Image Tools - Background Removal, Upscaling & Face Restoration MCP server
io.github.fasuizu-br/image-toolsfasuizu-brstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Background removal, 4x upscaling, and face restoration via GPU
4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things and 3 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
4 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the Image Tools - Background Removal, Upscaling & Face Restoration MCP server can do
The Image Tools - Background Removal, Upscaling & Face Restoration MCP server is published by the GitHub account fasuizu-br. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: remove_background) and create or change data (3 tools: upscale_image, restore_face and check_image_service). None of its tools only reads.
4 tools bring in text other people can write (remove_background, upscale_image, restore_face and 1 more).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
remove_backgroundRemove the background from an image.Reads text others write2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "remove_background" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
- The server marks it not destructive (destructiveHint: false), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "remove_background" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "remove_background" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.
- Warn
The server marks "remove_background" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "remove_background" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.
Description, as the server wrote it Remove the background from an image. Uses BiRefNet segmentation to precisely separate foreground from background. Returns a base64-encoded image with transparent background (PNG) or white background (WebP). Sub-500ms latency on GPU. Args: image_base64: Base64-encoded image data (PNG, JPEG, or WebP). output_format: Output format -- 'png' (with transparency) or 'webp'. Returns: dict with keys: - image_base64 (str): Base64-encoded result image - format (str): Output image format - original_size (dict): Original width and height - processing_ms (int): Processing time in milliseconds
Annotations the server declares
- title: Remove Background
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
check_image_serviceCheck health status of Image API services and loaded models.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check health status of Image API services and loaded models. Returns: dict with keys: - status (str): 'healthy' or error state - models (dict): Loaded model status per capability - version (str): API version
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check Image Service
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
restore_faceRestore and enhance faces in an image using GFPGAN.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Restore and enhance faces in an image using GFPGAN. Detects all faces via RetinaFace, restores quality (fixes blur, noise, compression artifacts), and pastes them back. Optionally enhances the background using Real-ESRGAN. GPU-accelerated, sub-3s latency. Args: image_base64: Base64-encoded image data containing faces (PNG, JPEG, WebP). upscale: Output upscale factor -- 1 to 4 (default: 2). enhance_background: Whether to enhance background with Real-ESRGAN (default: true). Returns: dict with keys: - image (str): Base64-encoded restored image - format (str): Output image format - width (int): Output width - height (int): Output height - upscale (int): Scale factor applied - processing_time_ms (float): Processing time in milliseconds
Annotations the server declares
- title: Restore Face
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
upscale_imageUpscale image resolution using Real-ESRGAN.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Upscale image resolution using Real-ESRGAN. Enhances image resolution by 2x or 4x using GPU-accelerated Real-ESRGAN super-resolution. Processes in tiles (256x256) to manage VRAM. Maximum output dimension: 8192x8192. Args: image_base64: Base64-encoded image data (PNG, JPEG, or WebP). scale: Upscale factor -- 2 or 4 (default: 4). Returns: dict with keys: - image (str): Base64-encoded upscaled image - format (str): Output image format - width (int): Output width - height (int): Output height - scale (int): Scale factor applied - processing_time_ms (float): Processing time in milliseconds
Annotations the server declares
- title: Upscale Image
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:25 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://apim-ai-apis.azure-api.net/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp/image/mcp
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://apim-ai-apis.azure-api.net/mcp/image/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including remove_background (destructive), upscale_image (write), restore_face (write), check_image_service (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "remove_background" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "remove_background" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.
The server marks "remove_background" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "remove_background" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http image-tools https://apim-ai-apis.azure-api.net/mcp/image/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http image-tools https://apim-ai-apis.azure-api.net/mcp/image/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__image-tools__upscale_image",
"mcp__image-tools__restore_face",
"mcp__image-tools__check_image_service"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__image-tools__remove_background"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as image-tools. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__image-tools__remove_background untrusted-input
- mcp__image-tools__upscale_image untrusted-input
- mcp__image-tools__restore_face untrusted-input
- mcp__image-tools__check_image_service untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.fasuizu-br/image-tools/verify?hash=069ce18276b1234b4021fc4429e3b31051f38b07e08f95139e88be64ce3a821c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 069ce18276b1, from Nov 19, 2026, 16:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.fasuizu-br/image-tools/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.fasuizu-br/image-tools)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:33 UTC.
Image Tools - Background Removal, Upscaling & Face Restoration MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Image Tools - Background Removal, Upscaling & Face Restoration MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Image Tools - Background Removal, Upscaling & Face Restoration MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: remove_background.
Can the Image Tools - Background Removal, Upscaling & Face Restoration MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Image Tools - Background Removal, Upscaling & Face Restoration MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 destructive, 3 write. remove_background, upscale_image, restore_face and check_image_service.
Does the Image Tools - Background Removal, Upscaling & Face Restoration MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Image Tools - Background Removal, Upscaling & Face Restoration MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Image Tools - Background Removal, Upscaling & Face Restoration MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.