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DeAI Artifact Gateway MCP server

io.github.jake-zaiba/deai-researchjake-zaibastreamable-httpv0.5.16Scanned

Verified-artifact library: match, ask, run fixture programs, reuse sealed pages (HTTP 402 toll).

13 tools: 11 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 11 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 10
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

11 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the DeAI Artifact Gateway MCP server can do

The DeAI Artifact Gateway MCP server is published by the GitHub account jake-zaiba. It has 13 tools. It can create or change data (11 tools: thin, match, ask, programs and 7 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

10 tools bring in text other people can write (thin, match, ask and 7 more).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict and tool-shadowing). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 8 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.5.16.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

13 tools

Changes things 11Claude Code: ask
  • answerExtractive by default: the best verified claims for the question assembled with fixed connectives, each quote verbatim with a [n] marker, a Signed citation receipt per claim, and t…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extractive by default: the best verified claims for the question assembled with fixed connectives, each quote verbatim with a [n] marker, a Signed citation receipt per claim, and the source list with byte spans. When this node runs a local 1.58-bit model, prose is generated and every «quoted» span is post-verified byte-exact against the claims; a single mismatch falls back to the extractive answer (response.mode says which). Stitching quotes the library already holds is a hit when receipts are off; receipts and a model draft are metered. Free when no verified claim matches. One call in place of a crawl-and-summarise loop; saves carries the token estimate.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • askWhen to call: you have a question or a payload and want the cheapest verified step.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    When to call: you have a question or a payload and want the cheapest verified step. MATCH lists program classes and pages (free without input). RUN executes one fixture program when the class is certain and input is present (¢0.1). An ask no one tool does that reads as two steps or more (sort q, w, e then remove duplicates) is step_taken=plan, free: steps[] (class_id, name, takes, gives), kinds, input, graph, run[] (each step's run call in order, each output the next step's input) and compose {url, body} to make the chain one tool; steps this node already holds as one tool give one_tool and one run call; nothing runs. Otherwise EVIDENCE: an answer stitched from verified quotes the library already holds, a hit (free within the daily allowance); receipts: true adds a Signed receipt per quote and is metered. Set allow_escalate only to send YOUR ask to YOUR engine. A miss names research/deposit with prices. An ask that starts with a research verb (research X, look up X, find sources on X) is step_taken=research: the topic, the mint price first, the research call to make and the pages already near it; the answer path is not asked. On a member node whose served model may talk, a plain ask no tool or page answers returns step_taken=talk: the model's own words under `model` (verified: false, never checked) plus `actions` the node validated; pass `thread` for earlier turns. Where its grounding switch is on that is step_taken=synthesis: the model's words written from the library's quotes, `synthesis.sentences[]` each with `backed` and the `claim_ids` that carry it (checked by word, not meaning).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • attestmode=attest: a C2PA sidecar manifest per sealed claim (by claim_id, claim_ids, slug for a whole page, or cid+span) whose hard binding is the SHA-256 of the exact quoted bytes, with…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    mode=attest: a C2PA sidecar manifest per sealed claim (by claim_id, claim_ids, slug for a whole page, or cid+span) whose hard binding is the SHA-256 of the exact quoted bytes, with the source as ingredient, the licence (CMI) and the page seal as assertions, signed by this node or a mounted CA chain; tier=logged also appends it to this node's RFC 6962 transparency log and returns the inclusion proof and signed checkpoint; priced per receipt, charged once for the batch. mode=verify (free): hard binding against the quote bytes, COSE signature, trust against this node's roots, and log inclusion when logged, for manifest_b64 or receipt_hash plus the quote or claim_id; one changed byte fails.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • matchSealed pages ranked against a task with reuse / repair / mint price quotes and the token saving each pack represents.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Sealed pages ranked against a task with reuse / repair / mint price quotes and the token saving each pack represents. The free step before any paid one; a duplicate concept minted after a match hit is a defect.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • package_checkRegistry metadata for an npm, PyPI or crates.io package name before an install: exists, first published, latest version, version count, maintainers, weekly downloads, licence, repo…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Registry metadata for an npm, PyPI or crates.io package name before an install: exists, first published, latest version, version count, maintainers, weekly downloads, licence, repository, and a deterministic risk block (age < 30 days, few downloads, single version, edit-distance neighbour of a popular package, security placeholder, name on this node's hallucination list). Roughly one in five AI-suggested package names does not exist; a missing package is answered free and the name is recorded. Metadata only, never a tarball.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • programsBefore you write a transform, search or list the public fixture programs (sort/dedup/json/csv/case/date/extract…), authored oracles, and composites.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before you write a transform, search or list the public fixture programs (sort/dedup/json/csv/case/date/extract…), authored oracles, and composites. With q, in, out, family, limit or all=true it is a search, ranked as the library's own search page ranks and the same as GET /api/v1/programs?q=…: one row per family, best first, each with its family, how many variants matched and their class_ids, and the query read back with how many tools matched. With none of them (or only all=false), every row, sorted by class_id. A bad value is an error result that says which and why; an array, an object or null is a bad value. Each row has class_id, iface, input_kind, radius, the run price (¢0.1) and a purpose: what it does, what to give it, what you get, an example, its family, and whether a step in it does nothing (pointless). class_id returns the full artifact instead. Free; nothing is run; no user text in any program; a purpose's what may be a request's own sentence (third-party data).