Ambr MCP server
io.github.getambr/ambr-mcp-servergetambrstreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned
Ricardian contracts for AI agents — dual-format, SHA-256 bound, legible by construction.
7 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Ambr MCP server can do
The Ambr MCP server is published by the GitHub account getambr. It has 7 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (ambr_check_transaction) and create or change data (3 tools: ambr_create_contract, ambr_verify_hash and ambr_agent_handshake), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (long-description and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.3.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
ambr_check_transactionCheck one payment against the limits of an agreement.2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The input carries an amount (input.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
The description is 4,886 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...t that was checked (contract_id, effective_contract_id, sha256_hash, reader_url)."
- Warn
The server marks "ambr_check_transaction" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input carries an amount (input.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
Description, as the server wrote it Check one payment against the limits of an agreement. Advisory only: Ambr compares what you report with the figures stored with the agreement; it does not authorize, block or see the payments it checks, and a "within_limits" answer is not an approval or a guarantee. It checks only what a program can check exactly: status, validity window, currency, per-transaction and monthly limits, a total budget, a price or monthly fee, the approval and escalation thresholds, and the category and action labels you send, matched exactly against the agreement's lists (case, spaces, dots, colons and hyphens are folded, and a leading "do not", "don't", "no", "not", "never", "avoid", "without" or "prohibited:" on a prohibited entry is ignored). The limits come from the form answers stored with the agreement, not from its text. It reads the delegation templates (general authorization, power of attorney, limited service, fleet) and the commerce templates (API access, compute SLA, task execution). If the agreement was amended, the newest approved version is checked. Free: no credits are burned. Amounts are compared in USD (USDC counts as USD) or in the template's own currency; a payment in another currency is not compared and the verdict is "incomplete". It does NOT read the agreement's human-readable text. Anything written in words (the scope, conditions, geographic limits, who may be paid, how a limit is measured) is for you to read yourself: always read the agreement's scope and conditions before acting on any answer. The response's "not_checked" lists, by path and never the text, parts to start with (each has a kind and a short reason; at most thirty are listed, "not_checked_count" has the total). It is a best-effort hint, not a complete list: an empty or short list does not mean there is nothing to read. Read the agreement itself through the contract read. Verdicts: - "within_limits": the template is one the check reads, the form answers are stored and valid, every limit they set was evaluated and passed, every figure written in digits or in common number words in the agreement's machine-readable text is accounted for, and at least one spending limit or price was evaluated. It says nothing about terms written in words. - "out_of_scope": a limit definitely fails (status, validity window, a cap, a payment that must equal what is left of a task price, a category or action that is not on a list held in the form answers, or that is prohibited). A permitted-action or category list found only in the agreement's text is never trusted to decide this: a miss there is "incomplete". - "needs_approval": an approval or escalation threshold is exceeded. "also_incomplete": true then means some limit could not be evaluated either; the reasons still carry it. - "incomplete": something could not be checked or placed: an input you did not send (category, action, currency, period_spent), a form answer the check cannot use, a figure or statement in the agreement's text that the form answers do not explain or contradict, wording beside a limit that names another period than the one period_spent covers, a date the check cannot place as the agreement's end, a miss on a permitted-action or category list found only in the agreement's text, a payment that is not a whole number of calls at the price per call, permitted counterparties (the request carries none), a payment model the check cannot match, an agreement without stored form answers or made from another template. Ambr does not hold funds or track spend: period_spent is what was already spent in the period the limit covers (this month for a monthly limit, fee or fleet budget, for a fleet the whole fleet's; the whole agreement so far for a total budget or task price). One payment above a limit fails without it. Access: a public contract is open to anyone; otherwise use the creator's API key or pass a share_token. Args: - contract_id (string, required): Contract ID (amb-YYYY-NNNN), SHA-256 hash, or UUID - amount (number, required): payment amount, zero or more - currency (string, optional): e.g. "USD" - category (string, optional): your own category label, matched exactly against the agreement's list - action (string, optional): the action the agent is taking, matched exactly against the agreement's lists - period_spent (number, optional): already spent in the period the limit covers (this month, or the whole agreement for a total budget) - share_token (string, optional): share token for a private contract Returns: verdict ("within_limits" | "out_of_scope" | "incomplete" | "needs_approval"), the per-rule checks, plain-language reasons, "not_checked" and "not_checked_count", "also_incomplete" when it applies, and the contract that was checked (contract_id, effective_contract_id, sha256_hash, reader_url).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
ambr_agent_handshakeInitiate a handshake on a contract on behalf of your delegating principal.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Initiate a handshake on a contract on behalf of your delegating principal. Requires an API key with an active delegation (principal wallet registered via /api/v1/delegations). Records the agent's intent to accept, reject, or request changes on the contract. The principal must separately approve via wallet signature on the Reader Portal. Args: - contract_id (string, required): Contract ID (amb-YYYY-NNNN), SHA-256 hash, or UUID - intent (string, required): "accept" | "reject" | "request_changes" - message (string, optional): Note for the counterparty - visibility_preference (string, optional): "private" | "metadata_only" | "public" | "encrypted" Returns: Handshake status and next steps for principal approval. Legibility: the handshake itself is auditable — delegation scope, agent identity, and principal approval are recorded alongside the contract hash.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
