Agent Utility MCP server
io.github.insivotron/agent-utility-mcpinsivotronstreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned
Stop your agent before it runs rm -rf /etc or emails your .env. Deterministic preflight checks.
4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agent Utility MCP server can do
The Agent Utility MCP server is published by the GitHub account insivotron. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (analyze_tool_call) and create or change data (1 tool: inspect_command), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (inspect_file); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (analyze_url_risk); 1 tool can send data out of your system (analyze_url_risk). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.3.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
analyze_tool_callAnalyze a proposed AI-agent tool call before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) covering destructive actions, sensitive-d…1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "analyze_tool_call" says "analyze": a word for reading.
- The description says "irreversible".
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "analyze_tool_call" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "analyze_tool_call" says "analyze": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyze a proposed AI-agent tool call before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) covering destructive actions, sensitive-data exposure, external transmission, privilege changes and irreversible operations, under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default. Filesystem paths outside a known workspace_root are treated as higher risk than paths inside it.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
inspect_commandAnalyze a shell command before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) without running it, under the applicable policy — permi…1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "inspect_command" says "inspect": a word for reading.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.command), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "inspect_command" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "inspect_command" says "inspect": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyze a shell command before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) without running it, under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default. Paths outside a known workspace_root are treated as higher risk than paths inside it.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
analyze_url_riskAnalyze a URL for structural and security risk signals and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) under the applicable policy — permissive,…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "analyze_url_risk" says "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe name "analyze_url_risk" says "analyze" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "analyze" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyze a URL for structural and security risk signals and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
inspect_fileInspect a Base64-encoded file locally for deterministic structural and security risk signals without executing it, and return a policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or blo…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "inspect_file" says "inspect": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "inspect_file" says "inspect" and "file": it reads files.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "inspect" and "file": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it Inspect a Base64-encoded file locally for deterministic structural and security risk signals without executing it, and return a policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__agent-utility__analyze_url_risk"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:06 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including analyze_tool_call (irreversible), inspect_command (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warninspect_command
The server marks "inspect_command" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "inspect_command" says "inspect": a word for reading.
The server marks "analyze_tool_call" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "analyze_tool_call" says "analyze": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-utility https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agent-utility https://agent-utility-mcp.insivotron.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agent-utility__inspect_file"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agent-utility__analyze_url_risk",
"mcp__agent-utility__inspect_command",
"mcp__agent-utility__analyze_tool_call"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-utility. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__agent-utility__analyze_url_risk untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-utility__inspect_file private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.insivotron/agent-utility-mcp/verify?hash=82e99fd93720bcbdc408f1030cdf9f515040220908c2ee5338441b988ec8461e" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 82e99fd93720, from Nov 20, 2026, 22:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.insivotron/agent-utility-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.insivotron/agent-utility-mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:36 UTC.
Agent Utility MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agent Utility MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agent Utility MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agent Utility MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: analyze_tool_call.
What tools does the Agent Utility MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read. analyze_tool_call, inspect_command, analyze_url_risk and inspect_file.
Does the Agent Utility MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agent Utility MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): analyze_url_risk.
Has the Agent Utility MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.