Tollbridge MCP server
io.github.clawpipe/tollbridgeclawpipestreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Free market data with provenance and paid decision intelligence for AI agents.
34 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 29 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 34
- Can send data out · 2
- 3 findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
30 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the Tollbridge MCP server can do
The Tollbridge MCP server is published by the GitHub account clawpipe. It has 34 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (tollbridge_export) and create or change data (29 tools: tollbridge_market_state, tollbridge_liquidation_risk, tollbridge_funding_opportunities, tollbridge_wallet_intelligence and 25 more), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
34 tools bring in text other people can write (tollbridge_market_state, tollbridge_liquidation_risk, tollbridge_funding_opportunities and 31 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (tollbridge_hook and tollbridge_export).
The fixed checks matched 3 findings (long-description and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Last scanned Oct 21, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
34 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
tollbridge_exportx402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it x402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. PAID ADD-ON — export the DECISION HISTORY for one subject (an asset symbol, or a question id) over one UTC calendar month: the append-only public record — claim, distribution or probability, confidence, hashes, decided_at, horizon, and the outcome once it settles — as CSV or JSONL. One export debits the billing.export.asset_period add-on; the same subject+month is a typed replay (already exported), never a second charge; a failed generation reverses the debit. Refusals never carry rows: an oversized window is refused uncharged — narrow the period. Another payer's private subjects are redacted to null in the payload. PAID — x402 exact USDC on Base (eip155:8453) or Scout credits via the credit rail: pass `payer` (a Base address 0x…) as a tool argument, or send `x-tollbridge-payer: <address>` on the MCP HTTP request, or settle with an x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE. After paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. An unpaid call returns a structured payment_required challenge, never fabricated data. A refusal refunds the debit. Exact current USDC comes from tollbridge_pricing (the current rung, never assumed).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 29Claude Code: ask
tollbridge_arena_leaderboardFREE — THE PUBLIC ARENA BOARD over opted-in players, ranked by XP (default), accuracy, or current streak, with human and agent tracks.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — THE PUBLIC ARENA BOARD over opted-in players, ranked by XP (default), accuracy, or current streak, with human and agent tracks. The entire public shape is a handle, rank tier, XP and call record: NO payment field ever joins the ranking (paying more cannot move you up). A payer must opt in (POST /v1/arena/opt-in) to appear; a wallet with a record but no opt-in is absent, never shown. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_arena_levelsFREE — THE LEVEL CATALOG: the Intelligence Level bands (IL1..IL5+ with their credit cost ranges and the XP granted per ask and per correct call) and the earned rank ladder (Initiat…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — THE LEVEL CATALOG: the Intelligence Level bands (IL1..IL5+ with their credit cost ranges and the XP granted per ask and per correct call) and the earned rank ladder (Initiate → Oracle) with each rank's XP threshold and automatic credit-cost discount. Read this before you ask: it is exactly how the price of a question and the XP it earns are derived. No payment required; static.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_arena_next_actionFREE — WHAT EARNS THE MOST XP NEXT: the OPEN quests for your wallet ranked deterministically by their XP reward and how little remains, each with the glossary verb that completes i…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — WHAT EARNS THE MOST XP NEXT: the OPEN quests for your wallet ranked deterministically by their XP reward and how little remains, each with the glossary verb that completes it (ask a question, lock a call, cover a market). Also reports your agent-track declaration (POST /v1/arena/agent) and the total XP still available this window. The recommendation is arithmetic over the quest board — never an opinion, never paid. No payment required; name your payer address.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_arena_profileFREE — YOUR ARENA STANDING, keyed by your wallet address: rank (Initiate → Strategist → Analyst → Forecaster → Oracle, EARNED from XP and never bought), total XP with progress to t…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — YOUR ARENA STANDING, keyed by your wallet address: rank (Initiate → Strategist → Analyst → Forecaster → Oracle, EARNED from XP and never bought), total XP with progress to the next rank, the automatic credit-cost discount your rank grants, accuracy over your graded calls, current and longest streak, markets covered, and the badges you have earned. Every number is derived from measured calls — a wallet with no record reports honest zeros, never a fabricated rank. No payment required; name your payer address.