TradingAgentStack MCP server
io.github.intoApex/tradingagentstackintoApexstreamable-httpv0.8.0Scanned
Verified results for AI trading bots, vaults and algo strategies, plus safety scores and incidents.
11 tools: 3 change things and 8 only read.
- Reads private data · 3
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the TradingAgentStack MCP server can do
The TradingAgentStack MCP server is published by the GitHub account intoApex. It has 11 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: broker_order_gating, check and check_setup), but cannot delete data. 8 tools only read.
3 tools read private data (search_tools, get_leaderboard and get_track_record); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (get_tool and get_track_record).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 5 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 0.8.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
11 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
broker_order_gatingWho places the order for every official broker MCP server: AI trades directly, you confirm each order, approval optional, or you place the order.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Who places the order for every official broker MCP server: AI trades directly, you confirm each order, approval optional, or you place the order.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Broker MCP order approval overview
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
checkCheck before connecting (TAS Check): give a name, link, Telegram or X @handle, GitHub repo or app-store link of a Telegram trading bot, web trading terminal, exchange, swap service…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check before connecting (TAS Check): give a name, link, Telegram or X @handle, GitHub repo or app-store link of a Telegram trading bot, web trading terminal, exchange, swap service or wallet (incl. Zcash/Monero wallets). Returns whether the link is on that service's official list (confirmed from two independent places), a known fake, or a lookalike that uses its name, plus the worst case for your money, who holds the keys, freeze/hold policy, what a leaked API key can do, Monero/Zcash support, what the service collects about you and any data breaches, incidents, deadlines and a 3-step safe setup, each with sources. For a hardware wallet (by name, maker or website: Ledger, Trezor, Coldcard, OneKey, BitBox, Tangem, Keystone, Jade, Passport, CoolWallet) it also returns the custody score from tradingagentstack.com/custody/. For a shop, it says which maker names it on its own authorized-reseller list (Ledger, Trezor, BitBox, CoolWallet), flags marketplaces, and flags shops whose reseller authorization was revoked. Unknown links are reported as unknown, never as safe.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check a bot, exchange or wallet before connecting
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
check_setupCheck a whole setup at once: up to 8 bots, exchanges, wallets, swap services or AI trading connectors someone uses (names, links, @handles or slugs).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a whole setup at once: up to 8 bots, exchanges, wallets, swap services or AI trading connectors someone uses (names, links, @handles or slugs). For each: who holds the keys, the worst case, who places orders, the Safety score, incidents in the last 12 months and the first fix, each from the dataset. Also returns the single biggest risk by a fixed rule, items we don't track (reported as unknown, never as safe), and a report_url that opens the same report on tradingagentstack.com. Links that use a tracked name but aren't official are flagged.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check my whole setup
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 8Show 8 read-only tools
compare_toolsCompare two tools side by side, field by field, with sources.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "compare_tools" says "compare": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Compare two tools side by side, field by field, with sources.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Compare two tools
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_incidentsSecurity incidents involving AI agents, trading tools and the infrastructure they run on (breaches, exploits, security releases), each from an official disclosure.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_incidents" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Security incidents involving AI agents, trading tools and the infrastructure they run on (breaches, exploits, security releases), each from an official disclosure. Filter by date, or by a listed tool or a bot, exchange or wallet tracked by check.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent security incidents
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_leaderboardVerified performance leaderboard for AI trading agents, bots and vaults: return, BTC over the same dates, max drawdown and Sortino ratio, computed by TradingAgentStack from the ven…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_leaderboard" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "vault": it reads secrets.
