MyLegend — public profiles, rich cards and personal agents MCP server
io.github.falsalama/mylegendfalsalamastreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Find owner-published people, display rich profile cards and ask approved public questions. No login.
5 tools: 2 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →Its sign-in does not let Anlyon set up an OAuth client on its own, so there is no link to it here.
What the MyLegend — public profiles, rich cards and personal agents MCP server can do
The MyLegend — public profiles, rich cards and personal agents MCP server is published by the GitHub account falsalama. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: ask_person and save_my_agent_draft), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_my_agent_draft).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
ask_personUse this for a specific question about a resolved published person, including follow-ups to their displayed rich card.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this for a specific question about a resolved published person, including follow-ups to their displayed rich card. Answers use approved information. Ask explicitly for technical detail, equations or a derivation to receive longer approved material when available. A question-only request does not require a card. If a card is requested, use get_profile once. No raw CV or P3 data is exposed. If the user offers an agreed code word, pass only that supplied phrase unchanged as the current question; never guess or suggest phrases.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
save_my_agent_draftUse this only when the signed-in owner explicitly asks to create or edit their MyLegend agent.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "save_my_agent_draft" says "save": a word for a change.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...egend for owner approval. Do not invent credentials or infer sensitive details."
Description, as the server wrote it Use this only when the signed-in owner explicitly asks to create or edit their MyLegend agent. Save only the fields they choose to share from this conversation, never the whole chat. Read the current revision first (0 if no draft). Saves a PRIVATE draft, never publishes. Show the proposed text for review and link to MyLegend for owner approval. Do not invent credentials or infer sensitive details.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
find_personUse this when locating a person's owner-published MyLegend profile by name, headline, job title or organisation.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_person" says "find": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when locating a person's owner-published MyLegend profile by name, headline, job title or organisation. Returns at most 10 matches with approved job, organisation and location context, including labelled fictional demos. Compare supplied context with those fields; ask for clarification if multiple plausible people remain. Location is not a search field. When the user requests a profile or rich card and the person is resolved, call get_profile once with the returned slug. A match is not independent verification.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
get_my_agent_draftUse this to review the signed-in owner's suggested public introduction.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_my_agent_draft" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this to review the signed-in owner's suggested public introduction. Excludes private CV, knowledge, rules and unpublished personal notes. Never reads another account.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_profileUse this when the user asks to see a person's MyLegend profile or interactive rich card.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_profile" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this when the user asks to see a person's MyLegend profile or interactive rich card. Shows the card, with questions and a private message composer, in a compatible connected MCP Apps host. Invoke once to display the card; use ask_person for follow-up answers without another card. Use the resolved slug from find_person or a known MyLegend profile URL. No MyLegend login is needed for public cards.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:04 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://mylegend.id/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- https://ingbbwinetxdhvinvvqp.supabase.co/auth/v1
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- no
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mylegend.id/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including ask_person (write), save_my_agent_draft (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...egend for owner approval. Do not invent credentials or infer sensitive details."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http mylegend https://mylegend.id/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http mylegend https://mylegend.id/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__mylegend__find_person",
"mcp__mylegend__get_profile",
"mcp__mylegend__get_my_agent_draft"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__mylegend__ask_person",
"mcp__mylegend__save_my_agent_draft"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mylegend. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__mylegend__get_my_agent_draft untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.falsalama/mylegend/verify?hash=1dffe5f9ebf70e9fdd8a15e91cbfd135de6e40418123f3fd5fa54be0fba8fe91" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 1dffe5f9ebf7, from Nov 20, 2026, 21:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.falsalama/mylegend/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.falsalama/mylegend)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:33 UTC.
MyLegend — public profiles, rich cards and personal agents MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the MyLegend — public profiles, rich cards and personal agents MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the MyLegend — public profiles, rich cards and personal agents MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the MyLegend — public profiles, rich cards and personal agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the MyLegend — public profiles, rich cards and personal agents MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 2 write, 3 read. ask_person, save_my_agent_draft, find_person, get_profile and get_my_agent_draft.
Does the MyLegend — public profiles, rich cards and personal agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the MyLegend — public profiles, rich cards and personal agents MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the MyLegend — public profiles, rich cards and personal agents MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.