ambr_create_contractGenerate a Ricardian Contract from a template.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ambr_create_contract" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate a Ricardian Contract from a template. Creates a dual-format contract (human-readable legal text + machine-parsable JSON) using AI, linked by SHA-256 hash. The contract is stored on Ambr and accessible via the Reader Portal. Requires a valid API key (X-API-Key header on the HTTP request) with available credits. Use ambr_list_templates first to discover templates and their required parameters. Args: - template (string, required): Template slug (e.g. "d1-general-auth") - parameters (object, required): Template-specific parameters matching the schema - principal_declaration (object, required): { agent_id, principal_name, principal_type } - principal_wallet (string, optional): the deploying party's own wallet. It must differ from the counterparty wallet in parameters (same_wallet_both_parties otherwise); left out, the first wallet that signs fills the principal side - parent_contract_hash (string, optional): SHA-256 hash of a contract you created, which this one is created under (its oversight threshold then applies). Not for amendments: propose those with POST /api/v1/contracts/{id}/amend - oversight_threshold_usd (number, optional): spending level above which work created under this contract needs human approval. Children exceeding it halt at awaiting_principal_approval. Returns: - contract_id: Unique ID (e.g. "amb-2026-0042") - sha256_hash: SHA-256 hash for verification - status: Contract status - reader_url: URL to view in Reader Portal - credits_remaining: Remaining API credits Legibility: Output is dual-format by construction and replayable to the original SHA-256 hash — the basis of Ambr's legibility guarantee.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
ambr_verify_hashVerify a contract's SHA-256 hash to confirm document integrity.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify a contract's SHA-256 hash to confirm document integrity. Checks whether the provided hash matches a contract stored on Ambr. Returns verification status, contract metadata, and Reader Portal URL if found. Args: - hash (string, required): SHA-256 hash (64-character hex string) Returns: - verified: boolean - contract_id: string (if found) - status: string (if found) - reader_url: string (if found) Legibility: verification is the point at which legibility becomes provable — matching hash means the prose a human reads and the JSON a machine parses are the same document that was originally signed.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
ambr_get_contractRetrieve a contract by ID, SHA-256 hash, or UUID.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ambr_get_contract" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve a contract by ID, SHA-256 hash, or UUID. With a valid API key (contract creator): returns the full contract including human-readable text, machine-readable JSON, status, and principal declaration. Without authentication: returns metadata only (contract_id, status, hash, dates). Supports three lookup formats: - Contract ID: "amb-2026-0042" - SHA-256 hash: 64-character hex string - UUID: Standard UUID format Args: - id (string, required): Contract ID, SHA-256 hash, or UUID Returns: Full contract (if authorized) or metadata-only response. Legibility: retrieval preserves the dual-format pairing — prose and JSON always replay to the same SHA-256.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
ambr_get_contract_statusCheck the status of a contract and its amendment chain.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ambr_get_contract_status" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Check the status of a contract and its amendment chain. Returns the current status and any linked amendments (parent or child contracts). Useful for verifying if a contract is active, amended, or terminated. Args: - id (string, required): Contract ID, SHA-256 hash, or UUID Returns: - contract_id, status, created_at - amendment_type, parent_contract_hash - amendments: Array of child contracts (if any) Legibility: amendments are bilateral and themselves dual-format — the chain stays legible from original through every revision.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
ambr_list_templatesList available contract templates on Ambr.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ambr_list_templates" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List available contract templates on Ambr. Returns all active Ricardian Contract templates with their slugs, names, descriptions, categories, parameter schemas, and pricing. Use this to discover which templates are available before creating a contract with ambr_create_contract. No authentication required. Returns: Array of template objects with slug, name, description, category, parameter_schema, price_cents, and version fields. Legibility: templates are the parameter schema for the dual-format contracts you create — starting here keeps your request conformant and your output defensible.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:05 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://getamber.dev/api/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including ambr_check_transaction (irreversible), ambr_create_contract (write), ambr_verify_hash (write), ambr_agent_handshake (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 6, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "ambr_check_transaction" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input carries an amount (input.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
The description is 4,886 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...t that was checked (contract_id, effective_contract_id, sha256_hash, reader_url)."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:ambr_check_transactionCan't be undonedescriptioninputSchema
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 4.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4
Tools1 added, 1 changed.+1 added~1 changedView diff
- Added:ambr_check_transactionCan't be undone
- Changed:ambr_create_contractChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http ambr https://getamber.dev/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http ambr https://getamber.dev/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__ambr__ambr_list_templates",
"mcp__ambr__ambr_get_contract",
"mcp__ambr__ambr_get_contract_status"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__ambr__ambr_create_contract",
"mcp__ambr__ambr_verify_hash",
"mcp__ambr__ambr_agent_handshake",
"mcp__ambr__ambr_check_transaction"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ambr. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.getambr/ambr-mcp-server/verify?hash=b865fd73edcedfd019b7cdd3250acbf9849fd2cfe997f8a79d9f8f9583a9c476" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b865fd73edce, from Nov 19, 2026, 19:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.getambr/ambr-mcp-server/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.getambr/ambr-mcp-server)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:34 UTC.
Ambr MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Ambr MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Ambr MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Ambr MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: ambr_check_transaction.
What tools does the Ambr MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write, 3 read. ambr_check_transaction, ambr_create_contract, ambr_verify_hash, ambr_agent_handshake, ambr_list_templates, ambr_get_contract and ambr_get_contract_status.
Does the Ambr MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Ambr MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Ambr MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.