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MyOTP.App MCP server

io.github.brntech/myotpbrntechstreamable-httpv0.1.14Scanned

Send and verify one-time passcodes over SMS, WhatsApp and Telegram.

10 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 4 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 1 irreversible, 4 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 10
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the MyOTP.App MCP server can do

The MyOTP.App MCP server is published by the GitHub account brntech. It has 10 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: top_up_credits), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (generate_otp) and create or change data (4 tools: verify_otp, extend_otp, create_account and get_account_status). 4 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_account_status); 10 tools bring in text other people can write (generate_otp, verify_otp, check_otp_status and 7 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (generate_otp and verify_otp). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.1.14.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • top_up_creditsPrepare or complete an autonomous MyOTP credit purchase with USDC or card through Machine Payments Protocol (MPP).Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...lient; if fetch is already wrapped by a credential-carrying MPP runtime, it returns the cr..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Prepare or complete an autonomous MyOTP credit purchase with USDC or card through Machine Payments Protocol (MPP). Use this when generate_otp or another send fails with HTTP 403 insufficient balance / NoBalance. The tool quotes first, then returns a structured 402 challenge and exact retry details for the agent's own MPP client; if fetch is already wrapped by a credential-carrying MPP runtime, it returns the credited response directly.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • generate_otpSend a one-time password (OTP) to a phone number via SMS, WhatsApp, or Telegram.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_otp" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone_number): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send a one-time password (OTP) to a phone number via SMS, WhatsApp, or Telegram. MyOTP.App generates the code, formats the message, picks the best carrier route, and delivers it. Returns a `message_id` (UUID) — keep it; you'll pass it to `verify_otp`, `check_otp_status`, or `extend_otp` later. Each call deducts credits from the account balance; the per-message cost varies by destination country and channel and is returned in the `cost` field. Use this whenever an app needs to verify someone's phone — signup, login 2FA, password reset, transaction confirmation, etc.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • create_accountCreate a MyOTP.App agent account and return its one-time API key.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_account" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a MyOTP.App agent account and return its one-time API key. No API key is required for this tool. The new account starts with zero balance; USDC top-ups work immediately, while card top-ups unlock after a human confirms the email address.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • extend_otpExtend the expiry time of an active OTP without sending a new one.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extend the expiry time of an active OTP without sending a new one. Useful when the end user is taking longer than expected to enter the code (e.g., switched apps, dealing with carrier delivery delay). Adds `duration` seconds (60-14400) to the current `expires_at`. Requires the EXTEND_OTP entitlement (Business or Enterprise plan). Some destination countries don't allow extensions — the API will return 403 in that case. Cheaper and less spammy than calling `generate_otp` again.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_account_statusReturn email verification, balance, plan, and status for the configured MyOTP agent account.Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_account_status" says "get": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "email": it reads mail.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "get_account_status" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_account_status" says "get": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return email verification, balance, plan, and status for the configured MyOTP agent account. Set resend_verification to request another confirmation email first. Unverified accounts can top up with USDC, but cards stay locked.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_otpVerify a code submitted by an end user against the OTP MyOTP delivered.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone_number): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify a code submitted by an end user against the OTP MyOTP delivered. Returns `{status: 'success'}` if the code matches and the OTP hasn't expired — at that point the OTP is consumed and cannot be reused. Returns `{status: 'failed', reason: 'invalid' | 'expired' | 'not found'}` otherwise. You MUST pass either `phone_number` or `message_id` to identify which OTP you're verifying against. Call this after collecting the code from the user (login form, signup screen, etc.).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • check_otp_statusCheck whether a previously sent OTP is still active and (with DLR_ACCESS entitlement on Enterprise plan) get its delivery status.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_otp_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a previously sent OTP is still active and (with DLR_ACCESS entitlement on Enterprise plan) get its delivery status. Returns `is_active` (bool) and `expires_at` (ISO timestamp) on every plan. On Enterprise plans, also returns `DLR`: 'delivered', 'sent', 'read', 'pending', or a failure as `failed.<reason>` (on WhatsApp, `failed.Undeliverable` means the number cannot receive WhatsApp and `failed.Provider` means a retry is worth it). Useful when an end user reports they didn't receive the code — you can confirm whether MyOTP delivered it before deciding to resend. Does NOT verify a code; use `verify_otp` for that.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_account_infoReturn account details for the API key in use.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_account_info" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return account details for the API key in use. Always returns at least the account `email`; depending on plan and platform version may also return balance/credit/plan info. Use this as a sanity check when wiring up MyOTP for the first time — if this call succeeds, your API key and IP whitelist are configured correctly.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_topup_quoteGet the live price and payment options for buying MyOTP credits, without making a purchase.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_topup_quote" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the live price and payment options for buying MyOTP credits, without making a purchase. Use this when generate_otp or another send fails with HTTP 403 insufficient balance / NoBalance, or before calling `top_up_credits` to show the cost. Returns USDC and card client commands and never exposes the configured API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_usage_reportFetch a paginated list of OTP transactions for a date range.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_usage_report" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch a paginated list of OTP transactions for a date range. Each transaction includes message_id, timestamp, phone_number, channel, country, cost, status, and the originating client IP. Date range cannot exceed 31 days. Defaults: last 7 days, page 1, 10 per page. Requires the API_REPORTING entitlement (Business or Enterprise plan). Use this to: audit recent activity, build internal dashboards, reconcile billing, or debug delivery issues across many recipients.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

20 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write10
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__myotp__get_account_status"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:02 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.myotp.app/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including top_up_credits (destructive), generate_otp (irreversible), verify_otp (write), extend_otp (write), create_account (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn1 info
  • The server marks "get_account_status" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_account_status" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...lient; if fetch is already wrapped by a credential-carrying MPP runtime, it returns the cr..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.14. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http myotp https://mcp.myotp.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http myotp https://mcp.myotp.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__myotp__check_otp_status",
      "mcp__myotp__get_account_info",
      "mcp__myotp__get_usage_report",
      "mcp__myotp__get_topup_quote"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__myotp__generate_otp",
      "mcp__myotp__verify_otp",
      "mcp__myotp__extend_otp",
      "mcp__myotp__create_account",
      "mcp__myotp__get_account_status"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__myotp__top_up_credits"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as myotp. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 10 rules
  • mcp__myotp__generate_otp untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__myotp__verify_otp untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__myotp__check_otp_status untrusted-input
  • mcp__myotp__extend_otp untrusted-input
  • mcp__myotp__get_account_info untrusted-input
  • mcp__myotp__get_usage_report untrusted-input
  • mcp__myotp__create_account untrusted-input
  • mcp__myotp__get_account_status private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__myotp__get_topup_quote untrusted-input
  • mcp__myotp__top_up_credits untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.brntech/myotp/verify?hash=caf5462381f134117a749af875c34854e30436ff13a69c2f5816a684859cff07" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash caf5462381f1, from Nov 16, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.brntech/myotp/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.brntech/myotp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.brntech/myotp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.brntech/myotp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:26 UTC.

MyOTP.App MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the MyOTP.App MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the MyOTP.App MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: top_up_credits.

Can the MyOTP.App MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: generate_otp.

What tools does the MyOTP.App MCP server have?

10 tools: 1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 4 write, 4 read. top_up_credits, generate_otp, verify_otp, extend_otp, create_account, get_account_status, check_otp_status, get_account_info and 2 more.

Does the MyOTP.App MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the MyOTP.App MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): generate_otp and verify_otp.

Has the MyOTP.App MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.