Aspicio MCP server
io.github.frontsail-ai/aspiciofrontsail-aistreamable-httpv0.13.2Scanned
DXF and PDF/X-4 for AI agents: structured facts, PNG renders, an interactive in-chat viewer.
8 tools: 5 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 8
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
5 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Aspicio MCP server can do
The Aspicio MCP server is published by the GitHub account frontsail-ai. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: render_dxf, render_pdf, render_doc, view_dxf and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (describe_doc and view_dxf); 8 tools bring in text other people can write (describe_dxf, render_dxf, describe_pdf and 5 more).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.13.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
load_dxf_for_viewerInternal: returns DXF bytes (base64) for the in-chat viewer.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Internal: returns DXF bytes (base64) for the in-chat viewer. Called by the widget, not the model.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
render_docRender a drawing in any supported format (DXF or PDF) to a PNG you can look at, detected from its bytes rather than its name.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Render a drawing in any supported format (DXF or PDF) to a PNG you can look at, detected from its bytes rather than its name. Use this when you do not know which format you have. Renders the first page/sheet by default; pass `space` (a name from a describe reply's `spaces`) to render another one. Some chat UIs do not display the returned image to the user: for URL sources the result also includes a direct image link — show it (e.g. as a markdown image) when they need to see the render. When the user wants to see or explore the drawing themselves, prefer view_dxf (interactive viewer) — if your platform gates it behind user approval, offer it and ask rather than substituting a static render.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
render_dxfRender a DXF drawing to a PNG image you can look at.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Render a DXF drawing to a PNG image you can look at. Use this to answer visual questions (what does it look like, where is a feature, does it look right) — it returns an image, not text. For structural facts, prefer describe_dxf. For a PDF use render_pdf; if you do not know the format, use render_doc. Renders the first page/sheet by default; pass `space` (a name from a describe reply's `spaces`) to render another one. Some chat UIs do not display the returned image to the user: for URL sources the result also includes a direct image link — show it (e.g. as a markdown image) when they need to see the render. When the user wants to see or explore the drawing themselves, prefer view_dxf (interactive viewer) — if your platform gates it behind user approval, offer it and ask rather than substituting a static render.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
render_pdfRender a PDF drawing's vector content to a PNG you can look at.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Render a PDF drawing's vector content to a PNG you can look at. Images, shadings, and transparency are not drawn — they are reported by describe_pdf — so this shows line work and text, not a page facsimile. For a DXF use render_dxf; if you do not know the format, use render_doc. Renders the first page/sheet by default; pass `space` (a name from a describe reply's `spaces`) to render another one. Some chat UIs do not display the returned image to the user: for URL sources the result also includes a direct image link — show it (e.g. as a markdown image) when they need to see the render. When the user wants to see or explore the drawing themselves, prefer view_dxf (interactive viewer) — if your platform gates it behind user approval, offer it and ask rather than substituting a static render.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
view_dxfOpen an interactive viewer the user can pan, zoom, and toggle layers in (renders in-chat on MCP Apps-capable hosts).Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "view_dxf" says "view": a word for reading.
- The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "chat": it reads messages.
