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ipvolt Proxy Toolkit MCP server

io.github.ipvolt/proxy-toolkitipvoltstreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned

Rent and manage ipvolt mobile proxies locally with an API key, or try a no-key sandbox; proxy docs.

4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 4 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ipvolt Proxy Toolkit MCP server can do

The ipvolt Proxy Toolkit MCP server is published by the GitHub account ipvolt. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: generate_proxy_config and diagnose_proxy_error), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (search_proxy_docs and get_proxy_doc).

The fixed checks matched 4 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.3.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • diagnose_proxy_errorUse structured client/version, phase, status or exception observations to identify possible causes and the next check.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...undaries. Do not send raw logs, URLs or credentials."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use structured client/version, phase, status or exception observations to identify possible causes and the next check. Returns uncertainty and retry boundaries. Do not send raw logs, URLs or credentials.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • generate_proxy_configGenerate an HTTPS GET example for an exact tested curl, Requests, HTTPX or Playwright APIRequestContext version.2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_proxy_config" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "Credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...r Playwright APIRequestContext version. Credentials and target are local environment placeh..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_proxy_config" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_proxy_config" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate an HTTPS GET example for an exact tested curl, Requests, HTTPX or Playwright APIRequestContext version. Credentials and target are local environment placeholders. It does not execute the example or configure other agent tools.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_proxy_docRead a bounded chunk or named section using a document ID returned by search_proxy_docs.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_proxy_doc" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "get_proxy_doc" says "get" and "doc": it reads documents.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "document": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a bounded chunk or named section using a document ID returned by search_proxy_docs. Follow nextCursor to continue; cursors are bound to the content revision.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_proxy_docsFind reviewed ipvolt public guides and articles.Reads private data1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_proxy_docs" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "search_proxy_docs" says "search" and "doc": it reads documents.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...sion. Submit a short topic query, never credentials or logs."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find reviewed ipvolt public guides and articles. Returns canonical document IDs, excerpts and content revision. Submit a short topic query, never credentials or logs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:06 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.ipvolt.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including generate_proxy_config (write), diagnose_proxy_error (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn3 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http proxy-toolkit https://mcp.ipvolt.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http proxy-toolkit https://mcp.ipvolt.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__proxy-toolkit__search_proxy_docs",
      "mcp__proxy-toolkit__get_proxy_doc"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__proxy-toolkit__generate_proxy_config",
      "mcp__proxy-toolkit__diagnose_proxy_error"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as proxy-toolkit. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__proxy-toolkit__search_proxy_docs private-data
  • mcp__proxy-toolkit__get_proxy_doc private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ipvolt/proxy-toolkit/verify?hash=6b9307cd43f5e948b7c0431f0641adfadcab06a46d17b6167e72f7354edf3106" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 6b9307cd43f5, from Nov 18, 2026, 20:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ipvolt/proxy-toolkit/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.ipvolt/proxy-toolkit
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.ipvolt/proxy-toolkit.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ipvolt/proxy-toolkit)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 18, 2026, 21:17 UTC.

ipvolt Proxy Toolkit MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ipvolt Proxy Toolkit MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ipvolt Proxy Toolkit MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the ipvolt Proxy Toolkit MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ipvolt Proxy Toolkit MCP server have?

4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. generate_proxy_config, diagnose_proxy_error, search_proxy_docs and get_proxy_doc.

Does the ipvolt Proxy Toolkit MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ipvolt Proxy Toolkit MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the ipvolt Proxy Toolkit MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.