acdoyle MCP server
io.github.granetb-acdoyle/acdoylegranetb-acdoylestreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Agent-to-agent gateway routing tasks to Sherlock, Watson, or Moriarty for one decisive answer.
2 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the acdoyle MCP server can do
The acdoyle MCP server is published by the GitHub account granetb-acdoyle. It has 2 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (acdoyle_dispatch and acdoyle_dispatch_x402), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
2 tools can send data out of your system (acdoyle_dispatch and acdoyle_dispatch_x402).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Last scanned Nov 5, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
acdoyle_dispatchSend a task to acdoyle, an agent-to-agent gateway.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe description's first verb is "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Send a task to acdoyle, an agent-to-agent gateway. acdoyle routes the task to one of three specialist personas (Sherlock: general decisive research/recommendation; Watson: budget execution and allocation, currently simulated; Moriarty: monetization/opportunity advice) and returns one confident, non-hedged answer. Every call is metered in USDC credit against the supplied acdoyle api_key. Get an api_key and top up credit at https://acdoyle.dev.
acdoyle_dispatch_x402Send a task to acdoyle, an agent-to-agent gateway, with no pre-issued api_key required.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe description's first verb is "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Send a task to acdoyle, an agent-to-agent gateway, with no pre-issued api_key required. acdoyle routes the task to one of three specialist personas (Sherlock: general decisive research/recommendation; Watson: budget execution and allocation, currently simulated; Moriarty: monetization/opportunity advice) and returns one confident, non-hedged answer. This call is gated by the x402 payment protocol instead of a metered api_key: the underlying HTTP request may come back as an HTTP 402 with a payment-required challenge (price, network, and payment details) instead of a result. If that happens, this tool returns isError: true with the 402 challenge details in its content — the MCP client's own HTTP layer (or the calling agent) must complete the x402 payment (sign and attach the payment header) and retry the call for it to succeed. Currently Base Sepolia testnet only.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:05 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 402
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 402.
Posture changes
- Nov 13, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 402; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http acdoyle https://acdoyle.dev/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http acdoyle https://acdoyle.dev/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__acdoyle__acdoyle_dispatch",
"mcp__acdoyle__acdoyle_dispatch_x402"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as acdoyle. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__acdoyle__acdoyle_dispatch outbound
- mcp__acdoyle__acdoyle_dispatch_x402 outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.granetb-acdoyle/acdoyle/verify?hash=f8c0cb37d76f9581d80db7f68f2fa6518a193cfab51fc6c40845878cf717a845" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash f8c0cb37d76f, from Nov 5, 2026, 21:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.granetb-acdoyle/acdoyle/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.granetb-acdoyle/acdoyle)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:34 UTC.
acdoyle MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the acdoyle MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the acdoyle MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the acdoyle MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: acdoyle_dispatch and acdoyle_dispatch_x402.
What tools does the acdoyle MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 irreversible. acdoyle_dispatch and acdoyle_dispatch_x402.
Does the acdoyle MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the acdoyle MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): acdoyle_dispatch and acdoyle_dispatch_x402.
Has the acdoyle MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 5, 2026.