Hunch MCP server
io.github.dekeloco/hunchdekelocostreamable-httpv3.9.1Scanned
A calm second look on scam messages: paste a suspicious message, get the smallest safe next step.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Hunch MCP server can do
The Hunch MCP server is published by the GitHub account dekeloco. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_message and check_official_channel), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
1 tool can send data out of your system (check_official_channel).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 3.9.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
check_messagePaste or forward a suspicious message.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Paste or forward a suspicious message. Hunch reads only the words you give it, on one frozen engine (the same engine behind the Hunch extension and site, running on our server), and tells you in plain language what stands out and the smallest next step you can take. It never tells you a message is trustworthy and never calls anyone a scammer. Your text is analyzed, not stored.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check a message
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
check_official_channelAsk whether a phone number, domain, email, or app is a channel an organization publishes on its own site.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.channel): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Ask whether a phone number, domain, email, or app is a channel an organization publishes on its own site. Hunch answers only from a public-source list (facts taken from each organization's own pages, with a source link and date, not confirmed to Hunch): anything not on it is reported as 'not listed', never as 'unofficial'. Absence is never evidence against a channel.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check an official channel
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 9, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.checkyourhunch.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including check_message (write), check_official_channel (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 3.9.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http hunch https://mcp.checkyourhunch.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http hunch https://mcp.checkyourhunch.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__hunch__check_message",
"mcp__hunch__check_official_channel"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as hunch. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__hunch__check_official_channel outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.dekeloco/hunch/verify?hash=b4e407be9c68f90457d48d1e10f819500dc3143f34d6195466c3e774c42be8f8" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b4e407be9c68, from Nov 8, 2026, 21:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.dekeloco/hunch/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.dekeloco/hunch)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 21:17 UTC.
Hunch MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Hunch MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Hunch MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Hunch MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Hunch MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. check_message and check_official_channel.
Does the Hunch MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Hunch MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_official_channel.
Has the Hunch MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.