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Agent Payment Guard MCP server

io.github.dagu3371/agent-payment-guarddagu3371streamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Check wallets and tokens before an agent pays or trades: sanctions, honeypots, taxes, reputation.

3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Agent Payment Guard MCP server can do

The Agent Payment Guard MCP server is published by the GitHub account dagu3371. It has 3 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (check_payment_counterparty) and create or change data (2 tools: check_token and verify_receipt), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_payment_counterparty and check_token).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • check_payment_counterpartyCheck a wallet/payTo address before paying it: sanctioned crypto address (OFAC/UK/EU), x402 seller reputation, live Base facts, optional counterparty-name screening, signed receipt…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_payment_counterparty" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_payment_counterparty" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_payment_counterparty" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a wallet/payTo address before paying it: sanctioned crypto address (OFAC/UK/EU), x402 seller reputation, live Base facts, optional counterparty-name screening, signed receipt. Verdict block/review/clear. $0.005 per call after the free daily quota.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • check_tokenBefore buying or accepting a token: simulates a buy and sell (Uniswap V2, Base/Ethereum) to detect honeypots and taxes, and checks owner powers (mint/pause/blacklist/fees), upgrade…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before buying or accepting a token: simulates a buy and sell (Uniswap V2, Base/Ethereum) to detect honeypots and taxes, and checks owner powers (mint/pause/blacklist/fees), upgradeable proxy, liquidity and sanctioned owner. Verdict avoid/caution/ok with a signed receipt. $0.01 per call after the free daily quota.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_receiptFree.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free. Verify that a receipt (payload_json + signature) was issued by Agent Payment Guard and has not been altered.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 18, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agent-payment-guard.agent-data-apis.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including check_payment_counterparty (irreversible), check_token (write), verify_receipt (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "check_payment_counterparty" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_payment_counterparty" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-payment-guard https://agent-payment-guard.agent-data-apis.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent-payment-guard https://agent-payment-guard.agent-data-apis.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-payment-guard__check_payment_counterparty",
      "mcp__agent-payment-guard__check_token",
      "mcp__agent-payment-guard__verify_receipt"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-payment-guard. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__agent-payment-guard__check_payment_counterparty untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-payment-guard__check_token untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.dagu3371/agent-payment-guard/verify?hash=bb51edc04d99e98edcada6d817f818107ee2531472ea09c40e927b3ce845b3f1" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash bb51edc04d99, from Nov 17, 2026, 17:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.dagu3371/agent-payment-guard/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.dagu3371/agent-payment-guard
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.dagu3371/agent-payment-guard.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.dagu3371/agent-payment-guard)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 18:17 UTC.

Agent Payment Guard MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Agent Payment Guard MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Agent Payment Guard MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Agent Payment Guard MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: check_payment_counterparty.

What tools does the Agent Payment Guard MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write. check_payment_counterparty, check_token and verify_receipt.

Does the Agent Payment Guard MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Agent Payment Guard MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Agent Payment Guard MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.