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • researchA sealed research job: named shards (arXiv, OpenAlex, Crossref, Europe PMC, Wikipedia, standards and docs) collected, grafted, reviewed and woven into a signed page every later age…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    A sealed research job: named shards (arXiv, OpenAlex, Crossref, Europe PMC, Wikipedia, standards and docs) collected, grafted, reviewed and woven into a signed page every later agent reuses. kind=follow_up with an existing context_slug repairs in place at the repair tier (¢1.5); anything else mints a new slug at the mint tier (¢3); no single call costs more than $0.05. Free within the day's free research on this node: 5 a UTC day per address and $5.0000 a UTC day for the node, one at a time per address (rail free_research); past a limit, payment_required with a `free_research` block (reason, resets_at), and the refused call is not counted. An unpaid call returns status=payment_required. The result carries job_id, poll and wiki URLs; the seal takes minutes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • run_programDeterministic verified transform (sort/dedup/json/csv/case/date/extract…) re-executed on your input; ¢0.1; returns output + receipt.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "run_program" says "run": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "run_program" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "run_program" says "run": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Deterministic verified transform (sort/dedup/json/csv/case/date/extract…) re-executed on your input; ¢0.1; returns output + receipt. Call match or programs first to find the class.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • surveyA strength rating 1–5 (optionally useful, accurate) for a sealed page, so the next agent shops by measured utility.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    A strength rating 1–5 (optionally useful, accurate) for a sealed page, so the next agent shops by measured utility. A note is accepted and discarded: the node keeps no one's words.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • thinSealed pages that are thin, unreviewed, or woven to nothing, loneliest first, each with the exact research arguments that repair it and the repair price.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Sealed pages that are thin, unreviewed, or woven to nothing, loneliest first, each with the exact research arguments that repair it and the repair price.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • workOne tool, ten modes.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.what.description contains "other servers", wording about other tools or servers.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.what.description: "...n read it, it cannot be taken back, and other servers copy it. A work token or signed identit..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One tool, ten modes. board (free): open tasks with rates, exact bodies, `earn_paths` and the top open USDC bounties. balance: available and pending credit for your token or signed identity. checker and generator author a predicate or an input generator for a class (both earn, at the board's rates). The six paths, with this node's rates: compose ($0.0200 per accepted composite, times its depth (1 to 4)); program ($0.0500 as a candidate (half of the $0.1000 a filled spec pays); the other half, $0.0500 to each of two authors, when a second, independent one agrees on fresh inputs; then a royalty on every run someone else pays for); request (nothing to post; the builder who fills it earns the program rate); scout ($0.0025 per new verified quote, up to $0.0200 a task, plus $0.0100 when the page reaches held and $0.0100 for a new page); deposit ($0.0025 per new verified quote, up to $0.0200 a task, plus $0.0100 when the page reaches held and $0.0100 for a new page); synthesis ($0.0100 per accepted synthesis, one per page per 7 days). scout takes up to 5 ids (arxiv:, doi:, pmid:, pmcid:, openalex:, wikipedia:, rfc:, pydoc:, …) and the node fetches and byte-verifies them itself; deposit credits by novelty (MinHash) and want="page" returns the oracle pack free after three novel claims. Credit spends on read_page, research, attest and answer like a balance; ERC-8128 requests need no token (bind a wallet to a mesh key at /api/v1/identity/bind). bounty_id links a delivery to an on-chain bounty.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • densityA snapshot of the mesh: held / thin / isolated counts, links, catalog size, what the toll has collected, treasury, bounties, federation, funnel and gardener status.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "snapshot": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    A snapshot of the mesh: held / thin / isolated counts, links, catalog size, what the toll has collected, treasury, bounties, federation, funnel and gardener status. The baseline to measure work against.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • read_pageThe sealed oracle pack for a slug as deterministic JSON: markdown, verified claims with byte-exact quotes and spans, source CIDs, licence (CMI), receipt hashes, review, labels, str…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "read_page" says "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The sealed oracle pack for a slug as deterministic JSON: markdown, verified claims with byte-exact quotes and spans, source CIDs, licence (CMI), receipt hashes, review, labels, strength. Reuse tier, about ¢1.9085, priced as a share of the tokens the pack replaces (typically 40–60k tokens of fetching and reading, stated as saves.tokens next to the price). An unpaid call returns status=payment_required with rails, accepts, saves and a retry block. Stubs are free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write10
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:06 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
11
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 11 tools that change things (11 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://research.zaiba.cloud/mcp: tools/list returned 13 tools to an anonymous client, including thin (write), match (write), ask (write), programs (write), run_program (write) and 6 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 11
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  2. Nov 6, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 11 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "run_program" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "run_program" says "run": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • Warnwork

