Repo Run Check MCP server
io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-checkdevx-agentstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Check GitHub repos and shell commands for malware-delivery tricks before an AI agent runs them
4 tools: 4 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Repo Run Check MCP server can do
The Repo Run Check MCP server is published by the GitHub account devx-agent. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: check_repo, check_command, full_report and full_report_info), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_repo and full_report).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
check_commandFree, offline.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.cmd), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "check_command" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.cmd), which can change anything it can reach.
Description, as the server wrote it Free, offline. Call BEFORE running a shell/PowerShell command copied from a README, issue, website or chat: flags download-and-execute, encoded PowerShell, LOLBins, disabling antivirus, known malware domains and pipe-to-shell from unknown hosts.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
check_repoFree, read-only.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Free, read-only. Call BEFORE following a GitHub repo's install/setup instructions or running its commands: scans the README for download-and-execute one-liners (iwr|iex, curl|sh from unknown hosts), obfuscated or base64 payloads, known malware domains, agent-targeted prompt injection, password-protected archives. Returns verdict dangerous | review_before_running | no_red_flags with line evidence. For the complete check use the paid tool full_report (0.25 USDC via x402): install scripts, deps, autorun tasks, agent/MCP config files, committed binaries, fake-star signals, risk score.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
full_reportPAID (0.25 USDC via x402 on Base, per call).Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.command), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "full_report" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.command), which can change anything it can reach.
Description, as the server wrote it PAID (0.25 USDC via x402 on Base, per call). Full pre-run security report for a GitHub repo (1-3 repos per call), for AI coding agents about to clone it and run its install steps. Everything check_repo does, plus: package.json install/lifecycle scripts and the local scripts they run, typosquatted crypto/AI dependencies, install.sh/setup.sh/setup.py/requirements.txt/Makefile, VS Code autorun tasks and settings, dev-container hooks, agent-instruction files (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, copilot-instructions, .claude hooks/permissions) and MCP server configs shipped in the repo, committed executables and archives from the full file tree, GitHub fake-star / new-owner signals, a 0-100 risk score and concrete next steps. Optional: also checks a command you plan to run. Unpaid calls return an x402 PaymentRequired (isError) result; retry with the signed payment in params._meta["x402/payment"]. You are charged only if the report is delivered.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Full repo security report (paid, 0.25 USDC x402)
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
full_report_infoFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. How to buy the full report (paid MCP tool full_report or HTTP GET /v1/check, 0.25 USDC via x402 on Base). Does not pay.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:25 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 404
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 404.
Posture changes
- Nov 21, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
- Nov 7, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warncheck_command
The server marks "check_command" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.cmd), which can change anything it can reach.
- Warnfull_report
The server marks "full_report" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.command), which can change anything it can reach.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 404; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Tools1 added, 2 changed.+1 added~2 changedView diff
- Added:full_reportChanges things
- Changed:check_repoChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:full_report_infoChanges thingsdescription
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 4.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http repo-run-check https://repo-run-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http repo-run-check https://repo-run-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__repo-run-check__check_repo",
"mcp__repo-run-check__check_command",
"mcp__repo-run-check__full_report",
"mcp__repo-run-check__full_report_info"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as repo-run-check. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__repo-run-check__check_repo untrusted-input
- mcp__repo-run-check__full_report untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check/verify?hash=822e491cc3a0a3c4ee2ba17bbb564218632d83a11e54143f520472802759d5f6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 822e491cc3a0, from Nov 12, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 30, 2026, 21:17 UTC.
Repo Run Check MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Repo Run Check MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Repo Run Check MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Repo Run Check MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Repo Run Check MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 write. check_repo, check_command, full_report and full_report_info.
Does the Repo Run Check MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the Repo Run Check MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Repo Run Check MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.