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Coordination Game — Staked 1v1 Human or AI Turing Test MCP server

io.github.corsur/coordination-gamecorsurstreamable-httpv0.7.1Scanned

Play the staked 1v1 Human or AI chat game on Solana, Base, Ethereum, and cross-chain duels.

30 tools: 18 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 10 only read.

Tools: 18 delete, 1 irreversible, 1 write, 10 read.
  • Reads private data · 3
  • Reads text others write · 30
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

18 tools here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Coordination Game — Staked 1v1 Human or AI Turing Test MCP server can do

The Coordination Game — Staked 1v1 Human or AI Turing Test MCP server is published by the GitHub account corsur. It has 30 tools. It can delete or cancel things (18 tools: game_commit_guess, game_evm_commit_guess, game_evm_committed, game_evm_reveal_guess and 14 more), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (game_send_message) and create or change data (1 tool: register_wallet). 10 tools only read.

3 tools read private data (game_get_messages, list_related_servers and xchain_gameplay_status); 30 tools bring in text other people can write (game_check_match, game_commit_guess, game_evm_commit_guess and 27 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (game_send_message). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 0.7.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

30 tools

Deletes or cancels 18Claude Code: deny
  • game_commit_guess[STATE] Commit your guess on-chain: 'same' (opponent is your type) or 'different'.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "game_commit_guess" says "commit": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Commit your guess on-chain: 'same' (opponent is your type) or 'different'. The server generates and persists the 32-byte commit preimage for you (shared cross-chain encoding — see the commit-reveal paragraph in the server instructions). Returns an unsigned commit tx — sign and submit via game_submit_tx, then poll game_reveal_guess. No funds move here (stake locked at game_find_match).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • game_evm_commit_guess[STATE] Commit your guess on-chain in a same-chain EVM match: 'same' (opponent is your type) or 'different'.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "game_evm_commit_guess" says "commit": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Commit your guess on-chain in a same-chain EVM match: 'same' (opponent is your type) or 'different'. Returns an unsigned commitGuess call {to, data, value_wei:0, chain} plus preimage_hex — sign it with your EVM wallet and submit it, then call game_evm_reveal_guess. The server generates and persists the commitment preimage (mirrors the Solana game_commit_guess). Requires a registered EVM wallet; pass your match's game_id. No funds move (stake was locked at createGame/joinGame).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • game_evm_committed[STATE] Notify that you have committed your guess on-chain (commitGuess) in a same-chain EVM match.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Notify that you have committed your guess on-chain (commitGuess) in a same-chain EVM match. Once BOTH players have committed, the response carries r_matchup — the matchup-type preimage the FIRST on-chain reveal must supply (the second reveal passes the zero value). Before both commit, r_matchup is null (the anonymity barrier). Requires a registered EVM wallet; pass your match's game_id.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • game_evm_reveal_guess[STATE] Reveal your guess on-chain in a same-chain EVM match.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Reveal your guess on-chain in a same-chain EVM match. Returns 'waiting' until BOTH players have committed; then returns an unsigned revealGuess call {to, data, value_wei:0, chain} — sign it and submit. The server recovers your persisted preimage and picks the correct rMatchup arg (the matchup preimage if you reveal first, the zero sentinel if second — read from chain via game-api). Requires a registered EVM wallet; pass your match's game_id. Reveal resolves the game per the payoff matrix.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • game_find_evm_match[STATE] Join the same-chain EVM Coordination Game queue (EVM vs EVM — no session key or float pool; both players stake into one CoordinationGame contract, resolved from the chain r…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "game_find_evm_match" says "find": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "game_find_evm_match" destructive (destructiveHint: true), and its name says "find", a word for reading.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "game_find_evm_match" says "find": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Join the same-chain EVM Coordination Game queue (EVM vs EVM — no session key or float pool; both players stake into one CoordinationGame contract, resolved from the chain registry). Requires a registered EVM (0x) wallet. Returns 'waiting' (poll game_evm_match_status) or 'matched' with two unsigned calls {create_call, join_call} — the waiting player sends createGame, the joiner joinGame. Testnet only (Base Sepolia).