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_arena_questsFREE — THE QUEST BOARD: the daily and weekly quests with your live progress, counted from the append-only XP journal (no separate counter).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — THE QUEST BOARD: the daily and weekly quests with your live progress, counted from the append-only XP journal (no separate counter). Each quest names its target, its XP reward, how far you are, and the completion window key. Complete one to bank its XP toward your next rank. No payment required; name your payer address.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_arena_seasonFREE — YOUR SEASON STANDING: a season is ONE week (Monday 00:00 UTC to the next Monday, when the board freezes and the top players earn a permanent season badge).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — YOUR SEASON STANDING: a season is ONE week (Monday 00:00 UTC to the next Monday, when the board freezes and the top players earn a permanent season badge). This names the live season key, when it started and when it ends (seconds_remaining), and YOUR season facts measured INSIDE the window from the append-only XP journal and the graded calls: season XP, calls locked, correct resolutions, accuracy, and your trailing correct streak. A public season rank appears ONLY for wallets opted in to the board (POST /v1/arena/opt-in) — the numbers are measured either way, never invented. Season stats reset every week; badges never expire. No payment required; name your payer address.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_blotterFREE — MANY ASSETS, ONE OBJECT.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — MANY ASSETS, ONE OBJECT. The cross-asset cut of the question sheet: for the assets you name, `pending` is every open clock (soonest horizon_end first, each row carrying its asset and decision_id), `latest_terminal` is the last dead chip per question on each asset, and `dark` names each blocked question ONCE with its exact blocker. Every row is a sheet row — this tool re-derives nothing, so its pending set can never disagree with tollbridge_sheet or GET /v1/clocks/open. `assets` is comma-separated and defaults to BTC,ETH,SOL; it is capped at 20. A symbol with no live market is SKIPPED with a typed warning — the other assets still answer, never a 404 of the whole blotter. An empty `pending` is []: data, not a fabricated "none". THE AGENT LOOP: read the blotter → if pending is non-empty, sleep until min(pending.horizon_end) → read the resolution → ask ONLY rows with ask.allowed == true. No payment required, no clocks are started or credits spent by this read.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_calibrationFREE reliability calibration per question: decile buckets with the predicted-band midpoint and the realized empirical frequency, publication-gated — below the per-question floor a …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE reliability calibration per question: decile buckets with the predicted-band midpoint and the realized empirical frequency, publication-gated — below the per-question floor a bucket shows its counts and published: false ("n too small" is data, not an error). No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_callFREE — BEAT THE HOUSE.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tollbridge_call" says "call": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — BEAT THE HOUSE. Lock your OWN call on an OPEN clock before its horizon: {decision_id, call} where call is "obtains" or "not" on a probability question, or the question's own label (e.g. trending_up) on a choice question. The call is FREE — credits are spent only on the ask that opened the clock — and it NEVER moves the house number (the house probability is frozen into the row, so you saw it before calling). Immutable after horizon_end (409 CLOCK_CLOSED); one call per payer per clock (409 CALL_LOCKED). At resolution the SAME evaluator grades both the house and your call. A calibration game — no wagering, no payout, no odds movement. Read tollbridge_open_clocks for open clock ids first; your record is tollbridge_calls.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_callsFREE — YOUR SCOREBOARD AGAINST THE HOUSE on identical events: n, graded, open, player/house accuracy, both Brier scores (lower is better; a bare call is a certainty claim and grade…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "tollbridge_calls" says "call": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "tollbridge_calls" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "tollbridge_calls" says "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — YOUR SCOREBOARD AGAINST THE HOUSE on identical events: n, graded, open, player/house accuracy, both Brier scores (lower is better; a bare call is a certainty claim and grades 0 or 1), per question. Every number is a count of real graded calls — n=0 reports nulls, never fabricated zeros. Strictly personal: name your payer address and this reads only your own calls; no public leaderboard exists. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_decisionx402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description is 3,682 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...act current USDC comes from tollbridge_pricing (the current rung, never assumed)."
