Skip to content

Context Awesome MCP server

io.github.bh-rat/context-awesomebh-ratstreamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned

MCP server for accessing curated awesome list documentation

2 tools: 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Context Awesome MCP server can do

The Context Awesome MCP server is published by the GitHub account bh-rat. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

1 tool reads private data (get_awesome_items).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.1.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • find_awesome_sectionDiscovers sections/categories across awesome lists matching a search query and returns matching sections from awesome lists.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_awesome_section" says "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Discovers sections/categories across awesome lists matching a search query and returns matching sections from awesome lists. You MUST call this function before 'get_awesome_items' to discover available sections UNLESS the user explicitly provides a githubRepo or listId. Selection Process: 1. Analyze the query to understand what type of resources the user is looking for 2. Return the most relevant matches based on: - Name similarity to the query and the awesome lists section - Category/section relevance of the awesome lists - Number of items in the section - Confidence score Response Format: - Returns matching sections of the awesome lists with metadata - Includes repository information, item counts, and confidence score - Use the githubRepo or listId with relevant sections from results for get_awesome_items For ambiguous queries, multiple relevant sections will be returned for the user to choose from.
  • get_awesome_itemsRetrieves items from a specific awesome list or section with token limiting.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_awesome_items" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a repo (input.githubRepo), and the tool reads: it reads repositories.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieves items from a specific awesome list or section with token limiting. You must call 'find_awesome_section' first to discover available sections, UNLESS the user explicitly provides a githubRepo or listId.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:02 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http context-awesome https://www.context-awesome.com/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http context-awesome https://www.context-awesome.com/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__context-awesome__find_awesome_section",
      "mcp__context-awesome__get_awesome_items"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as context-awesome. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__context-awesome__get_awesome_items private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.bh-rat/context-awesome/verify?hash=4c9fa92c712e8dd64698a4f453d8d427c6fbf6e3bf9d7a66672f2ec967c79784" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4c9fa92c712e, from Nov 16, 2026, 12:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.bh-rat/context-awesome/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.bh-rat/context-awesome
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.bh-rat/context-awesome.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.bh-rat/context-awesome)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:23 UTC.

Context Awesome MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Context Awesome MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the Context Awesome MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Context Awesome MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Context Awesome MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 read. find_awesome_section and get_awesome_items.

Does the Context Awesome MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Context Awesome MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Context Awesome MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.