- private-dataThe input names a file (input.allow_file_open), and the tool reads: it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "open" and "chat": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "view_dxf" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "view_dxf" says "view": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Open an interactive viewer the user can pan, zoom, and toggle layers in (renders in-chat on MCP Apps-capable hosts). Reads DXF and vector PDF; for a PDF it shows line work and text rather than a page facsimile, so images, shadings, and transparency are absent by design. Use this when the user wants to see or explore the drawing themselves; for your own analysis use a describe_* tool (facts) or a render_* tool (image). The viewer shows only the drawing from this call. Delivery is handled by the widget itself: small drawings are embedded in the result and larger URL-sourced drawings are fetched by the widget through its own tool call — never re-fetch or inline the file for the viewer's sake, and don't blind-retry if the user reports an empty viewer (the viewer posts its actual status back to the conversation context).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
describe_docReturn a structured JSON summary of a drawing in any supported format (DXF or PDF), detected from its bytes rather than its name.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "describe_doc" says "describe": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "describe_doc" says "describe" and "doc": it reads documents.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Return a structured JSON summary of a drawing in any supported format (DXF or PDF), detected from its bytes rather than its name. Use this when you do not know which format you have; the reply names the format that was read. Covers the whole drawing by default, including every page of a multi-page PDF; pass `space` (a name from the reply's `spaces`) to scope it to one page or sheet. When the user wants to see or explore the drawing themselves, prefer view_dxf (interactive viewer) — if your platform gates it behind user approval, offer it and ask rather than substituting a static render.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
describe_dxfReturn a structured JSON summary of a DXF drawing — units, bounding box, layers (with the color actually drawn), per-type entity counts, and any skipped/unsupported types.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "describe_dxf" says "describe": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Return a structured JSON summary of a DXF drawing — units, bounding box, layers (with the color actually drawn), per-type entity counts, and any skipped/unsupported types. Use this to answer structural questions (what layers exist, how many parts, what size, is it to scale) without rendering an image. For a PDF use describe_pdf; if you do not know the format, use describe_doc. Covers the whole drawing by default, including every page of a multi-page PDF; pass `space` (a name from the reply's `spaces`) to scope it to one page or sheet. When the user wants to see or explore the drawing themselves, prefer view_dxf (interactive viewer) — if your platform gates it behind user approval, offer it and ask rather than substituting a static render.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
describe_pdfReturn a structured JSON summary of a PDF drawing — units (points), bounding box, layers, per-type entity counts, the text it contains, and what was skipped (images, shadings, tran…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "describe_pdf" says "describe": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Return a structured JSON summary of a PDF drawing — units (points), bounding box, layers, per-type entity counts, the text it contains, and what was skipped (images, shadings, transparency). Use this for structural questions about a PDF without rendering it. For a DXF use describe_dxf; if you do not know the format, use describe_doc. Covers the whole drawing by default, including every page of a multi-page PDF; pass `space` (a name from the reply's `spaces`) to scope it to one page or sheet. When the user wants to see or explore the drawing themselves, prefer view_dxf (interactive viewer) — if your platform gates it behind user approval, offer it and ask rather than substituting a static render.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write8
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:05 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://aspicio-api.frontsail.app/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including render_dxf (write), render_pdf (write), render_doc (write), view_dxf (write), load_dxf_for_viewer (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnview_dxf
The server marks "view_dxf" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "view_dxf" says "view": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.13.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http aspicio https://aspicio-api.frontsail.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http aspicio https://aspicio-api.frontsail.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__aspicio__describe_dxf",
"mcp__aspicio__describe_pdf",
"mcp__aspicio__describe_doc"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__aspicio__render_dxf",
"mcp__aspicio__render_pdf",
"mcp__aspicio__render_doc",
"mcp__aspicio__view_dxf",
"mcp__aspicio__load_dxf_for_viewer"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as aspicio. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 8 rules
- mcp__aspicio__describe_dxf untrusted-input
- mcp__aspicio__render_dxf untrusted-input
- mcp__aspicio__describe_pdf untrusted-input
- mcp__aspicio__render_pdf untrusted-input
- mcp__aspicio__describe_doc private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__aspicio__render_doc untrusted-input
- mcp__aspicio__view_dxf private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__aspicio__load_dxf_for_viewer untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.frontsail-ai/aspicio/verify?hash=14085b50a02a53c16edcb68313f38fb79fec0a8de710cfa39c16db9746416b36" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 14085b50a02a, from Nov 8, 2026, 18:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.frontsail-ai/aspicio/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.frontsail-ai/aspicio)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 23, 2026, 02:17 UTC.
Aspicio MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Aspicio MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Aspicio MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Aspicio MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Aspicio MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 5 write, 3 read. render_dxf, render_pdf, render_doc, view_dxf, load_dxf_for_viewer, describe_dxf, describe_pdf and describe_doc.
Does the Aspicio MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Aspicio MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Aspicio MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.