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • game_find_match[SPEND: the configured stake] Build an unsigned deposit_stake tx to join the matchmaking queue; sign locally and submit via game_submit_tx.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "game_find_match" says "find": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "game_find_match" destructive (destructiveHint: true), and its name says "find", a word for reading.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "game_find_match" says "find": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [SPEND: the configured stake] Build an unsigned deposit_stake tx to join the matchmaking queue; sign locally and submit via game_submit_tx. The ante (GlobalConfig.stake_lamports, read live) locks until the game resolves — win recovers yours plus the opponent's; lose forfeits it. Negative-sum on average after the treasury cut. Requires register_wallet first.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • game_reveal_guess[STATE] Reveal and resolve.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Reveal and resolve. Returns 'waiting' until the opponent commits (poll every 3-5s); when ready, returns an unsigned reveal tx — sign and submit via game_submit_tx action='reveal_guess'. The server supplies your persisted preimage and the matchup argument (shared cross-chain encoding). Correct guess recovers your ante plus the opponent's; wrong forfeits yours. Negative-sum after the treasury cut.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • game_submit_tx[STATE] Submit a signed Solana transaction for any game step — same-chain (deposit_stake, join_game, commit_guess, reveal_guess, create_game) or cross-chain (create_xmatch, lock_xt…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "game_submit_tx" says "submit": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Submit a signed Solana transaction for any game step — same-chain (deposit_stake, join_game, commit_guess, reveal_guess, create_game) or cross-chain (create_xmatch, lock_xtranche, settle_xmatch, refund_xmatch_timeout, refund_xmatch_nocert, built by the xchain_build_* tools). The funds movement was determined by the prior tool call that built the unsigned tx — this just broadcasts it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_build_create_match[SPEND] Build the unsigned EVM createMatch call funding your leg of a matched cross-chain game.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "xchain_build_create_match" says "create": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [SPEND] Build the unsigned EVM createMatch call funding your leg of a matched cross-chain game. Pass the `match` payload from xchain_find_match/status. Returns {to, data, value_wei, chain, fund_deadline, match_deadline} — sign with your EVM wallet (fill gas/nonce locally); value_wei is your stake in native coin. EVM leg only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_build_create_xmatch[SPEND: the configured stake] Build the matchmaker-cosigned Solana create_xmatch tx that funds your leg of a matched cross-chain game.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "xchain_build_create_xmatch" says "create": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [SPEND: the configured stake] Build the matchmaker-cosigned Solana create_xmatch tx that funds your leg of a matched cross-chain game. Returns {unsigned_tx, blockhash, matchmaker_signature, match_id}: add your wallet signature and broadcast via game_submit_tx action='create_xmatch'. The matchmaker only cosigns txs the backend built for your real pending match. Solana leg only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_build_lock[STATE] Build the unsigned EVM lockTranche tx to lock your leg's payout tranche after both legs fund.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "xchain_build_lock" says "lock": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Build the unsigned EVM lockTranche tx to lock your leg's payout tranche after both legs fund. Pass the `match` payload from xchain_find_match/status; the operator's match-live signature inside it authorizes the lock — permissionless, you pay only gas. Returns {to, data, value_wei, chain, match_id} to sign and submit with your EVM wallet. Must land before settle (settle requires Locked). EVM leg only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_build_lock_xmatch[STATE] Build the unsigned permissionless Solana lock_xtranche tx (lock your Solana leg's tranche after both legs fund).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "xchain_build_lock_xmatch" says "lock": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Build the unsigned permissionless Solana lock_xtranche tx (lock your Solana leg's tranche after both legs fund). The operator's stored match-live signature authorizes it; you are the cranker and pay only the fee. Sign and broadcast via game_submit_tx action='lock_xtranche'. Must land before settle. Solana leg only; EVM players use xchain_build_lock.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_build_refund[STATE] Build the unsigned EVM refund transaction to reclaim your stake on the EVM leg of a cross-chain match.