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api-governance MCP server

io.github.coderifts/api-governancecoderiftsstreamable-httpv1.0.3Scanned

Signed, offline-verifiable contract-change authorization. Only a granted change can proceed.

3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the api-governance MCP server can do

The api-governance MCP server is published by the GitHub account coderifts. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: preflight_change_set and verify_receipt), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (long-description and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 1.0.3.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • preflight_change_setUse this when: a contract artifact (OpenAPI, GraphQL, protobuf, AsyncAPI, MCP manifests, or agent tool schemas) changes before merge, deploy, publish, or tool registration; AND any…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "preflight_change_set" says "set": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when: a contract artifact (OpenAPI, GraphQL, protobuf, AsyncAPI, MCP manifests, or agent tool schemas) changes before merge, deploy, publish, or tool registration; AND any agent-executed operation with no supported contract type — send type agent_operation. Do not call for documentation-only changes, static readiness scoring, or receipt verification. Use analyze for risk only; authorize requires context.operation. Skipping this call is not permission. Absence of a key is not permission. Inputs: preflight_mode is required: "analyze" (risk only; no receipt, no execution_action) or "authorize" (may mint a receipt; requires context.operation — merge is not deploy is not publish). Supply exactly one artifact source: artifacts[] (1–20 items, each {id, type, before, after} as the FULL spec/schema text, not a path or URL; type is openapi|graphql|grpc|asyncapi|mcp_manifest|agent_tools|agent_operation) XOR derivation="server" (server reads GitHub Compare; needs context.repository + context.base + context.head; sending artifacts[] together is 400). Grant fields sit in one object, execution_grant_request {include_execution_grant, grant_version, tenant_id, executor_id, adapter_id, target_uri, expected_state_token, state_nonce, audience, policy_hash}; analyze ignores it; required is preflight_mode only. previous_receipt is a chain token base64url(body).base64url(signature) to LINK a prior decision — it does not re-verify; use coderifts.verify_receipt instead; for details of a past decision use coderifts.get_decision_details instead. idempotency_key replays authorize only (24h), never analyze.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • verify_receiptVerify a CodeRifts signed chain-receipt you ALREADY HOLD: cryptographic authenticity (signature + key id), body binding, and — when lifecycle indices are available — whether it is …1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 2,458 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...still branch on execution_action; next_agent_step is suggestion, not permission."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify a CodeRifts signed chain-receipt you ALREADY HOLD: cryptographic authenticity (signature + key id), body binding, and — when lifecycle indices are available — whether it is currently valid authorization (not expired, superseded, or revoked) for a stated operation/target. Use this when: - You already obtained a chain_receipt / receipt token from a prior preflight (or CI artifact) and are about to act (merge/deploy) under that receipt. - A contract-gate or policy requires offline/online proof that the receipt is authentic for this change before proceeding. - You must distinguish "signature ok" from "currently authorized" (stale or superseded receipts must not be treated as live approval). Do not use when: - You do not have a receipt yet — call coderifts.preflight_change_set first. - You need a NEW decision for a changed base→head set — preflight again; verify_receipt does not re-diff specs. - The receipt you hold binds a different operation or target than the one you are about to perform — call coderifts.preflight_change_set with context.operation set to that operation (a merge receipt does not authorize a deploy); verify_receipt cannot re-scope or re-issue a decision. - You only need human-readable history of an old decision_id without a receipt token — use coderifts.get_decision_details. - The change set itself is unknown or incomplete — fix the change set and preflight; do not "verify" a placeholder. Inputs: receipt token (required); target_id = decision_result.artifact_digest — required for an authorization verdict; omitted → target_not_stated. Optional intended context (operation, environment, fingerprint, audience, repository/branch/pull_request, base/head) and the body_hash-bound decision_result envelope. 30s clock-skew leeway on expiry. A 0s grace for declared destructive production operations is defined in the policy but is unreachable today: the intended-context schema has no destructive field, so nothing can declare one and the 30s leeway always applies. Returns { valid, status, currently_authorized (bool|null), reason, payload, authz_* }. Branch on currently_authorized; null = not evaluated. When a decision envelope is also in hand (e.g. from a prior preflight), its control_envelope.next_agent_step (if present) is structured remediation guidance the agent MAY follow after a non-CONTINUE decision — still branch on execution_action; next_agent_step is suggestion, not permission.