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BentCrypto Machine Payments MCP server

io.github.ghstaking/bentcrypto-machine-paymentsghstakingstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Paid token risk and security intelligence for AI agents over MCP with x402 payments.

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the BentCrypto Machine Payments MCP server can do

The BentCrypto Machine Payments MCP server is published by the GitHub account ghstaking. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: token_risk and token_security), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (token_risk and token_security).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • token_riskPaid pre-trade token risk analysis.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 43-character base64 string.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...in. Example Solana: So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112. Example Base: 0x42..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Paid pre-trade token risk analysis. Supports Solana and Base. The HTTP transport returns an x402 challenge before private analysis executes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • token_securityPaid Solana token-control analysis covering mint/freeze authority and Token-2022 control risks.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 43-character base64 string.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...o inspect. Example: So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Paid Solana token-control analysis covering mint/freeze authority and Token-2022 control risks. The HTTP transport returns an x402 challenge before private analysis executes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:05 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.bentcrypto.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including token_risk (write), token_security (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 43-character base64 string.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...in. Example Solana: So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112. Example Base: 0x42..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 43-character base64 string.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...o inspect. Example: So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http bentcrypto-machine-payments https://api.bentcrypto.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http bentcrypto-machine-payments https://api.bentcrypto.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__bentcrypto-machine-payments__token_risk",
      "mcp__bentcrypto-machine-payments__token_security"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as bentcrypto-machine-payments. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__bentcrypto-machine-payments__token_risk untrusted-input
  • mcp__bentcrypto-machine-payments__token_security untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ghstaking/bentcrypto-machine-payments/verify?hash=d3b688496257b884edaa6968a81a6a59798cb57eca4a08c4bd712b20e256743a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d3b688496257, from Nov 20, 2026, 21:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ghstaking/bentcrypto-machine-payments/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.ghstaking/bentcrypto-machine-payments
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.ghstaking/bentcrypto-machine-payments.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ghstaking/bentcrypto-machine-payments)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:34 UTC.

BentCrypto Machine Payments MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the BentCrypto Machine Payments MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the BentCrypto Machine Payments MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the BentCrypto Machine Payments MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the BentCrypto Machine Payments MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. token_risk and token_security.

Does the BentCrypto Machine Payments MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the BentCrypto Machine Payments MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the BentCrypto Machine Payments MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.