agenticfeed MCP server
io.github.bluestratus/agenticfeedbluestratusstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned
Match shopper intent to a merchant's products and fetch live price, stock and product Q&A.
4 tools: 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the agenticfeed MCP server can do
The agenticfeed MCP server is published by the GitHub account bluestratus. It has 4 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (find_merchant and list_products).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
find_merchantResolve a merchant's website domain to their Agenticfeed merchant ID and confirm they publish an Agentic Feed.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_merchant" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "resolve" and "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Resolve a merchant's website domain to their Agenticfeed merchant ID and confirm they publish an Agentic Feed. Call this first when you only know a store's domain; use the returned merchant_id with get_product or the discovery feeds.
get_productGet full detail for a single product by merchant_id and product_id: name, price, currency, availability, image, and the buyer questions, problems, and use cases it maps to.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_product" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get full detail for a single product by merchant_id and product_id: name, price, currency, availability, image, and the buyer questions, problems, and use cases it maps to. Returns a schema.org Product.
list_productsList a merchant's in-stock products (product_id, title, price, availability, url).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_products" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it List a merchant's in-stock products (product_id, title, price, availability, url). Call after find_merchant to see the catalogue, then get_product for full detail. For a specific shopper need, prefer search_products.
search_productsFind a merchant's products that match a shopper's need, question, problem, or use case.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_products" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Find a merchant's products that match a shopper's need, question, problem, or use case. Pass the buyer intent in natural language (e.g. "a light strategy game for 4 players under thirty pounds"); returns ranked in-stock products with the reason each fits, drawn from Agenticfeed's intent mapping (questions, problems, use cases). Call find_merchant first to get the merchant ID.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:02 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agenticfeed https://agenticfeed.ai/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agenticfeed https://agenticfeed.ai/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agenticfeed__find_merchant",
"mcp__agenticfeed__get_product",
"mcp__agenticfeed__list_products",
"mcp__agenticfeed__search_products"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agenticfeed. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__agenticfeed__find_merchant untrusted-input
- mcp__agenticfeed__list_products untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.bluestratus/agenticfeed/verify?hash=e6fb046358d37201ebb7c8f9f621a8cc6910bd9bf96fb816c79edeff099cb2d7" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e6fb046358d3, from Nov 16, 2026, 12:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.bluestratus/agenticfeed/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.bluestratus/agenticfeed)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:24 UTC.
agenticfeed MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the agenticfeed MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the agenticfeed MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the agenticfeed MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the agenticfeed MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 read. find_merchant, get_product, list_products and search_products.
Does the agenticfeed MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the agenticfeed MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the agenticfeed MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.