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Agent Daily MCP server

io.github.gregpunch/agent-dailygregpunchstreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned

Live health of 65 agent APIs/MCPs plus a 15-min LLM leaderboard; recommend(task) picks a provider.

5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Agent Daily MCP server can do

The Agent Daily MCP server is published by the GitHub account gregpunch. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: llm_leaderboard, recommend and incidents), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

5 tools bring in text other people can write (llm_leaderboard, recommend, incidents and 2 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 0.3.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • incidentsOutages (consecutive failed probes) and vendor status-page incidents with UTC start/end over the last N days (max 7).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Outages (consecutive failed probes) and vendor status-page incidents with UTC start/end over the last N days (max 7). Optional provider name filter. Use to judge whether a failing API is a known incident.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • llm_leaderboardWhich LLMs are up, correct and fast right now.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Which LLMs are up, correct and fast right now. Every 15 minutes ~20 popular models (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta, Mistral, DeepSeek, xAI, Qwen, Cohere...) are asked to reply 'pong'; returns rank, score (60% 24h correctness + 40% speed), correct %, p50 time-to-first-token, p50 total time, cost per 1k calls, uptime and last result. Use to pick a fast, reliable model. sort: score (default) | correct | ttft | total | cost.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • recommendBefore calling an external API, ask which provider to use.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before calling an external API, ask which provider to use. Give a task phrase or category (e.g. 'send email', 'web search', 'llm', 'scrape a page', 'vector db', 'speech to text', 'payments', 'geocode'). Returns the top healthy pick plus 1-2 fallbacks ranked by live status, vendor status, 7-day uptime and latency, with a reason and data freshness.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • list_toolsList the APIs and MCP servers Agent Daily monitors, with current up/down, latency and vendor status.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_tools" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the APIs and MCP servers Agent Daily monitors, with current up/down, latency and vendor status. Call before choosing a provider. Optional category filter (e.g. LLM, MCP, Search, Payments, Comms, Infra).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • tool_statusFull status record for one monitored tool (up, http_status, latency_ms, vendor_status, uptime_24h_pct).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "tool_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full status record for one monitored tool (up, http_status, latency_ms, vendor_status, uptime_24h_pct). Case-insensitive name or substring, e.g. 'openai', 'GitHub MCP'. Reachability only, not correctness.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 30, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agent-daily.agentdaily.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including llm_leaderboard (write), recommend (write), incidents (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 30, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 3

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 3.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 3
  2. Tools3 added.+3 addedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-daily https://agent-daily.agentdaily.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent-daily https://agent-daily.agentdaily.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent-daily__list_tools",
      "mcp__agent-daily__tool_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-daily__llm_leaderboard",
      "mcp__agent-daily__recommend",
      "mcp__agent-daily__incidents"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-daily. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__agent-daily__llm_leaderboard untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-daily__recommend untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-daily__incidents untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-daily__list_tools untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-daily__tool_status untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.gregpunch/agent-daily/verify?hash=285347af76cdc0f16be5f438654c3510f2b2a3900f8c5b1b3f19ced9458e8b1e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 285347af76cd, from Nov 9, 2026, 10:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.gregpunch/agent-daily/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.gregpunch/agent-daily
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.gregpunch/agent-daily.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.gregpunch/agent-daily)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 26, 2026, 13:17 UTC.

Agent Daily MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Agent Daily MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Agent Daily MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Agent Daily MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Agent Daily MCP server have?

5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. llm_leaderboard, recommend, incidents, list_tools and tool_status.

Does the Agent Daily MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Agent Daily MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Agent Daily MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 26, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.