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Counterparty Check MCP server

io.github.chtwebllc/counterparty-checkchtwebllcstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Check a payee before your agent pays: sanctions, lookalike domains, payment details, invoice fraud.

4 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 2 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Counterparty Check MCP server can do

The Counterparty Check MCP server is published by the GitHub account chtwebllc. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (check_counterparty and screen_sanctions) and create or change data (1 tool: verify_receipt), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_counterparty and screen_sanctions).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
  • check_counterpartyRun a full pre-payment risk check on a payee: OFAC sanctions (names and wallets), domain age and email authentication, lookalike domains (vendor impersonation, brand typo-squats, e…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
    • The input carries an amount (input.payment.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_counterparty" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run a full pre-payment risk check on a payee: OFAC sanctions (names and wallets), domain age and email authentication, lookalike domains (vendor impersonation, brand typo-squats, executive impersonation), routing/IBAN/SWIFT/wallet validation, and business-email-compromise signals. Returns verdict proceed/review/block, a 0-100 risk score, explained findings, and a signed receipt. Costs $0.25 from the API key balance. Fill in "context" with everything you know about how the payment request arrived; it materially improves fraud detection.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check a payee before paying
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • screen_sanctionsScreen a payee name (and optional crypto wallet) against OFAC sanctions lists and embargoed jurisdictions.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input carries an amount (input.payment.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "screen_sanctions" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input carries an amount (input.payment.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a payee name (and optional crypto wallet) against OFAC sanctions lists and embargoed jurisdictions. Faster and cheaper than check_counterparty but does not detect fraud patterns. Costs $0.05 from the API key balance; without a key, the first 3 screens each day are free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Sanctions screen only
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • verify_receiptConfirm that a receipt returned by a previous check is authentic and unaltered.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Confirm that a receipt returned by a previous check is authentic and unaltered. Free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify a check receipt
    • readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • check_balanceShow the remaining prepaid balance on the API key used for this connection.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "show": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Show the remaining prepaid balance on the API key used for this connection. Free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: API key balance
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:03 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (2 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://counterpartycheck.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including check_counterparty (irreversible), screen_sanctions (irreversible), verify_receipt (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "check_counterparty" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "screen_sanctions" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input carries an amount (input.payment.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http counterparty-check https://counterpartycheck.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http counterparty-check https://counterpartycheck.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__counterparty-check__check_balance"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__counterparty-check__check_counterparty",
      "mcp__counterparty-check__screen_sanctions",
      "mcp__counterparty-check__verify_receipt"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as counterparty-check. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__counterparty-check__check_counterparty untrusted-input
  • mcp__counterparty-check__screen_sanctions untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.chtwebllc/counterparty-check/verify?hash=e1746004c89464836fc7794b4b129c818584c674a4580460554968cc624b6609" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e1746004c894, from Nov 16, 2026, 23:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.chtwebllc/counterparty-check/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.chtwebllc/counterparty-check
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.chtwebllc/counterparty-check.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.chtwebllc/counterparty-check)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:27 UTC.

Counterparty Check MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Counterparty Check MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Counterparty Check MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Counterparty Check MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: check_counterparty and screen_sanctions.

What tools does the Counterparty Check MCP server have?

4 tools: 2 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read. check_counterparty, screen_sanctions, verify_receipt and check_balance.

Does the Counterparty Check MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Counterparty Check MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Counterparty Check MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.