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ZTL Judge MCP server

io.github.inventor1975/ztl-judgeinventor1975streamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Zero-trust logic judge: ZFL claims, algebra derivation steps, sets defined by a property.

6 tools: 6 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 6 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

6 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ZTL Judge MCP server can do

The ZTL Judge MCP server is published by the GitHub account inventor1975. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: language, examples, judge, check_steps and 2 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • check_stepsCheck an algebra derivation step by step: does each step keep exactly the same solutions?No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check an algebra derivation step by step: does each step keep exactly the same solutions? Args: request: {"equations": ["x^2 = x", "x = 1"], "var": "x", "domain": [lo, hi] or null, "domain_verified": true}. Each equation is the next step; one unknown; + - * / ^ with whole powers. Returns: The chain's verdict (its weakest step) and each step's: EARNED = same solutions on the domain; ON CREDIT = the same, on an unverified domain; REFUTED = a solution is lost (e.g. cancelling a factor that can be 0) or gained (e.g. clearing a denominator where the original was undefined), with the witness and the cause; E = the step divides by an expression that is 0 for every value. A request above the public limits is refused with the reason (ok: false, refused).
  • checker_examplesReady requests for check_steps and judge_naive (the kernels' own examples).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ready requests for check_steps and judge_naive (the kernels' own examples).
  • examplesWorked examples: questions already written as ZFL documents, ready to judge.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Worked examples: questions already written as ZFL documents, ready to judge.
  • judgeJudge a ZFL document with ZTL, a zero-trust logic: three values, two-valued connectives.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Judge a ZFL document with ZTL, a zero-trust logic: three values, two-valued connectives. Args: document: The ZFL document, as an object or as JSON text: {"rows": [{"name": ..., "means": ..., "status": ..., "ground": ...}], "claim": ...}. Returns: The verdict with its disposition and grade, the receipt, the instruments that applied, the issues found, and what the core read. Read the verdict WITH its disposition: T EARNED = established; F REFUTED = false; F OPEN or Z OPEN = NOT ESTABLISHED, it could still turn either way (do not report it as false) — `why` and `unverified` say what to check; ON CREDIT = holds only on an unverified ground. A compound claim gets T or F; a claim that is a single name gets that name's own value, Z while unverified. The full report is returned whatever `ask` says.
  • judge_naiveJudge sets defined by a property, self-reference allowed (Russell's set, a web of trust, a policy rule).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Judge sets defined by a property, self-reference allowed (Russell's set, a web of trust, a policy rule). Args: universe: {"sets": {name: {"list": [...]} | {"data": {name: "T"|"F"|"Z"}} | {"abs": formula}}, "claims": [formula, ...]}. Formulas: ["in", a, S], ["not", f], ["and"|"or"|"imp"|"iff", f, g], ["all"|"ex", "y", f], ["eq", S, T]; an abs set's own variable is "x". Every name is also an object. Returns: Per set: the members and non-members the definitions ground, and a passport for each membership they leave undecided — PARADOX (no stipulation can repair it), UNDERDETERMINED (consistent; a decision is owed), INTRINSIC, INPUT (verify the given cell), DOWNSTREAM (inherits a quarantine). Per claim: EARNED / REFUTED / EARNED IF STABLE / REFUTED IF STABLE / OPEN, the cells it rests on with their passports, and for a universal claim the instances left undecided. Oversized requests are refused with the reason.
  • languageThe ZFL language: the columns of a row, the document fields, their meaning and rules.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The ZFL language: the columns of a row, the document fields, their meaning and rules.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:06 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.ztljudge.com/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including language (write), examples (write), judge (write), check_steps (write), judge_naive (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 6

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 6.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 6
  2. Tools3 added.+3 addedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http ztl-judge https://api.ztljudge.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http ztl-judge https://api.ztljudge.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__ztl-judge__language",
      "mcp__ztl-judge__examples",
      "mcp__ztl-judge__judge",
      "mcp__ztl-judge__check_steps",
      "mcp__ztl-judge__judge_naive",
      "mcp__ztl-judge__checker_examples"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ztl-judge. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.inventor1975/ztl-judge/verify?hash=dd408b33ee96b3ef1262259eb4138f9b0742d0cbddfbcd8d1e576182772016ca" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash dd408b33ee96, from Nov 19, 2026, 06:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.inventor1975/ztl-judge/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.inventor1975/ztl-judge
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.inventor1975/ztl-judge.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.inventor1975/ztl-judge)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 5, 2026, 10:18 UTC.

ZTL Judge MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ZTL Judge MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ZTL Judge MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the ZTL Judge MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ZTL Judge MCP server have?

6 tools: 6 write. language, examples, judge, check_steps, judge_naive and checker_examples.

Does the ZTL Judge MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ZTL Judge MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the ZTL Judge MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 5, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.