Description, as the server wrote it x402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. Deep decision: ask a catalog signal through the decision engine for an asset on base — probability, confidence, policy verdict, horizons and ledger-grade provenance. asset may be ANY symbol tollbridge_universe lists (not only BTC/ETH/SOL); an unknown or delisted symbol is a typed 404. LIVE set (the only askable instruments): S01 · S05 · S06 · S07 · S08 · S09 · S10 · S11 · S12 · S13 · S14 · S15 · S16 · S17 · S18 · S19 · S20 · S21 · S22 · S23 · S24 · S25 · S26 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09 — each has a registered resolver and a wired emit tape (emit and resolver share the venue surface). Per question: S01 (asset; hourly price candles); S05 (asset; hourly price candles); S06 (asset; funding); S07 (asset; funding); S08 (asset; open interest); S09 (wallet; Hyperliquid account positions); S10 (wallet; Hyperliquid account positions); S11 (wallet; Hyperliquid account positions); S12 (asset; hourly price candles); S13 (asset; hourly price candles); S14 (asset; hourly price candles); S15 (asset; perp basis (mark vs index)); S16 (asset; the order book (top-of-book spread)); S17 (asset; the order book (resting-depth imbalance)); S18 (asset; the order book (resting depth)); S19 (asset; the market-wide liquidation tape (per-minute print journal)); S20 (asset; the market-wide liquidation tape (severity per dollar)); S21 (asset; the market-wide liquidation tape (mark vs fill)); S22 (asset; the market-wide liquidation tape (sided pressure)); S23 (wallet; wallet transfer flows); S24 (wallet; wallet transfer flows); S25 (wallet; wallet transfer flows); S26 (wallet; Hyperliquid account positions); X05 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X05 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X05 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X05 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X05 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X06 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X06 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X06 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X06 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X06 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X07 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X07 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X07 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X07 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X07 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X08 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X08 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X08 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X08 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X08 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X08 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X09 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X09 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X09 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X09 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X09 (asset; price candles (1m series)); X09 (asset; price candles (1m series)). The agent loop: get latest → get resolution → if terminal and the question is available, ask the NEXT dated sentence (tools/call tollbridge_decision with payer). Blocked questions (S02/S03/S04) return a typed honest refusal (out_of_scope) and refund — never a gradeless probability. PAID — x402 exact USDC on Base (eip155:8453) or Scout credits via the credit rail: pass `payer` (a Base address 0x…) as a tool argument, or send `x-tollbridge-payer: <address>` on the MCP HTTP request, or settle with an x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE. After paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. An unpaid call returns a structured payment_required challenge, never fabricated data. A refusal refunds the debit. Exact current USDC comes from tollbridge_pricing (the current rung, never assumed).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_feedFREE — THE TAPE.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — THE TAPE. The newest TERMINAL chips, newest-first: each row is {decision_id, question_id, asset, output, predicted, realized, match, observed, status, resolved_at, horizon_end}. CHOICE rows carry predicted/realized/match (which label obtained); PROBABILITY rows carry the FROZEN predicted p (the number you bought at emit) plus observed (true/false) — predicted is null exactly when the emit refused (a no-claim row); an unresolvable (no-claim) row is included, honestly labelled, with realized/match null. Lurk here forever for free: no wallet, no model guts, no pending rows (open clocks live in tollbridge_blotter / tollbridge_open_clocks). limit defaults to 50, capped at 200. THE GROWTH LOOP: read the feed → pick a question+asset with a recent chip → tollbridge_decision to open the next clock → poll tollbridge_get_resolution → watch it land here. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_funding_opportunitiesx402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it x402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. Funding-anomaly scan across BTC/ETH/SOL: per-asset funding (bps), basis (bps) and the S06 engine decision with explicit assumptions (economics_modeled: none — a policy verdict, not a trade; S06 is LIVE — emit and the resolver read the same venue settlement tape). S07 persistence is LIVE — the persistence instrument: emit and resolve both re-derive the trailing-7d median absolute funding rate from the same venue fundingHistory settlement tape; the T0 print must clear 3× that median and the next three settlements within 24h must share its sign. Nothing here is a profit claim. PAID — x402 exact USDC on Base (eip155:8453) or Scout credits via the credit rail: pass `payer` (a Base address 0x…) as a tool argument, or send `x-tollbridge-payer: <address>` on the MCP HTTP request, or settle with an x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE. After paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. An unpaid call returns a structured payment_required challenge, never fabricated data. A refusal refunds the debit. Exact current USDC comes from tollbridge_pricing (the current rung, never assumed).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_hookx402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it x402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. PAID ADD-ON — register an outcome hook endpoint: a public http(s) URL that Tollbridge POSTs to when one of the payer's decisions settles (realized or unresolvable). One registration debits the billing.addon.hook add-on and buys a 30-day window; re-registering the same URL inside its window replays honestly (no second charge, the signing secret is never re-served). Registration NEVER claims delivery is live — delivery truth is the attempt record, not optimism. The URL is checked at registration (loopback, private and metadata hosts are refused). READ THE SECRET ONCE: when the deployment signs per endpoint, the secret is shown exactly once in this result. PAID — x402 exact USDC on Base (eip155:8453) or Scout credits via the credit rail: pass `payer` (a Base address 0x…) as a tool argument, or send `x-tollbridge-payer: <address>` on the MCP HTTP request, or settle with an x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE. After paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. An unpaid call returns a structured payment_required challenge, never fabricated data. A refusal refunds the debit. Exact current USDC comes from tollbridge_pricing (the current rung, never assumed).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_lineageFREE — THE EVIDENTIARY BUNDLE.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — THE EVIDENTIARY BUNDLE. For one decision (full UUID or 8+ char id prefix), everything a hostile auditor needs to reconstruct the forecast, the payment and the grade: the full decision record verbatim, its resolution (the terminal outcome OR an honest {status: pending, horizon_end} — never a fabricated match), the payment leg (rail x402/credits/none with the on-chain tx or the credit draws), the per-input tape sources (the venue + each input kind with its fetch time), and a verify block. verify.request_hash is RECOMPUTED IN-HANDLER from the stored model request and compared to the journal — a mismatch reports request_ok: false and NEVER rewrites the journal; a pre-trace row reports "unknown" (honest absence, never true). No live model call, no second venue. An unknown id is a typed DECISION_NOT_FOUND refusal. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_liquidation_riskx402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it x402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. NOT AVAILABLE YET (the market-wide liquidation tape is not on record): the venue publishes no market-wide liquidation feed on info REST — liquidations appear only as a marker on per-wallet fills or on node trade files, and a single wallet is not the book. To light this question the operator mounts a Hyperliquid node trade stream at NODE_TRADES_DIR and sets LIQUIDATION_SOURCE=node_trades; GET /v1/liq/hours reports how many hourly observations exist (the N/24 figure). S02 stays OFF the default surface until 24 hourly observations are owned; calls still return a typed honest refusal (out_of_scope / insufficient_sample) and refund the debit; they never fabricate a probability. Refusal codes are the published taxonomy (out_of_scope / stale_input / insufficient_sample). PAID — x402 exact USDC on Base (eip155:8453) or Scout credits via the credit rail: pass `payer` (a Base address 0x…) as a tool argument, or send `x-tollbridge-payer: <address>` on the MCP HTTP request, or settle with an x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE. After paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. An unpaid call returns a structured payment_required challenge, never fabricated data. A refusal refunds the debit. Exact current USDC comes from tollbridge_pricing (the current rung, never assumed).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_market_stateFREE market snapshot for BTC/ETH/SOL on hyperliquid: fresh quote plus derived mid and spread (bps) with full provenance and freshness.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE market snapshot for BTC/ETH/SOL on hyperliquid: fresh quote plus derived mid and spread (bps) with full provenance and freshness. Free per the Tollbridge open-data carve-out — no payment required, no probability claim is made.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_marketcapFREE market-cap list: the largest coins by market capitalization (top 50 by default), rank-ordered with each coin's market cap, price and 24h change.