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ContexteTech MCP server

io.github.contexte-tech/contextecontexte-techstreamable-httpv0.5.2Scanned

Search and load AI datasets, prompts and few-shot contexts from the ContexteTech catalogue.

6 tools: 3 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ContexteTech MCP server can do

The ContexteTech MCP server is published by the GitHub account contexte-tech. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: load_resource, fill_prompt and estimate_cost), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (search_resources); 6 tools bring in text other people can write (search_resources, load_resource, fill_prompt and 3 more).

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.5.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • estimate_costEstimate in euros what a ContexteTech resource costs to run with common AI models, from the week's list prices.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "estimate_cost" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Estimate in euros what a ContexteTech resource costs to run with common AI models, from the week's list prices. Use it when the user asks about cost, budget or the cheapest model. For a prompt or context: input and output tokens, cost per call for each model and batch discount; for a dataset: cost of one pass over all rows and a fine-tuning estimate on rented GPUs (hours and offers); for a model: memory (VRAM) needed and GPU offers that fit. Returns available: false with a note when no estimate exists for that type.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Estimate the cost
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • fill_promptFill a ContexteTech prompt template and return the ready-to-send text, nothing else.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fill_prompt" says "fill": a word for a change.
    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "fill_prompt" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "fill_prompt" says "fill": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fill a ContexteTech prompt template and return the ready-to-send text, nothing else. Use it when the user wants a prompt applied to their own case; call load_resource first if you need the template or the exact variable names. 'variables' maps each {{name}} of the template to its text value; extra keys are ignored. Fails with an error if the code is unknown, if the resource is not a prompt, or if a template variable is missing (the error lists the missing names).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Fill a prompt
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • load_resourceRead one ContexteTech resource, usually right after search_resources or when the user gives a code or page URL.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "load_resource" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read one ContexteTech resource, usually right after search_resources or when the user gives a code or page URL. Accepts the short code (end of the page URL, e.g. 'jr6t0n'), 'author/name', or 'code#v2' for a fixed version. Always returns title, type, licence, language, source, version and page URL; plus, for a dataset, the total number of rows, the first rows (default 10, max 50); for a prompt, the template and its {{variables}} (then call fill_prompt); for a context, the system prompt, knowledge and examples. The result ends with a Source line (resource, author, original data source, publisher, licence): citing it with its links is required. Fails with an error if the code does not exist or the resource is private.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Load a resource
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • fetchFetch the full content of a ContexteTech resource by the id returned by search.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch the full content of a ContexteTech resource by the id returned by search.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Fetch (connector format)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • search_resourcesSearch the ContexteTech catalogue of AI building blocks: fine-tuning and evaluation datasets (chat, DPO, agent traces), prompts, few-shot contexts, MCP servers, models and more, ma…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_resources" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "chat": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "search" and "chat": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the ContexteTech catalogue of AI building blocks: fine-tuning and evaluation datasets (chat, DPO, agent traces), prompts, few-shot contexts, MCP servers, models and more, many grounded in official European sources, in 9 languages. Use it first when the user needs AI training or evaluation data, a prompt, a context or an AI component, then call load_resource with a returned code. Write the topic in a few words, in English or the content language; common topics are matched across French, English, German and Spanish (e.g. 'marine weather' finds 'météo marine'), and a type word such as 'dataset' or 'prompt' puts that type first. Resources matching every topic come first; weaker matches carry match: partial. Returns up to 15 matches, each with short code, title, type, language, licence, author, rows (datasets), description and page URL; when nothing matches, returns a short message suggesting how to rephrase.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search the ContexteTech catalogue
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:03 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://contextetech.com/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including load_resource (write), fill_prompt (write), estimate_cost (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

3 warn
  • The server marks "load_resource" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "fill_prompt" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "fill_prompt" says "fill": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "estimate_cost" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.5.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http contexte https://contextetech.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http contexte https://contextetech.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__contexte__search_resources",
      "mcp__contexte__search",
      "mcp__contexte__fetch"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__contexte__load_resource",
      "mcp__contexte__fill_prompt",
      "mcp__contexte__estimate_cost"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as contexte. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__contexte__search_resources private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__contexte__load_resource untrusted-input
  • mcp__contexte__fill_prompt untrusted-input
  • mcp__contexte__estimate_cost untrusted-input
  • mcp__contexte__search untrusted-input
  • mcp__contexte__fetch untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.contexte-tech/contexte/verify?hash=d41a52699c69234db6fc3da7627578f6dbda662f6d6898cf81bc4293e8053710" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d41a52699c69, from Nov 17, 2026, 00:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.contexte-tech/contexte/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.contexte-tech/contexte
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.contexte-tech/contexte.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.contexte-tech/contexte)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:28 UTC.

ContexteTech MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ContexteTech MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ContexteTech MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the ContexteTech MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ContexteTech MCP server have?

6 tools: 3 write, 3 read. load_resource, fill_prompt, estimate_cost, search_resources, search and fetch.

Does the ContexteTech MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ContexteTech MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the ContexteTech MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.