Agent Watch MCP server
io.github.entradox/agent-watchentradoxstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Monitoring for the agent economy — liveness, latency, trust scoring for MCP endpoints
8 tools: 4 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 3
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agent Watch MCP server can do
The Agent Watch MCP server is published by the GitHub account entradox. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: aw_health, aw_check_endpoint, aw_census and aw_watch), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (read_skill); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (read_skill); 3 tools can send data out of your system (aw_check_endpoint, aw_watch and read_skill). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
aw_censusFull-census summary of the official MCP registry: 7,454 endpoints probed with real MCP handshakes.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...directing — liveness unprovable without credentials. Use to quantify how much of the MC..."
Description, as the server wrote it Full-census summary of the official MCP registry: 7,454 endpoints probed with real MCP handshakes. Returns alive/dead/unknown counts and percentages. States: alive = MCP initialize succeeded; dead = no answer; unknown = answered but auth-gated (401/403/402) or redirecting — liveness unprovable without credentials. Use to quantify how much of the MCP ecosystem is actually reachable.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Registry Liveness Census
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
aw_check_endpointProbe an MCP or HTTP-402 endpoint now and get its trust verdict.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Probe an MCP or HTTP-402 endpoint now and get its trust verdict. Performs a real MCP initialize handshake (not a ping), measures p50/p95 latency, counts tools, hashes the tool schema (for drift detection), and checks RFC 9728 auth metadata. Returns: alive (bool), name, tool_count, latency_p50_ms, tool_schema_hash, auth_metadata_present, and error detail when dead. Use before wiring any new MCP server into your client. Args: url: the MCP or HTTP-402 endpoint URL to probe (e.g. https://host/mcp/) timeout: probe timeout in seconds (default 30)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Probe MCP Endpoint
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
aw_healthLiveness check for the Agent Watch API.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Liveness check for the Agent Watch API. Returns ok, service name, and version. Call this first to verify connectivity before using other tools.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Watch Health
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
aw_watchAdd endpoints to your personal watchlist (probed immediately, then every 6h).Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "add": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.urls): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Add endpoints to your personal watchlist (probed immediately, then every 6h). Plan-limited by the email used at checkout: free 5, Builder ($19/mo) 50, Team ($99/mo) 500 endpoints. Alerts fire on alive→dead transitions and tool-schema drift. Already-watched URLs are returned without re-probing. Args: email: the email your subscription is under (free tier works too) urls: endpoint URLs to add to your watchlist watch_token: issued at registration, delivered in your onboarding email — required
Annotations the server declares
- title: Add Endpoints to Watchlist
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
aw_alertsShow dead endpoints across the monitored registry (alive=false).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "show": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Show dead endpoints across the monitored registry (alive=false). Returns up to 500 dead endpoints with names. Use after aw_census or aw_list_monitored to get the actionable dead list. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Dead Endpoint Alerts
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
aw_list_monitoredList all endpoints in the Agent Watch census with their registry names.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "aw_list_monitored" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List all endpoints in the Agent Watch census with their registry names. Returns count and the full endpoint list (URLs). Combine with aw_alerts to find which of these are dead. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List Monitored Endpoints
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
read_skillRead a product skill file by its skill:// URI.Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "read_skill" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "file": it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "uri": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.uri), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.uri): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Read a product skill file by its skill:// URI. Args: uri: e.g. skill://<product>/<skill-name>/SKILL.md Get valid URIs from `skills_list_tool`.
skills_list_toolList this product's skills.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "skills_list_tool" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List this product's skills. Each entry carries the SKILL.md URI, its name and description, verbatim frontmatter, and a per-file sha256 manifest. Read a body with `read_skill`.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
3 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 untrusted-input tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out3
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__agent-watch__read_skill"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:04 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agent-watch-api-production.up.railway.app/mcp/: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including aw_health (write), aw_check_endpoint (write), aw_census (write), aw_watch (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infoaw_census
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...directing — liveness unprovable without credentials. Use to quantify how much of the MC..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-watch https://agent-watch-api-production.up.railway.app/mcp/claude mcp add --transport http agent-watch https://agent-watch-api-production.up.railway.app/mcp/Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agent-watch__aw_list_monitored",
"mcp__agent-watch__aw_alerts",
"mcp__agent-watch__skills_list_tool"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agent-watch__aw_health",
"mcp__agent-watch__aw_check_endpoint",
"mcp__agent-watch__aw_census",
"mcp__agent-watch__aw_watch",
"mcp__agent-watch__read_skill"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-watch. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__agent-watch__aw_check_endpoint outbound
- mcp__agent-watch__aw_watch outbound
- mcp__agent-watch__read_skill private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.entradox/agent-watch/verify?hash=4e3671d18c65ccb03ccea08fddef97dd15b5943a0c3af1be05de938a1f5aac56" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 4e3671d18c65, from Nov 19, 2026, 16:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.entradox/agent-watch/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.entradox/agent-watch)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:33 UTC.
Agent Watch MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agent Watch MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agent Watch MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agent Watch MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Agent Watch MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 4 write, 4 read. aw_health, aw_check_endpoint, aw_census, aw_watch, aw_list_monitored, aw_alerts, skills_list_tool and read_skill.
Does the Agent Watch MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agent Watch MCP server send data to outside services?
- 3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): aw_check_endpoint, aw_watch and read_skill.
Has the Agent Watch MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.