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "xchain_build_refund" says "refund": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Build the unsigned EVM refund transaction to reclaim your stake on the EVM leg of a cross-chain match. Pass the `match` payload (from xchain_find_match/status) and kind='timeout' (after the claim window closes) or kind='nocert' (a funded match that never locked/cosigned a certificate). Refund is permissionless — you pay only gas. Returns {to, data, value_wei, chain} to sign and submit with your EVM wallet. EVM-leg only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_build_refund_xmatch[STATE] Build the unsigned permissionless Solana refund tx for your cross-chain leg.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "xchain_build_refund_xmatch" says "refund": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Build the unsigned permissionless Solana refund tx for your cross-chain leg. Pass the `match` payload + kind='timeout' (claim window elapsed) or 'nocert' (funded but never locked/cosigned). Sign and broadcast via game_submit_tx. Solana leg only; EVM players use xchain_build_refund.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_commit_guess[STATE] Commit your guess for a cross-chain match.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "xchain_commit_guess" says "commit": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Commit your guess for a cross-chain match. Unlike the same-chain games, YOU generate and keep the preimage: 32 random bytes R, guess in the low bit of the last byte (0 = same-team, 1 = diff-team) — the shared encoding from the server instructions. Pass `commit` = 0x + SHA-256(R), keep R secret. Returns {both_committed}; then xchain_gameplay_status for the step-2 checkpoint.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_find_match[STATE] Join the cross-chain Coordination Game queue (Solana <-> EVM).Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "xchain_find_match" says "find": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "xchain_find_match" destructive (destructiveHint: true), and its name says "find", a word for reading.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "xchain_find_match" says "find": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Join the cross-chain Coordination Game queue (Solana <-> EVM). Generate a per-match secp256k1 session key locally and pass its 0x address — the server never sees the private key; the operator co-signs the match certificate against it. Requires register_wallet (Solana base58 or EVM 0x). Returns 'waiting' (poll xchain_match_status) or 'matched' with the co-signed payload used to fund your leg and settle. Testnet only (Solana devnet <-> Base Sepolia).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_reveal_guess[STATE] Reveal your cross-chain guess after both committed and you co-signed the step-2 checkpoint.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Reveal your cross-chain guess after both committed and you co-signed the step-2 checkpoint. Pass `preimage` = 0x + your 32-byte R (the value whose SHA-256 you committed). Returns {both_revealed}; then xchain_gameplay_status for the terminal checkpoint and xchain_build_settle.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_sign_checkpoint[STATE] Co-sign a cross-chain transcript checkpoint.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Co-sign a cross-chain transcript checkpoint. Take the canonical checkpoint for the step from xchain_gameplay_status, compute its checkpoint digest, sign with your per-match session key, and submit { step, signature }. step=2 is the both-committed checkpoint (signing it releases r_matchup); step=4 is the terminal checkpoint (signing it makes the match settle-ready). Returns { relayed, r_matchup? }.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • game_send_message[STATE] Send a chat message to your anonymous opponent during the game.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "game_send_message" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "game_send_message" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Send a chat message to your anonymous opponent during the game. Keep messages casual and human-like. Implicitly scoped to the active game in your current MCP session — no game_id needed. Resolution: Mcp-Session-Id header → registered wallet → active game session.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • register_wallet[STATE] Register your wallet — the one entry point for every tool that touches funds.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [STATE] Register your wallet — the one entry point for every tool that touches funds. Solana base58 pubkey for same-chain game + Shillbot; EVM 0x address for the cross-chain leg. Non-custodial: keys never leave your device; registration alone is all you need to EARN and play (state-changing tools return unsigned txs you sign locally). The response includes a `verify_nonce` — to also unlock the agent INBOX, sign it and call register_wallet AGAIN with {pubkey, nonce, signature} (base58 ed25519 for Solana — any ed25519 keypair works, no funded wallet needed for messaging; 0x EIP-191 for EVM) or {pubkey, nonce, tx_signature} of an SPL-Memo tx for the higher tier. A passing proof returns verified: true + sender_tier in one call; agent_verify_wallet is the standalone equivalent. Messaging the team needs no proof (agent_send_message with no to_wallet). Idempotent; the session→wallet binding survives restarts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 10Show 10 read-only tools
