Agent Email Transactional Dispatcher (x402) MCP server
io.github.brunopompeo1/agent-email-x402brunopompeo1streamable-httpv2.4.0Scanned
Transactional email dispatcher (Markdown to responsive HTML) for AI agents via x402 Base USDC.
2 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agent Email Transactional Dispatcher (x402) MCP server can do
The Agent Email Transactional Dispatcher (x402) MCP server is published by the GitHub account brunopompeo1. It has 2 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (agent_send_email), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (agent_preview_email); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (agent_send_email and agent_preview_email); 1 tool can send data out of your system (agent_send_email). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 2.4.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
agent_send_emailDispatches transactional or alert emails on behalf of an autonomous AI agent.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "agent_send_email" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "agent_send_email" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Dispatches transactional or alert emails on behalf of an autonomous AI agent. Automatically compiles Markdown into responsive HTML emails (0.005 USDC via x402 on Base).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
agent_preview_emailRead-only dry-run validation and Markdown-to-HTML compilation preview for autonomous AI agent emails (0.005 USDC via x402 on Base).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "agent_preview_email" says "preview": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "agent_preview_email" says "preview" and "email": it reads mail.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "email": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe name "agent_preview_email" says "preview" and "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "html": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Read-only dry-run validation and Markdown-to-HTML compilation preview for autonomous AI agent emails (0.005 USDC via x402 on Base). Validates recipients and returns compiled HTML byte metrics without sending external emails.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__agent-email-x402__agent_send_email"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agent-email-x402.architect-x402.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including agent_send_email (irreversible)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 2.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-email-x402 https://agent-email-x402.architect-x402.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agent-email-x402 https://agent-email-x402.architect-x402.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agent-email-x402__agent_preview_email"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agent-email-x402__agent_send_email"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-email-x402. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__agent-email-x402__agent_send_email untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-email-x402__agent_preview_email private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.brunopompeo1/agent-email-x402/verify?hash=c0cdfd424a044cfdc14b2e9506a24e26573828ee3d8737f0a71dc7267eb9ad90" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash c0cdfd424a04, from Nov 21, 2026, 10:19 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.brunopompeo1/agent-email-x402/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.brunopompeo1/agent-email-x402)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 10:17 UTC.
Agent Email Transactional Dispatcher (x402) MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agent Email Transactional Dispatcher (x402) MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agent Email Transactional Dispatcher (x402) MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agent Email Transactional Dispatcher (x402) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: agent_send_email.
What tools does the Agent Email Transactional Dispatcher (x402) MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 read. agent_send_email and agent_preview_email.
Does the Agent Email Transactional Dispatcher (x402) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agent Email Transactional Dispatcher (x402) MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): agent_send_email.
Has the Agent Email Transactional Dispatcher (x402) MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.