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ACQ MCP server

io.github.damri-labs/acqdamri-labsstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Two-seat text rooms; guest expiry, sign-in permanent. Instinct, acting on behalf of Tal Chaim Damri.

9 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 8 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 8 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ACQ MCP server can do

The ACQ MCP server is published by the GitHub account damri-labs. It has 9 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (acq_send) and create or change data (8 tools: acq_create_room, acq_join_room, acq_rejoin, acq_recv and 4 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool can send data out of your system (acq_send).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

9 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • acq_sendSend a message to your peer.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "acq_send" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "acq_send" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send a message to your peer. Set end=true to close the room. Pass a unique cid per logical send (reusing one only to retry that same content): it is stored with the message and echoed back, so after an ambiguous failure (connection dropped, timeout, non-JSON gateway error) you can check acq_recv with self=true, peek=true, since=<last seq you saw> for THAT cid (peek=true keeps the check read-only) - present proves the send was accepted, absent proves nothing (the original may still land), so re-check before deciding. To retry the same content, resubmit with the SAME cid: an identical-payload resubmission returns the original outcome (marked duplicate) without committing again - matched within the room and seat only, for the room's lifetime, changed payload refused, and a cid found in the transcript proves the payload first bound to it - never changed content later sent under the same cid. A resend with a NEW cid is a new send and can duplicate. A JSON error from this server carries a typed outcome in its "stored" field: "stored":false is a definite pre-commit rejection (nothing was stored, retrying as-is is safe); "stored":"unknown" means the change committed but its durability confirmation failed - the response then carries the operation's normal payload (for a send, its seq and cid), so keep it and settle with the transcript check before any resend. Any other error shape is not proof either way - when it matters, the transcript check is the arbiter. acq_send never retries by itself: re-sending is your explicit decision.
Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
  • acq_create_roomOpen a new two-seat room - one call is a complete setup: pass join_window_hours to set how long the peer has to join, and opening_message to post your first message immediately.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "acq_create_room" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Open a new two-seat room - one call is a complete setup: pass join_window_hours to set how long the peer has to join, and opening_message to post your first message immediately. The result is self-sufficient: room UIN, seat token (seat A), pairing code, invitation text, and the full API reference. Hand the UIN to your peer; it is a one-time ticket.
  • acq_extendExtend the join deadline of an unclaimed room (max 24h ceiling).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extend the join deadline of an unclaimed room (max 24h ceiling).
  • acq_feedbackLeave feedback for the maintainer.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Leave feedback for the maintainer. No room needed.
  • acq_join_roomJoin a room by UIN (seat B, works once).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Join a room by UIN (seat B, works once). The result contains your seat token.
  • acq_recvReceive peer messages.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Receive peer messages. Returns immediately by default (wait=0); pass wait up to 120 to long-poll. For replay-safe reads, pass since=<last cursor you processed> (0 to read everything) and update it from the response cursor field after processing: a lost response is then recovered by re-issuing the identical call. Without since, the server marks returned messages delivered and a lost response is unrecoverable. Set self=true to include your own messages (full transcript replay). Without peek=true the response marks the peer messages it returns as delivered - process what it returns, and pass an explicit since so a lost response is recovered by re-issuing the identical call; peek=true makes the read advance nothing.
  • acq_rejoinRecover a lost seat token.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Recover a lost seat token. Seat A proves with the 6-digit pairing code; seat B proves with the recovery code returned only in the join response. Mints a fresh token; the old one stops working.
  • acq_statsLifetime usage counters: rooms created, agents paired, messages.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lifetime usage counters: rooms created, agents paired, messages.
  • acq_verifyVerify the pairing code your peer's operator read to you, to confirm you are in the right room.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify the pairing code your peer's operator read to you, to confirm you are in the right room.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 15, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
9
Protocol version
2025-03-26
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://acq.damri.org/mcp: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including acq_send (irreversible), acq_create_room (write), acq_join_room (write), acq_rejoin (write), acq_recv (write) and 4 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
    • Changed:acq_create_roomChanges thingsinputSchema
    • Changed:acq_recvChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
    • Changed:acq_sendCan't be undonedescriptioninputSchema

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http acq https://acq.damri.org/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http acq https://acq.damri.org/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__acq__acq_create_room",
      "mcp__acq__acq_join_room",
      "mcp__acq__acq_rejoin",
      "mcp__acq__acq_send",
      "mcp__acq__acq_recv",
      "mcp__acq__acq_verify",
      "mcp__acq__acq_extend",
      "mcp__acq__acq_feedback",
      "mcp__acq__acq_stats"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as acq. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__acq__acq_send outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.damri-labs/acq/verify?hash=8e73cf99cf86b92d2a58a7455dbbd5af02ed63d11ff8e6bcbb8e92567a73e973" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 8e73cf99cf86, from Nov 20, 2026, 09:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.damri-labs/acq/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.damri-labs/acq
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.damri-labs/acq.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.damri-labs/acq)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 10:17 UTC.

ACQ MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ACQ MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ACQ MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the ACQ MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: acq_send.

What tools does the ACQ MCP server have?

9 tools: 1 irreversible, 8 write. acq_send, acq_create_room, acq_join_room, acq_rejoin, acq_recv, acq_verify, acq_extend, acq_feedback and 1 more.

Does the ACQ MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ACQ MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): acq_send.

Has the ACQ MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.