Description, as the server wrote it Verified performance leaderboard for AI trading agents, bots and vaults: return, BTC over the same dates, max drawdown and Sortino ratio, computed by TradingAgentStack from the venue's public API (never screenshots, self-reported PnL or backtests), with security rated separately as a gate. Sections: ai_vaults (Hyperliquid vaults whose leader says they are AI-run, with the quoted claim), vaults (biggest Hyperliquid vaults of any strategy), agents (AI agents with an officially published trading account or on-chain registration), apps (AI trading apps on Hyperliquid: users, volume and users' realized PnL from public builder fills), models (which AI model forecasts and trades best: ForecastBench, Prophet Arena, Alpha Arena, FutureEval), signals (grade B: MQL5 robot signals on real accounts, venue-reported, not ranked), usage (fees users pay Telegram bots, trading apps and AI agent protocols, and open-source repo health). Ranked vaults passed a 30% drawdown gate and are sorted by Sortino; the rest are listed as high_drawdown. Not investment advice.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verified AI trading leaderboard
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_riskCheck a tool before your agent connects to it: how much money could be lost if the tool, or the agent using it, is wrong, hacked or prompt-injected?No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_risk" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a tool before your agent connects to it: how much money could be lost if the tool, or the agent using it, is wrong, hacked or prompt-injected? Returns the Safety score (human approval, guardrails outside the agent, test mode, sending funds out, who holds the keys, open source or audited, incident record), each input with its reason and source; missing inputs are listed, not guessed. Omit tool to rank every tool in a category (e.g. agent_wallet, bot_exchange, broker_mcp).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Safety score for a tool
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_toolFull facts for one tool: pricing, live vs paper, order approval, rate limits, safety score inputs and every source URL.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_tool" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Full facts for one tool: pricing, live vs paper, order approval, rate limits, safety score inputs and every source URL.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get tool facts and sources
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_track_recordLook up one verified track record by Hyperliquid vault address, vault URL or name, or by the address of an AI agent whose operator published its Hyperliquid or Polymarket account: …Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_track_record" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "vault": it reads secrets.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up one verified track record by Hyperliquid vault address, vault URL or name, or by the address of an AI agent whose operator published its Hyperliquid or Polymarket account: return, BTC over the same dates, max drawdown, Sortino, 30-day return and TVL (for Polymarket agents: ROI on money put in, PnL and win rate), computed by TradingAgentStack from Hyperliquid's public API (not self-reported), with the window, the data date and a SHA-256 of the record so an agent can cite exactly what it read. On the hosted endpoint the hash also comes signed (an ES256 JWT whose public keys are published), so anyone can check later that TradingAgentStack issued that exact record. Unknown addresses come back as not_tracked with how to get verified. Not investment advice.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Look up one verified track record
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_categoryList every tool in a category.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_category" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List every tool in a category. Call with an unknown category to get the list of categories.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List tools in a category
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_toolsSearch the TradingAgentStack directory of AI trading tools (broker MCP servers, trading and data APIs, bots, frameworks) by name, market or feature.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_tools" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "directory": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the TradingAgentStack directory of AI trading tools (broker MCP servers, trading and data APIs, bots, frameworks) by name, market or feature. Optional filters: category slug, can_trade_live, has_paper.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Search AI trading tools
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data3
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:06 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://tradingagentstack.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including broker_order_gating (write), check (write), check_setup (write)
Posture changes
- Oct 29, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 3
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff
- Added:get_track_recordOnly reads
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:checkChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:check_setupChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:get_riskOnly readstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 3.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 3
Tools2 added, 3 changed.+2 added~3 changedView diff
- Added:check_setupChanges things
- Added:get_leaderboardOnly reads
- Changed:checkChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:get_incidentsOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:search_toolsOnly readsinputSchema
Tools2 added.+2 addedView diff
- Added:get_incidentsOnly reads
- Added:get_riskOnly reads
Install
Pinned to version 0.8.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http tradingagentstack https://tradingagentstack.com/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http tradingagentstack https://tradingagentstack.com/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__tradingagentstack__search_tools",
"mcp__tradingagentstack__get_tool",
"mcp__tradingagentstack__list_category",
"mcp__tradingagentstack__compare_tools",
"mcp__tradingagentstack__get_risk",
"mcp__tradingagentstack__get_incidents",
"mcp__tradingagentstack__get_leaderboard",
"mcp__tradingagentstack__get_track_record"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__tradingagentstack__broker_order_gating",
"mcp__tradingagentstack__check",
"mcp__tradingagentstack__check_setup"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tradingagentstack. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__tradingagentstack__search_tools private-data
- mcp__tradingagentstack__get_tool untrusted-input
- mcp__tradingagentstack__get_leaderboard private-data
- mcp__tradingagentstack__get_track_record private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.intoApex/tradingagentstack/verify?hash=61ccee3ec9fbae392068e8c204682bf9c169247f32966915f50a4bf9b0c1bf4a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 61ccee3ec9fb, from Nov 9, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.intoApex/tradingagentstack/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.intoApex/tradingagentstack)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 9, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
TradingAgentStack MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the TradingAgentStack MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the TradingAgentStack MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the TradingAgentStack MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the TradingAgentStack MCP server have?
- 11 tools: 3 write, 8 read. broker_order_gating, check, check_setup, search_tools, get_tool, list_category, compare_tools, get_risk and 3 more.
Does the TradingAgentStack MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the TradingAgentStack MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the TradingAgentStack MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 5 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 9, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.