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PayeeProof MCP server

io.github.davisvillelabs/payeeproofdavisvillelabsstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Payment identity intelligence for AI agents.

1 tool: 1 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 4 findings

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the PayeeProof MCP server can do

The PayeeProof MCP server is published by the GitHub account davisvillelabs. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: payeeproof.check_payee), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (payeeproof.check_payee); 1 tool can send data out of your system (payeeproof.check_payee).

The fixed checks matched 4 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Last scanned Oct 21, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

1 tool

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • payeeproof.check_payeePaid $0.01 public machine identity and payment-destination consistency assessment.Reads text others writeCan send data out4 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.target_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...payment, never forwards target payment credentials, and actively probes only anonymous pub..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.observed_response.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.observed_response.description: "...target methods. Never include a payment credential, Authorization, Cookie, or response bod..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.observed_response.properties.payment_required.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.observed_response.properties.payment_required.description: "...is is challenge metadata, not a payment credential."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.observed_response.properties.www_authenticate.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.observed_response.properties.www_authenticate.description: "...llenge. Do not include an authorization credential."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Paid $0.01 public machine identity and payment-destination consistency assessment. Use immediately before an autonomous machine payment to compare the requested HTTPS endpoint, claimed service expectations, HTTP 402 challenge, resource binding, public discovery metadata, and prior PayeeProof observations. PayeeProof never authorizes the target payment, never forwards target payment credentials, and actively probes only anonymous public GET/HEAD requests under a bounded SSRF-safe contract; state-changing target methods require caller-observed 402 evidence. Missing evidence can remain unknown. This is not KYC, AML, sanctions screening, fraud certification, legal identity verification, legal advice, or a delivery guarantee.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:25 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
no
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
not observed
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: The server redirected a POST to a different request.

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

4 info
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...payment, never forwards target payment credentials, and actively probes only anonymous pub..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.observed_response.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.observed_response.description: "...target methods. Never include a payment credential, Authorization, Cookie, or response bod..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.observed_response.properties.payment_required.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.observed_response.properties.payment_required.description: "...is is challenge metadata, not a payment credential."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.observed_response.properties.www_authenticate.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.observed_response.properties.www_authenticate.description: "...llenge. Do not include an authorization credential."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http payeeproof https://payeeproof.davisvillelabs.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http payeeproof https://payeeproof.davisvillelabs.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__payeeproof__payeeproof_check_payee"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as payeeproof. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__payeeproof__payeeproof_check_payee untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.davisvillelabs/payeeproof/verify?hash=c075b5ba82f92c4be92e38d6600eccf6f83f25ccf7494860bf338d9584a78002" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c075b5ba82f9, from Oct 21, 2026, 19:32 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.davisvillelabs/payeeproof/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.davisvillelabs/payeeproof
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.davisvillelabs/payeeproof.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.davisvillelabs/payeeproof)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:31 UTC.

PayeeProof MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the PayeeProof MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the PayeeProof MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the PayeeProof MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the PayeeProof MCP server have?

1 tool: 1 write. payeeproof.check_payee.

Does the PayeeProof MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the PayeeProof MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): payeeproof.check_payee.

Has the PayeeProof MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 21, 2026.