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sealed_recordCalls sealed/signed before outcomes: hits/misses, decided counts, ledger root.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "sealed_record" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Calls sealed/signed before outcomes: hits/misses, decided counts, ledger root. Report hits and misses together.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Sealed calls record (misses kept)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • trade_safety_exit_contextExact-rung BTC/USD observe/paper: request hash, PIT source/rights, level-free peg, bid bands, approved venue clocks, startup SHA.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Exact-rung BTC/USD observe/paper: request hash, PIT source/rights, level-free peg, bid bands, approved venue clocks, startup SHA. No live mode/clearance.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: PIT-bound exact-rung paper exit context
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • unwind_watchWatched-filer headlines: effective positions, days-to-exit brackets, blind spots.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Watched-filer headlines: effective positions, days-to-exit brackets, blind spots. No live execution model. Full grids: unwind_stress.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Can the watched books exit? (free)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • venue_concentrationBTC two-sided depth: HHI, effective/top venue, venue depth.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    BTC two-sided depth: HHI, effective/top venue, venue depth. Subscriber exit_desk_full: ETH and venue failure.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Depth concentration today
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • venue_price_reconciliationBTC/ETH consensus: depth/squared-half-spread weights, deepest-venue blindness, concentration, dislocations.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    BTC/ETH consensus: depth/squared-half-spread weights, deepest-venue blindness, concentration, dislocations. Experimental; no execution authority.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Consensus price when venues disagree
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • agent_access_statusIdentity, entitlement, daily usage, access instructions; missing/refused subscriber tools.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "agent_access_status" says "status": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Identity, entitlement, daily usage, access instructions; missing/refused subscriber tools.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Your access + meter
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:27 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
16
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 16 tools that change things (16 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.seiche.info/undertow/mcp: tools/list returned 17 tools to an anonymous client, including crypto_exit_check (write), crypto_funding_cost (write), crypto_portfolio_stress (write), depth_episodes (write), exit_atlas (write) and 11 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 15 to 16
  2. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 11 to 15

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "sealed_record" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 15 -> 16.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 15 to 16
  2. Tools1 added, 1 changed.+1 added~1 changedView diff
  3. Tools6 changed.~6 changedView diff
  4. Tools16 changed.~16 changedView diff
  5. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 11 -> 15.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 11 to 15

Install

Pinned to version 1.14.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http undertow https://api.seiche.info/undertow/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http undertow https://api.seiche.info/undertow/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__undertow__agent_access_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__undertow__crypto_exit_check",
      "mcp__undertow__crypto_funding_cost",
      "mcp__undertow__crypto_portfolio_stress",
      "mcp__undertow__depth_episodes",
      "mcp__undertow__exit_atlas",
      "mcp__undertow__exit_cost",
      "mcp__undertow__gold_cash_realisation",
      "mcp__undertow__latest_article",
      "mcp__undertow__liquidity_tiers",
      "mcp__undertow__market_corpus_context",
      "mcp__undertow__research_network",
      "mcp__undertow__sealed_record",
      "mcp__undertow__trade_safety_exit_context",
      "mcp__undertow__unwind_watch",
      "mcp__undertow__venue_concentration",
      "mcp__undertow__venue_price_reconciliation"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as undertow. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.beepboop2025/undertow/verify?hash=01fd1412570736239f9bd0b02cc40e99a0b1009f6781518a5ba30dd560190256" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 01fd14125707, from Nov 18, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.beepboop2025/undertow/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.beepboop2025/undertow
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.beepboop2025/undertow.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.beepboop2025/undertow)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 18, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

Undertow market liquidity and exit-cost tools MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Undertow market liquidity and exit-cost tools MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 17 tools, 16 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Undertow market liquidity and exit-cost tools MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Undertow market liquidity and exit-cost tools MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Undertow market liquidity and exit-cost tools MCP server have?

17 tools: 16 write, 1 read. crypto_exit_check, crypto_funding_cost, crypto_portfolio_stress, depth_episodes, exit_atlas, exit_cost, gold_cash_realisation, latest_article and 9 more.

Does the Undertow market liquidity and exit-cost tools MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Undertow market liquidity and exit-cost tools MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Undertow market liquidity and exit-cost tools MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 3 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.