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE market-cap list: the largest coins by market capitalization (top 50 by default), rank-ordered with each coin's market cap, price and 24h change. This is the DISCOVERY list a user picks a subject from — it is NOT the ask authority. Each row carries askable: true when the venue universe also trades it, false when it does not, and null when the venue could not be read (never a lie in either direction). Computed from a named public source and cached (never a curated list); quality is "real" on a fresh read and "degraded" when a failed refresh served the last good snapshot. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_open_clocksFREE open clocks: the pending decisions across the AVAILABLE questions (S01 · S05 · S06 · S07 · S08 · S09 · S10 · S11 · S12 · S13 · S14 · S15 · S16 · S17 · S18 · S19 · S20 · S21 · …Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "tollbridge_open_clocks" says "open": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "tollbridge_open_clocks" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "tollbridge_open_clocks" says "open": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE open clocks: the pending decisions across the AVAILABLE questions (S01 · S05 · S06 · S07 · S08 · S09 · S10 · S11 · S12 · S13 · S14 · S15 · S16 · S17 · S18 · S19 · S20 · S21 · S22 · S23 · S24 · S25 · S26 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09) and canonical assets (BTC · ETH · SOL), soonest horizon_end first — the same pending set the web strip computes, served as one call. For MORE than the canonical three assets use tollbridge_blotter (comma-separated assets). Each clock carries {question_id, asset, question_label, decision_id, predicted, horizon_end}. An empty list is DATA (nothing in flight), not an error; a degraded upstream is a typed refusal, never an invented row. This tool never asks (no credits are spent): sleep until the soonest horizon_end, re-read, and only ask via tollbridge_decision once the question is terminal. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_pricingFREE price list for every Tollbridge surface: per-endpoint USDC prices (atomic amounts), subscription plans with effective per-credit rates, booster credit packs and the credit anc…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE price list for every Tollbridge surface: per-endpoint USDC prices (atomic amounts), subscription plans with effective per-credit rates, booster credit packs and the credit anchor. Free per the Tollbridge open-data carve-out — the exact numbers an agent needs before calling any paid tool. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_scoutFREE first-run: grant the free taste (3 questions at the entry tier, 1000 credits each) to a Base address (payer, 0x + 40 hex) so it can pay for decision.deep calls over the credit…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE first-run: grant the free taste (3 questions at the entry tier, 1000 credits each) to a Base address (payer, 0x + 40 hex) so it can pay for decision.deep calls over the credit rail — no x402 facilitator needed. Idempotent: an address that already holds its taste is a successful no-op (granted: false) that still returns the readable balance, never a double grant. The agent first-run recipe is: tollbridge_scout → then read balance via the credit ledger → tollbridge_get_decision / tollbridge_get_resolution → tollbridge_decision only when the latest sentence is terminal and the question is live. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_sheetFREE — THE ONE OBJECT.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — THE ONE OBJECT. For one asset, all eleven questions in fixed catalog order (S01…S11), each with its DERIVED state: "live" (askable, a terminal result is on record or none exists yet), "pending" (a clock is open — carries decision_id and horizon_end), "empty" (no decision on record — data, not an error) or "dark" (blocked — ask.allowed false with the exact blocker, e.g. "0 of 24 hourly observations on the node_trades tape"). Every row carries ask {allowed, price_usd, credits, needs_wallet}. THE AGENT LOOP: read the sheet → if any row is pending, sleep until min(horizon_end) → read the resolution → ask ONLY rows with ask.allowed == true. The available set is S01 · S05 · S06 · S07 · S08 · S09 · S10 · S11 · S12 · S13 · S14 · S15 · S16 · S17 · S18 · S19 · S20 · S21 · S22 · S23 · S24 · S25 · S26 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09 (derived from the resolver registry and the emit gates, never a hand list). An unknown or delisted asset is a typed UNKNOWN_ASSET refusal. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_standFREE REGISTRATION of a scheduled run: a question (+ optional asset or wallet subject) is asked automatically every horizon window until the cap or a delete stops it.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE REGISTRATION of a scheduled run: a question (+ optional asset or wallet subject) is asked automatically every horizon window until the cap or a delete stops it. Registration itself costs nothing — EACH RUN bills its question's price at settle time through the same paid path as any ask, from the named payer's credit balance. The cap is real and acknowledged IN THE CALL: spend_cap_credits must cover at least 10 windows at the question's decision tier, and acknowledge_spend_cap must be literally true (an automated charge is consent-first). Account-scoped questions require the wallet subject. One active run per question+subject — a second registration is a typed conflict, never a second billing stream. List your runs with tollbridge_stands; stop one via the API DELETE /v1/standings/:id. No payment required for the registration itself.