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Repo Run Check MCP server

io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-checkdevx-agentstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Check GitHub repos and shell commands for malware-delivery tricks before an AI agent runs them

4 tools: 4 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Repo Run Check MCP server can do

The Repo Run Check MCP server is published by the GitHub account devx-agent. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: check_repo, check_command, full_report and full_report_info), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_repo and full_report).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • check_commandFree, offline.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.cmd), which can change anything it can reach.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_command" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.cmd), which can change anything it can reach.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, offline. Call BEFORE running a shell/PowerShell command copied from a README, issue, website or chat: flags download-and-execute, encoded PowerShell, LOLBins, disabling antivirus, known malware domains and pipe-to-shell from unknown hosts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • check_repoFree, read-only.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free, read-only. Call BEFORE following a GitHub repo's install/setup instructions or running its commands: scans the README for download-and-execute one-liners (iwr|iex, curl|sh from unknown hosts), obfuscated or base64 payloads, known malware domains, agent-targeted prompt injection, password-protected archives. Returns verdict dangerous | review_before_running | no_red_flags with line evidence. For the complete check use the paid tool full_report (0.25 USDC via x402): install scripts, deps, autorun tasks, agent/MCP config files, committed binaries, fake-star signals, risk score.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • full_reportPAID (0.25 USDC via x402 on Base, per call).Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.command), which can change anything it can reach.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "full_report" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.command), which can change anything it can reach.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    PAID (0.25 USDC via x402 on Base, per call). Full pre-run security report for a GitHub repo (1-3 repos per call), for AI coding agents about to clone it and run its install steps. Everything check_repo does, plus: package.json install/lifecycle scripts and the local scripts they run, typosquatted crypto/AI dependencies, install.sh/setup.sh/setup.py/requirements.txt/Makefile, VS Code autorun tasks and settings, dev-container hooks, agent-instruction files (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, copilot-instructions, .claude hooks/permissions) and MCP server configs shipped in the repo, committed executables and archives from the full file tree, GitHub fake-star / new-owner signals, a 0-100 risk score and concrete next steps. Optional: also checks a command you plan to run. Unpaid calls return an x402 PaymentRequired (isError) result; retry with the signed payment in params._meta["x402/payment"]. You are charged only if the report is delivered.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Full repo security report (paid, 0.25 USDC x402)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • full_report_infoFree.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free. How to buy the full report (paid MCP tool full_report or HTTP GET /v1/check, 0.25 USDC via x402 on Base). Does not pay.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:25 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
404
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 404.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 21, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
  2. Nov 7, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "check_command" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.cmd), which can change anything it can reach.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "full_report" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.command), which can change anything it can reach.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 404; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
  2. Tools1 added, 2 changed.+1 added~2 changedView diff
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 4.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http repo-run-check https://repo-run-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http repo-run-check https://repo-run-check.nextill-pos.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__repo-run-check__check_repo",
      "mcp__repo-run-check__check_command",
      "mcp__repo-run-check__full_report",
      "mcp__repo-run-check__full_report_info"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as repo-run-check. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__repo-run-check__check_repo untrusted-input
  • mcp__repo-run-check__full_report untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check/verify?hash=822e491cc3a0a3c4ee2ba17bbb564218632d83a11e54143f520472802759d5f6" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 822e491cc3a0, from Nov 12, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.devx-agent/repo-run-check)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 30, 2026, 21:17 UTC.

Repo Run Check MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Repo Run Check MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Repo Run Check MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Repo Run Check MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Repo Run Check MCP server have?

4 tools: 4 write. check_repo, check_command, full_report and full_report_info.

Does the Repo Run Check MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the Repo Run Check MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Repo Run Check MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.