A2A Passport — one GTIN, one call, everything GSC knows, signed MCP server
io.github.greencore-solutions/a2a-passportgreencore-solutionsstreamable-httpv1.0.2Scanned
The hubs are the records; A2A-Passport.ai issues the passport.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the A2A Passport — one GTIN, one call, everything GSC knows, signed MCP server can do
The A2A Passport — one GTIN, one call, everything GSC knows, signed MCP server is published by the GitHub account greencore-solutions. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: get_passport and verify_passport), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (get_passport and list_passports).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
get_passportThe signed passport of a product (a Global Trade Item Number, GTIN) or a retail banner (market/banner, e.g.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_passport" says "get": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "get_passport" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_passport" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The signed passport of a product (a Global Trade Item Number, GTIN) or a retail banner (market/banner, e.g. FR/Carrefour): which hub holds its record, where it is on the record, its compliance records, who lists it, where the payment door is. Read live from the wefetch hubs on every call; the first call issues version 1. subject = a GTIN (8 to 14 digits) or market/banner; kind = gtin or banner (optional).
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
verify_passportCheck a passport: is the signature valid, is the chain of versions intact, how old is the stamp, was any section not read.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a passport: is the signature valid, is the chain of versions intact, how old is the stamp, was any section not read. Verifies from the published key at /.well-known/jwks.json.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
list_passportsThe passports on the register: ids, kinds, markets, versions and issue times, newest first.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_passports" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "issue": it reads issues, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it The passports on the register: ids, kinds, markets, versions and issue times, newest first. No bodies. Filter by kind (gtin or banner), market, or issued since a time; paginated.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:05 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.a2a-passport.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including get_passport (write), verify_passport (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnget_passport
The server marks "get_passport" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "get_passport" says "get": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:get_passportChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:list_passportsOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:verify_passportChanges thingsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http a2a-passport https://mcp.a2a-passport.ai/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http a2a-passport https://mcp.a2a-passport.ai/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__a2a-passport__list_passports"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__a2a-passport__get_passport",
"mcp__a2a-passport__verify_passport"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as a2a-passport. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__a2a-passport__get_passport untrusted-input
- mcp__a2a-passport__list_passports untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.greencore-solutions/a2a-passport/verify?hash=5430bc40f2afa8e9ac02151f913211eb22483d43e99a405353e48f27f6591dd5" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5430bc40f2af, from Nov 19, 2026, 19:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.greencore-solutions/a2a-passport/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.greencore-solutions/a2a-passport)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:34 UTC.
A2A Passport — one GTIN, one call, everything GSC knows, signed MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the A2A Passport — one GTIN, one call, everything GSC knows, signed MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the A2A Passport — one GTIN, one call, everything GSC knows, signed MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the A2A Passport — one GTIN, one call, everything GSC knows, signed MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the A2A Passport — one GTIN, one call, everything GSC knows, signed MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. get_passport, verify_passport and list_passports.
Does the A2A Passport — one GTIN, one call, everything GSC knows, signed MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the A2A Passport — one GTIN, one call, everything GSC knows, signed MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the A2A Passport — one GTIN, one call, everything GSC knows, signed MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.