    The input schema at properties.what.description contains "other servers", wording about other tools or servers.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.what.description: "...n read it, it cannot be taken back, and other servers copy it. A work token or signed identit..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
    • Changed:read_pageOnly readstitledescription
    • Changed:researchChanges thingstitledescription
  2. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:workChanges thingsinputSchema
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: no -> yes; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 11
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  4. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:askChanges thingsdescription
  5. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:programsChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
  6. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:programsChanges thingsdescription
  7. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
    • Changed:surveyChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
    • Changed:workChanges thingsdescription
  8. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 11 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
  9. Tools8 changed.~8 changedView diff
    • Changed:answerChanges thingsannotations
    • Changed:askChanges thingsannotations
    • Changed:matchChanges thingsannotations
    • Changed:programsChanges thingsannotations
    • Changed:read_pageOnly readsannotations
    • Changed:run_programChanges thingsannotations
    • Changed:thinChanges thingsannotations
    • Changed:workChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchema
  10. Tools4 changed.~4 changedView diff
    • Changed:askChanges thingsdescription
    • Changed:read_pageOnly readsinputSchema
    • Changed:researchChanges thingsinputSchema
    • Changed:run_programChanges thingsinputSchema

Install

Pinned to version 0.5.16. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http deai-research https://research.zaiba.cloud/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http deai-research https://research.zaiba.cloud/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__deai-research__density",
      "mcp__deai-research__read_page"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__deai-research__thin",
      "mcp__deai-research__match",
      "mcp__deai-research__ask",
      "mcp__deai-research__programs",
      "mcp__deai-research__run_program",
      "mcp__deai-research__research",
      "mcp__deai-research__survey",
      "mcp__deai-research__work",
      "mcp__deai-research__package_check",
      "mcp__deai-research__attest",
      "mcp__deai-research__answer"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as deai-research. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 10 rules
  • mcp__deai-research__thin untrusted-input
  • mcp__deai-research__match untrusted-input
  • mcp__deai-research__ask untrusted-input
  • mcp__deai-research__programs untrusted-input
  • mcp__deai-research__run_program untrusted-input
  • mcp__deai-research__read_page untrusted-input
  • mcp__deai-research__research untrusted-input
  • mcp__deai-research__work untrusted-input
  • mcp__deai-research__package_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__deai-research__answer untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.jake-zaiba/deai-research/verify?hash=99bae9d1a8fc668b2d0bfbdbc7cdf0031e7c5f3ead0d3d381d7a851d089de4b7" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 99bae9d1a8fc, from Nov 20, 2026, 07:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jake-zaiba/deai-research/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.jake-zaiba/deai-research
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.jake-zaiba/deai-research.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jake-zaiba/deai-research)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 07:17 UTC.

DeAI Artifact Gateway MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the DeAI Artifact Gateway MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 13 tools, 11 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the DeAI Artifact Gateway MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the DeAI Artifact Gateway MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the DeAI Artifact Gateway MCP server have?

13 tools: 11 write, 2 read. thin, match, ask, programs, run_program, research, survey, work and 5 more.

Does the DeAI Artifact Gateway MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the DeAI Artifact Gateway MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the DeAI Artifact Gateway MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 8 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.