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_standsFREE — YOUR SCHEDULED RUNS, newest first: every appointment registered for the payer you name, with its question, subject, spend cap, credits already spent, status (active | paused…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — YOUR SCHEDULED RUNS, newest first: every appointment registered for the payer you name, with its question, subject, spend cap, credits already spent, status (active | paused | spend_cap_reached), next run time and the last decision each run produced. Strictly personal: this reads only the named payer's own runs — no cross-payer listing exists. An empty list is data (nothing registered), not an error. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_token_riskx402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it x402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. LIVE: the same account liquidation-proximity distribution as account risk, labelled with the token subject kind. PAID — x402 exact USDC on Base (eip155:8453) or Scout credits via the credit rail: pass `payer` (a Base address 0x…) as a tool argument, or send `x-tollbridge-payer: <address>` on the MCP HTTP request, or settle with an x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE. After paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. An unpaid call returns a structured payment_required challenge, never fabricated data. A refusal refunds the debit. Exact current USDC comes from tollbridge_pricing (the current rung, never assumed).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_transaction_riskx402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it x402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. LIVE: the Hyperliquid ACCOUNT’s liquidation proximity, over {allow, review, block} — block when the nearest position sits within 5% of its liquidation price, review within 15% or at ≥5× account leverage, allow otherwise (a flat account is allow). Reads the venue’s own clearinghouseState; emit and resolver share that tape. PAID — x402 exact USDC on Base (eip155:8453) or Scout credits via the credit rail: pass `payer` (a Base address 0x…) as a tool argument, or send `x-tollbridge-payer: <address>` on the MCP HTTP request, or settle with an x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE. After paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. An unpaid call returns a structured payment_required challenge, never fabricated data. A refusal refunds the debit. Exact current USDC comes from tollbridge_pricing (the current rung, never assumed).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_universeFREE venue universe: the live perps ranked by 24h notional volume (top 50 by default), each with mid/mark price, 24h change, 24h volume, open interest in USD, funding and max lever…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE venue universe: the live perps ranked by 24h notional volume (top 50 by default), each with mid/mark price, 24h change, 24h volume, open interest in USD, funding and max leverage. THIS IS THE AUTHORITY on which symbols exist — an asset is legal exactly when it appears here and delisted is false. Computed from the venue tape and cached for at most 15 seconds (never a curated list); delisted names are dropped. quality is "real" on a fresh read and "degraded" when a failed refresh served the last good snapshot. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_wallet_intelligencex402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it x402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. Wallet intel on a Base address: the profile read. Account DECISION questions — S09 Wallet accumulation and S10 Wallet distribution — are LIVE (resolvers registered; emit and resolve both read the venue ACCOUNT tape, Hyperliquid clearinghouseState). Ask them through tollbridge_decision with a wallet subject; the profile/state reads here are the raw surfaces. LIVE set: S01 · S05 · S06 · S07 · S08 · S09 · S10 · S11 · S12 · S13 · S14 · S15 · S16 · S17 · S18 · S19 · S20 · S21 · S22 · S23 · S24 · S25 · S26 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X05 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X06 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X07 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X08 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09 · X09. Refusal codes are the published taxonomy (out_of_scope / stale_input / insufficient_sample). PAID — x402 exact USDC on Base (eip155:8453) or Scout credits via the credit rail: pass `payer` (a Base address 0x…) as a tool argument, or send `x-tollbridge-payer: <address>` on the MCP HTTP request, or settle with an x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE. After paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. An unpaid call returns a structured payment_required challenge, never fabricated data. A refusal refunds the debit. Exact current USDC comes from tollbridge_pricing (the current rung, never assumed).