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apipay MCP server

io.github.iamalanlui/apipayiamalanluistreamable-httpv0.4.2Scanned

Prepaid balance for AI agents: one key, 4,900+ tools your agent can run today, caps, receipts.

8 tools: 3 can delete or cancel things, 4 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 3 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the apipay MCP server can do

The apipay MCP server is published by the GitHub account iamalanlui. It has 8 tools. It can delete or cancel things (3 tools: topup, secret_transfer and secret_generate) and create or change data (4 tools: call_api, get_vault_link, check_balance and vendor_call). 1 tool only reads.

1 tool reads private data (get_vault_link); 5 tools bring in text other people can write (search_apis, call_api, vendor_call and 2 more).

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict, credentials-mention and tool-shadowing). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.4.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

8 tools

Deletes or cancels 3Claude Code: deny
  • secret_generateGenerate a random secret and place it directly at a vendor resource SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conversation.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "secret_generate" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate a random secret and place it directly at a vendor resource SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conversation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • secret_transferMove a secret from one vendor to another SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conversation.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "secret_transfer" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The description contains "another SERVER", wording about other tools or servers.

      Matched text

      description: "Move a secret from one vendor to another SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conv..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Move a secret from one vendor to another SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conversation. Example: fetch a Supabase service_role key and place it as a Vercel env var.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • topupTop up the apifare balance from the owner's standing auto-refill mandate (if the owner enabled one).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "topup" says "topup": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Top up the apifare balance from the owner's standing auto-refill mandate (if the owner enabled one). Charges within the owner's configured limits and returns the new balance. Without a mandate, returns payment instructions to relay to the user.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • call_apiCall an API from the apifare catalog by slug (find slugs with search_apis).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "call_api" says "call": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call an API from the apifare catalog by slug (find slugs with search_apis). The cost in prepaid credits is deducted automatically and returned with the result.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • check_balanceCheck the remaining apifare prepaid credit balance (1 credit = $0.01) and get the top-up link.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check the remaining apifare prepaid credit balance (1 credit = $0.01) and get the top-up link.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • vendor_callCall a vendor MANAGEMENT API (supabase, vercel, fly, resend, github, npm, cloudflare, lemonsqueezy) with the owner's vaulted root credential injected server-side.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "vendor_call" says "call": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...nsqueezy) with the owner's vaulted root credential injected server-side. Native request/re..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call a vendor MANAGEMENT API (supabase, vercel, fly, resend, github, npm, cloudflare, lemonsqueezy) with the owner's vaulted root credential injected server-side. Native request/response; destructive, billing, and member/admin routes are blocked. The root token is never visible.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • search_apisSearch the apifare catalog of ready-to-call APIs (web search, scraping, weather, and more).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_apis" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "search" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the apifare catalog of ready-to-call APIs (web search, scraping, weather, and more). Returns each API's slug, params, and per-call price in prepaid credits. Every miss is logged so missing APIs get added.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:05 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
7
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (3 destructive, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://apifare.com/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including topup (destructive), secret_transfer (destructive), secret_generate (destructive), call_api (write), get_vault_link (write) and 2 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn1 info
  • The server marks "get_vault_link" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_vault_link" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The description contains "another SERVER", wording about other tools or servers.

    Matched text

    description: "Move a secret from one vendor to another SERVER-SIDE — the value never enters this conv..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...nsqueezy) with the owner's vaulted root credential injected server-side. Native request/re..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.4.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http apipay https://apifare.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http apipay https://apifare.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__apipay__search_apis"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__apipay__call_api",
      "mcp__apipay__get_vault_link",
      "mcp__apipay__check_balance",
      "mcp__apipay__vendor_call"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__apipay__topup",
      "mcp__apipay__secret_transfer",
      "mcp__apipay__secret_generate"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as apipay. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__apipay__search_apis untrusted-input
  • mcp__apipay__call_api untrusted-input
  • mcp__apipay__get_vault_link private-data
  • mcp__apipay__vendor_call untrusted-input
  • mcp__apipay__secret_transfer untrusted-input
  • mcp__apipay__secret_generate untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.iamalanlui/apipay/verify?hash=2c8555c28f83b216dedefec649c97a8f0250723dfb42a4a99067cba20cd11806" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 2c8555c28f83, from Nov 19, 2026, 21:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.iamalanlui/apipay/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.iamalanlui/apipay
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.iamalanlui/apipay.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.iamalanlui/apipay)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:36 UTC.

apipay MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the apipay MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the apipay MCP server delete data?

Yes. 3 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: topup, secret_transfer and secret_generate.

Can the apipay MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the apipay MCP server have?

8 tools: 3 destructive, 4 write, 1 read. topup, secret_transfer, secret_generate, call_api, get_vault_link, check_balance, vendor_call and search_apis.

Does the apipay MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the apipay MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the apipay MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.