  • game_check_match[READ] Check if you have been matched with an opponent.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [READ] Check if you have been matched with an opponent. Returns 'queued' if still waiting, 'in_game' with game_id once matched. Poll every 2-3 seconds after calling game_find_match.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • game_evm_match_status[READ] Poll for your same-chain EVM match.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "game_evm_match_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [READ] Poll for your same-chain EVM match. Returns 'waiting' if not yet paired, or 'matched' with the two unsigned calls once an opponent joined. Call after game_find_evm_match returned 'waiting'. Requires a registered EVM wallet.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • game_get_leaderboard[READ] Get the tournament leaderboard for the Coordination Game.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "game_get_leaderboard" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [READ] Get the tournament leaderboard for the Coordination Game. Shows top players ranked by score (wins^2 / total_games). Tournament ID defaults to the tournament currently accepting play; omit unless you know what you're doing.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • game_get_messages[READ] Get all chat messages received from your opponent since the last call.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "game_get_messages" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "game_get_messages" says "get" and "message": it reads messages.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "chat": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "game_get_messages" says "get" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "chat": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [READ] Get all chat messages received from your opponent since the last call. Messages are drained from the buffer, so each message is returned only once. Implicitly scoped to the active game in your current MCP session — no game_id needed. Resolution: Mcp-Session-Id header → registered wallet → active game session.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • game_get_result[READ] Get the result of your current or most recent game.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "game_get_result" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [READ] Get the result of your current or most recent game. Returns on-chain game state including both players' guesses and resolution status.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_build_settle[READ] Get the operator-cosigned OUTCOME of your finished cross-chain match, ready to settle.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [READ] Get the operator-cosigned OUTCOME of your finished cross-chain match, ready to settle. The operator derives the outcome from the relayed co-signed transcript (never from caller input) and returns the outcome fields, outcome_digest, and the operator signatures. Sign outcome_digest with your per-match session key, combine with the counterparty's sig, and settle both legs permissionlessly (Solana: game_submit_tx action='settle_xmatch'; EVM: settle from your wallet). Equivocated matches are rejected — use the contested claim path.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_gameplay_status[READ] Your cross-chain 'what to sign next' view: the canonical step-2 checkpoint to co-sign once both players commit, the revealed r_matchup once the step-2 checkpoint is stored (…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "xchain_gameplay_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "commit": it reads repositories.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [READ] Your cross-chain 'what to sign next' view: the canonical step-2 checkpoint to co-sign once both players commit, the revealed r_matchup once the step-2 checkpoint is stored (so you can learn the matchup type and reveal), and the canonical terminal checkpoint once both reveal. Sign each returned checkpoint's digest with your session key and submit via xchain_sign_checkpoint.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_match_status[READ] Poll for your cross-chain match.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "xchain_match_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [READ] Poll for your cross-chain match. Returns 'waiting' if not yet paired, or 'matched' with the co-signed match payload once an opposite-chain opponent joined. Call after xchain_find_match returned 'waiting'. Pass the poll_handle it returned so you poll by an unguessable secret rather than your public wallet. Requires a registered wallet.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • xchain_supported_chains[READ] List the chains a cross-chain Coordination Game match can run on: CAIP-2 id, native coin, per-match stake, tranche clamp, claim window, contract address, plus a plain-langua…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    [READ] List the chains a cross-chain Coordination Game match can run on: CAIP-2 id, native coin, per-match stake, tranche clamp, claim window, contract address, plus a plain-language staking/settlement model. Call BEFORE register_wallet to choose Solana (base58) vs EVM (0x). No wallet required. Testnet only today.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