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_wallet_statex402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it x402 exact USDC Base · after paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. DEFERRED (v1): the wallet indexer is unwired (public-RPC 503) — calls refuse typed (PROVIDER_DOWN, nothing charged); the state-machine projection returns when the indexer lands. Wallet state machine on base (WATCHING → ACCUMULATING → HIGH_CONVICTION → DISTRIBUTING → EXITING): current state, since, sample adequacy, 30d net flow and first-seen. PAID — x402 exact USDC on Base (eip155:8453) or Scout credits via the credit rail: pass `payer` (a Base address 0x…) as a tool argument, or send `x-tollbridge-payer: <address>` on the MCP HTTP request, or settle with an x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE. After paying, poll /v1/resolutions/:id until horizon_end. An unpaid call returns a structured payment_required challenge, never fabricated data. A refusal refunds the debit. Exact current USDC comes from tollbridge_pricing (the current rung, never assumed).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
tollbridge_get_decisionFREE read of a past decision from the append-only ledger by decision_id (UUID): probability, confidence, policy verdict, hashes and payment linkage — the record exactly as the engi…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tollbridge_get_decision" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE read of a past decision from the append-only ledger by decision_id (UUID): probability, confidence, policy verdict, hashes and payment linkage — the record exactly as the engine wrote it, never a recomputation. Unknown ids are a typed DECISION_NOT_FOUND refusal. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_get_intelligenceFREE — THE MEASURED RECORD: the Decision-Intelligence Index exactly as published at GET /v1/intelligence — the composite (or its verbatim "insufficient sample — no index claim" sup…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tollbridge_get_intelligence" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — THE MEASURED RECORD: the Decision-Intelligence Index exactly as published at GET /v1/intelligence — the composite (or its verbatim "insufficient sample — no index claim" suppression below the index floor; a null composite is NOT a zero), the full Brier decomposition (reliability, resolution, uncertainty, skill vs the base-rate reference), the evidence counts behind every number (decided, realized, unresolvable, refused, and the measurement window), the published calibration-band count, the active intelligence release with its measured Brier delta and 95% CI, the graded crowd benchmark (comparison only — never an input), and the intelligence-gated price ladder (current rung, multiplier, both gates with what remains, and the pending turn countdown). Every number publishes with its n and window; below the floors the payload carries counts and the plain sentence, never a fabricated score. Agents buy on this read: "is the judgment worth the price? here is the measured record." Free read — no payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_get_resolutionFREE resolution outcome of a settled decision by decision_id (UUID): the product grammar realized | obtains | not | unresolvable (CHOICE claims resolve realized with the predicted_…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tollbridge_get_resolution" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE resolution outcome of a settled decision by decision_id (UUID): the product grammar realized | obtains | not | unresolvable (CHOICE claims resolve realized with the predicted_label/realized_label/match sentence; the statistic is the parsed OBJECT — the identical data object GET /v1/resolutions/:decision_id serves), or a dated {status: pending, horizon_end} while the horizon is still open — no outcome is ever inferred, and unknown ids are a typed DECISION_NOT_FOUND refusal. No payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tollbridge_list_releasesFREE — THE RELEASE FEED: every intelligence release with its measured deltas AND its rejections, exactly as published at GET /v1/intelligence/releases — version, parent, status (ca…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tollbridge_list_releases" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE — THE RELEASE FEED: every intelligence release with its measured deltas AND its rejections, exactly as published at GET /v1/intelligence/releases — version, parent, status (candidate | active | superseded | rejected), the dataset window and hash the proof was measured on, the walk-forward evaluation (delta Brier and delta log loss with their 95% confidence intervals, per-family deltas) and the four promotion-gate verdicts (evidence, improvement, no-regression, reproducible) in both shapes. Rejected candidates ship with the failing gate reason — the forge’s failures are part of the record, never hidden. Learned changes reach the probability path only as a sealed, published release with its measured proof: never silently self-tuned. Filter with `status`; without a filter the whole feed serves, newest first. Free read — no payment required.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write34
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:03 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 503
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 503.
