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HumanLeg.ai MCP server

io.github.humanleg-ai/humanleghumanleg-aistreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

Hand bounded tasks from AI agents to trusted humans.

4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the HumanLeg.ai MCP server can do

The HumanLeg.ai MCP server is published by the GitHub account humanleg-ai. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: humanleg_create_fee_quote and humanleg_create_task), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (humanleg_get_compliance_review).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • humanleg_create_fee_quoteCreate a short-lived synthetic fee quote before creating a task.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "humanleg_create_fee_quote" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a short-lived synthetic fee quote before creating a task.
  • humanleg_create_taskCreate a bounded task and run compliance review.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "humanleg_create_task" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a bounded task and run compliance review. This does not fund or publish the task.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • humanleg_get_compliance_reviewRetrieve the exact-content compliance decision for a task.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "humanleg_get_compliance_review" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "humanleg_get_compliance_review" says "get" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve the exact-content compliance decision for a task.
  • humanleg_get_taskRetrieve the current task, content version, hash and lifecycle status.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "humanleg_get_task" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve the current task, content version, hash and lifecycle status.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 11, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://humanleg.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including humanleg_create_fee_quote (write), humanleg_create_task (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http humanleg https://humanleg.ai/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http humanleg https://humanleg.ai/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__humanleg__humanleg_get_task",
      "mcp__humanleg__humanleg_get_compliance_review"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__humanleg__humanleg_create_fee_quote",
      "mcp__humanleg__humanleg_create_task"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as humanleg. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__humanleg__humanleg_get_compliance_review untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.humanleg-ai/humanleg/verify?hash=1e0bc1731afe1e3099b1b403c16699052d5d08bdff292eae10a8ff96efc960a0" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1e0bc1731afe, from Nov 10, 2026, 17:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.humanleg-ai/humanleg/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.humanleg-ai/humanleg
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.humanleg-ai/humanleg.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.humanleg-ai/humanleg)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 17:18 UTC.

HumanLeg.ai MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the HumanLeg.ai MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the HumanLeg.ai MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the HumanLeg.ai MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the HumanLeg.ai MCP server have?

4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. humanleg_create_fee_quote, humanleg_create_task, humanleg_get_task and humanleg_get_compliance_review.

Does the HumanLeg.ai MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the HumanLeg.ai MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the HumanLeg.ai MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.