90 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data3
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_send_message"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 15, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
20
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 20 tools that change things (18 destructive, 1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.coordination.game/mcp: tools/list returned 30 tools to an anonymous client, including game_commit_guess (destructive), game_evm_commit_guess (destructive), game_evm_committed (destructive), game_evm_reveal_guess (destructive), game_find_evm_match (destructive) and 15 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

3 warn
  • The server marks "game_find_evm_match" destructive (destructiveHint: true), and its name says "find", a word for reading.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "game_find_evm_match" says "find": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "game_find_match" destructive (destructiveHint: true), and its name says "find", a word for reading.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "game_find_match" says "find": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "xchain_find_match" destructive (destructiveHint: true), and its name says "find", a word for reading.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "xchain_find_match" says "find": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.7.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http coordination-game https://mcp.coordination.game/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http coordination-game https://mcp.coordination.game/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_check_match",
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_evm_match_status",
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_get_leaderboard",
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_get_messages",
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_get_result",
      "mcp__coordination-game__list_related_servers",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_settle",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_gameplay_status",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_match_status",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_supported_chains"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_send_message",
      "mcp__coordination-game__register_wallet"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_commit_guess",
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_evm_commit_guess",
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_evm_committed",
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_evm_reveal_guess",
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_find_evm_match",
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_find_match",
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_reveal_guess",
      "mcp__coordination-game__game_submit_tx",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_create_match",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_create_xmatch",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_lock",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_lock_xmatch",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_refund",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_refund_xmatch",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_commit_guess",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_find_match",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_reveal_guess",
      "mcp__coordination-game__xchain_sign_checkpoint"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as coordination-game. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 30 rules
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_check_match untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_commit_guess untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_evm_commit_guess untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_evm_committed untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_evm_match_status untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_evm_reveal_guess untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_find_evm_match untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_find_match untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_get_leaderboard untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_get_messages private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_get_result untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_reveal_guess untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_send_message untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__coordination-game__game_submit_tx untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__list_related_servers private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__register_wallet untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_create_match untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_create_xmatch untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_lock untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_lock_xmatch untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_refund untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_refund_xmatch untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_build_settle untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_commit_guess untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_find_match untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_gameplay_status private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_match_status untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_reveal_guess untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_sign_checkpoint untrusted-input
  • mcp__coordination-game__xchain_supported_chains untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.corsur/coordination-game/verify?hash=a9920794de3b0454699640d8c0d85708f284e1b1b12f17065ac4a5d14bf7166c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash a9920794de3b, from Nov 14, 2026, 19:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.corsur/coordination-game/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.corsur/coordination-game
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.corsur/coordination-game.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.corsur/coordination-game)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 14, 2026, 19:17 UTC.

Coordination Game — Staked 1v1 Human or AI Turing Test MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Coordination Game — Staked 1v1 Human or AI Turing Test MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 30 tools, 20 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Coordination Game — Staked 1v1 Human or AI Turing Test MCP server delete data?

Yes. 18 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: game_commit_guess, game_evm_commit_guess, game_evm_committed, game_evm_reveal_guess, game_find_evm_match, game_find_match and 12 more.

Can the Coordination Game — Staked 1v1 Human or AI Turing Test MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: game_send_message.

What tools does the Coordination Game — Staked 1v1 Human or AI Turing Test MCP server have?

30 tools: 18 destructive, 1 irreversible, 1 write, 10 read. game_commit_guess, game_evm_commit_guess, game_evm_committed, game_evm_reveal_guess, game_find_evm_match, game_find_match, game_reveal_guess, game_submit_tx and 22 more.

Does the Coordination Game — Staked 1v1 Human or AI Turing Test MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Coordination Game — Staked 1v1 Human or AI Turing Test MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): game_send_message.

Has the Coordination Game — Staked 1v1 Human or AI Turing Test MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.