Posture changes
- Nov 6, 2026
- Reachable: no to yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 503
- Oct 29, 2026
- Reachable: yes to no
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 30 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "tollbridge_open_clocks" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "tollbridge_open_clocks" says "open": a word for a change.
- Warntollbridge_calls
The server marks "tollbridge_calls" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "tollbridge_calls" says "call": a word for a change.
The description is 3,682 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...act current USDC comes from tollbridge_pricing (the current rung, never assumed)."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: no -> yes; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none -> 503.View diff
- Reachable: no to yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 503
PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
- Reachable: yes to no
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 30 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http tollbridge https://api.tollbridge.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http tollbridge https://api.tollbridge.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_get_decision",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_get_resolution",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_get_intelligence",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_list_releases"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_market_state",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_liquidation_risk",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_funding_opportunities",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_wallet_intelligence",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_transaction_risk",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_token_risk",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_decision",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_pricing",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_scout",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_lineage",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_calibration",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_sheet",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_blotter",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_feed",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_open_clocks",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_universe",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_marketcap",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_wallet_state",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_call",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_calls",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_stand",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_stands",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_hook",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_export",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_profile",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_quests",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_season",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_next_action",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_leaderboard",
"mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_levels"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tollbridge. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 34 rules
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_market_state untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_liquidation_risk untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_funding_opportunities untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_wallet_intelligence untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_transaction_risk untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_token_risk untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_decision untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_pricing untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_scout untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_get_decision untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_get_resolution untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_lineage untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_calibration untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_sheet untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_blotter untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_feed untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_open_clocks untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_universe untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_marketcap untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_wallet_state untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_call untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_calls untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_stand untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_stands untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_hook untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_export untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_get_intelligence untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_list_releases untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_profile untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_quests untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_season untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_next_action untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_leaderboard untrusted-input
- mcp__tollbridge__tollbridge_arena_levels untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.clawpipe/tollbridge/verify?hash=9a7101c4fea6046e3acb99745011f571af256a976ddbe1fcfca2eb23bf7cbc39" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 9a7101c4fea6, from Oct 21, 2026, 19:09 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.clawpipe/tollbridge/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.clawpipe/tollbridge)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:27 UTC.
Tollbridge MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Tollbridge MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 34 tools, 30 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Tollbridge MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Tollbridge MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: tollbridge_export.
What tools does the Tollbridge MCP server have?
- 34 tools: 1 irreversible, 29 write, 4 read. tollbridge_export, tollbridge_market_state, tollbridge_liquidation_risk, tollbridge_funding_opportunities, tollbridge_wallet_intelligence, tollbridge_transaction_risk, tollbridge_token_risk, tollbridge_decision and 26 more.
Does the Tollbridge MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the Tollbridge MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): tollbridge_hook and tollbridge_export.
Has the Tollbridge MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 21, 2026.