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cra-check MCP server

io.github.holistis/cra-checkholistisstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Free read-only check of a public GitHub repo for eight security signals related to the EU CRA.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the cra-check MCP server can do

The cra-check MCP server is published by the GitHub account holistis. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_x402_endpoint), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool reads private data (check_github_repo); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_github_repo and check_x402_endpoint); 1 tool can send data out of your system (check_x402_endpoint). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • check_x402_endpointMakes one anonymous request to a public x402 payment endpoint, without ever paying, and reports whether its payment request passes the official buyer schema and how far up the rece…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Makes one anonymous request to a public x402 payment endpoint, without ever paying, and reports whether its payment request passes the official buyer schema and how far up the receipt ladder the seller gets (does it name what it sells, does it sign its offer, does it return a signed receipt). Use it before an agent pays an endpoint it has not used before. The answer carries verdicts only, never the endpoint's raw headers or body. It is an indication from one request, not an endorsement, not a security review and not a promise that the seller will deliver; every answer says what it did not measure.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • check_github_repoReads up to about thirty public pages of a public GitHub repository and reports which of eight security signals are visible: a security policy that names a contact or a reporting l…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "check_github_repo" says "repo": it reads repositories.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "repository": it reads repositories.
    • private-dataThe input names a repo (input.repo), and the tool reads: it reads repositories.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reads up to about thirty public pages of a public GitHub repository and reports which of eight security signals are visible: a security policy that names a contact or a reporting link, a software bill of materials, proof of where releases come from, a lockfile, automatic updates of dependencies, security scans in CI, recent maintenance and a licence. For each signal that is not visible the answer says what would make it visible; a signal that could not be read completely is marked not measured, never as a gap. The eight signals are a selection related to topics in the EU Cyber Resilience Act. This is an indication from public data, not a compliance check, not a certificate and not legal advice; private repositories and hosts other than GitHub cannot be checked. Read only. Limited to a few checks per ten minutes per address.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

2 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__cra-check__check_x402_endpoint"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.tokenizen.nl/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including check_x402_endpoint (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 1.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 1

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http cra-check https://api.tokenizen.nl/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http cra-check https://api.tokenizen.nl/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__cra-check__check_github_repo"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__cra-check__check_x402_endpoint"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as cra-check. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__cra-check__check_github_repo private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__cra-check__check_x402_endpoint untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.holistis/cra-check/verify?hash=d0833cc5cdc85662609088dea29b11d0185c9cd69b2a2f74edc9d0b2a286cd4c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d0833cc5cdc8, from Nov 11, 2026, 08:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.holistis/cra-check/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.holistis/cra-check
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.holistis/cra-check.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.holistis/cra-check)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 29, 2026, 20:17 UTC.

cra-check MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the cra-check MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the cra-check MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the cra-check MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the cra-check MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. check_x402_endpoint and check_github_repo.

Does the cra-check MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the cra-check MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_x402_endpoint.

Has the cra-check MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 11, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.