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_decision_detailsRetrieve a PAST CodeRifts decision by exactly one identifier (case_id | decision_id | fingerprint): full report, breaking changes, scores, and linked receipt metadata if stored.2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_decision_details" says "get": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...efore constrained to the decisions your credential can prove it owns. A decision that exi..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description is 2,478 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...till branch on execution_action; next_agent_step is a suggestion, not permission."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve a PAST CodeRifts decision by exactly one identifier (case_id | decision_id | fingerprint): full report, breaking changes, scores, and linked receipt metadata if stored. Use this when: - You have a decision_id (or fingerprint) from a previous preflight, PR comment, or CI log and need to inspect or explain that past decision. - You are auditing why a prior ALLOW/WARN/BLOCK was issued. - You are NOT requesting a new analysis of current before/after specs. Do not use when: - You need a decision for the CURRENT uncommitted or PR head change set — call coderifts.preflight_change_set with the current artifacts. - You hold a receipt token and only need cryptographic/lifecycle verification — use coderifts.verify_receipt. - You have no identifier — run preflight first to create one. Inputs: exactly one of case_id, decision_id, or fingerprint. {} → INVALID_INPUT; two identifiers → LOOKUP_IDENTIFIER_CONFLICT; case_id → CASE_NOT_FOUND (lookup never opens a case). Returns the stored document or not_found. Scoping — fingerprint lookup returns only YOUR OWN decisions. A fingerprint is derived from content, not from an account, so two callers who preflight byte-identical specs derive the same one; the lookup is therefore constrained to the decisions your credential can prove it owns. A decision that exists but is not yours returns the SAME not_found as one that was never issued. This is deliberate: a distinguishable "exists but forbidden" would confirm to any caller that a given content hash had been decided on by someone, which is the fact the scoping exists to withhold. Do not read not_found as proof that no such decision exists anywhere. Decisions persisted without context.repository cannot currently be attributed to an account, and are not retrievable by fingerprint at all — not by their owner either. Retrieve those by decision_id, which is unchanged and unscoped. This is a limitation of what older stored rows carry, not a property of the lookup: rows written from now on record the account directly, so the gap narrows as older rows age out. If a fingerprint you expect returns not_found, use the decision_id before concluding the decision is missing. When the stored envelope carries control fields, control_envelope.next_agent_step is structured remediation guidance the agent MAY follow for non-CONTINUE execution_action values (null on CONTINUE*). Still branch on execution_action; next_agent_step is a suggestion, not permission.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:03 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://app.coderifts.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://app.coderifts.com
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://app.coderifts.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including preflight_change_set (write), verify_receipt (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

3 info
  • The description is 2,458 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...still branch on execution_action; next_agent_step is suggestion, not permission."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...efore constrained to the decisions your credential can prove it owns. A decision that exi..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description is 2,478 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...till branch on execution_action; next_agent_step is a suggestion, not permission."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http api-governance https://app.coderifts.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http api-governance https://app.coderifts.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__api-governance__get_decision_details"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__api-governance__preflight_change_set",
      "mcp__api-governance__verify_receipt"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as api-governance. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.coderifts/api-governance/verify?hash=edd412e235fdbdbc965a04ea8d6e88bc70ab709fd564e42bd4df397a07d81963" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash edd412e235fd, from Nov 16, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.coderifts/api-governance/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.coderifts/api-governance
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.coderifts/api-governance.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.coderifts/api-governance)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:27 UTC.

api-governance MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the api-governance MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the api-governance MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the api-governance MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the api-governance MCP server have?

3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. preflight_change_set, verify_receipt and get_decision_details.

Does the api-governance MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the api-governance MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the api-governance MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 16, 2026.