Lazaretto MCP server
io.github.jamesdfinance-dev/lazarettojamesdfinance-devstreamable-httpv1.3.6Scanned
Supply chain security: free npm lockfile malware check, paid scan of packages, skills, MCP servers.
10 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 6 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 8
- Can send data out · 1
- 4 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Lazaretto MCP server can do
The Lazaretto MCP server is published by the GitHub account jamesdfinance-dev. It has 10 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (get_free_key) and create or change data (6 tools: check_lockfile, scan_artifact, scan_lockfile_deep, scan_mcp_server and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (find_mcp_servers); 8 tools bring in text other people can write (known_bad_lookup, check_lockfile, scan_artifact and 5 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (scan_mcp_server). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 4 findings (credentials-mention and tool-shadowing). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.3.6.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
10 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
get_free_keyGet a free developer key for the metered tools on this server, without leaving this session.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_free_key" says "get": a word for reading.
- The description says "cannot be recovered".
Description, as the server wrote it Get a free developer key for the metered tools on this server, without leaving this session. No payment, no account, no card. The key holds a small daily allowance that refills every day, and one credit is consumed per verdict, nothing on an error. Present it as the X-API-Key header on this MCP connection, or hand it to whoever configures your client. Throttled exactly as the equivalent HTTP endpoint is: one key per source per window, so calling this again shortly after will be refused rather than minting a second key. Store the key when you get it: it is shown once and cannot be recovered.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get a free developer key (free)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
check_lockfileCheck EXACTLY-PINNED npm dependencies against published malicious-package advisories (OSV/OpenSSF).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check EXACTLY-PINNED npm dependencies against published malicious-package advisories (OSV/OpenSSF). Free, anonymous, one call for the whole set. Give EITHER `lockfile`, the full text of a package-lock.json, yarn.lock or pnpm-lock.yaml, OR `packages`, a list of "name@version" strings, which is the one to reach for when you only care about a few dependencies or when an 800-package tree would not fit in your context. Give one or the other, never both. Only exact versions can be answered: a range like ^5.0.0 has no definitive answer because a compromised release usually sits between clean ones. Fail-closed: anything that could not be checked is returned in `unverified`, so an empty `malicious` list is an all-clear only when `unverified` is empty too AND `truncated` is false. `truncated: true` means the lockfile ran past the per-request package limit and the packages past it went into NEITHER list: they were never looked at, `checked` counts only the ones that were, and the rest are unchecked rather than clean. When that happens, send the remainder as `packages` (name@version strings) in a second call, or split the lockfile by workspace, before telling anyone the tree is clean.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Lockfile malware check (free, whole tree)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
check_mcp_toolsCheck tool definitions you ALREADY HOLD, with no network call to anyone.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Warn
The description contains "ANOTHER server", wording about other tools or servers.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...conversation out, standing orders about ANOTHER server's tools, and invisible-unicode payloads..."
Description, as the server wrote it Check tool definitions you ALREADY HOLD, with no network call to anyone. Most MCP servers run locally over stdio and have no endpoint that can be reached, so this is the only way to check them, and your client already read their tool list at startup. Paste that JSON: a whole tools/list response, a {"tools":[...]} object, or a bare array. Analyzes the same text as scan_mcp_server and applies the same rules, so a payload cannot be caught over the wire and missed here. Detects tool poisoning (hidden directive blocks, orders pointing the agent at private keys or an agent config file), parameters whose real purpose is to carry secrets or your conversation out, standing orders about ANOTHER server's tools, and invisible-unicode payloads. Metered like scan_artifact.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check tool definitions you already have (metered, no network)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
scan_artifactDeterministically analyze a package, repo, AI model, skill, or file for malicious behavior (credential theft, data exfiltration, obfuscation, prompt injection aimed at the agent, i…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...skill, or file for malicious behavior (credential theft, data exfiltration, obfuscation,..."
Description, as the server wrote it Deterministically analyze a package, repo, AI model, skill, or file for malicious behavior (credential theft, data exfiltration, obfuscation, prompt injection aimed at the agent, install scripts, model files that run code on load) and return a verdict (malicious, flagged, clear, error) with the exact evidence and a hash of what was scanned. Metered: present an X-API-Key holding credits. If you hold a wallet instead of an account, pay per call over x402 at POST https://lazaretto.dev/v1/scan ($0.03 USDC on Base, no signup). A free key with a daily allowance is available at POST https://lazaretto.dev/v1/trial. For checks that are always free, use check_lockfile or known_bad_lookup.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Full behavioral scan (metered)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
scan_lockfile_deepBehaviorally scan the exactly-pinned dependencies in a lockfile, not just their identities: reads the code of each package and screens for credential theft, exfiltration, obfuscati…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...he code of each package and screens for credential theft, exfiltration, obfuscation, promp..."
Description, as the server wrote it Behaviorally scan the exactly-pinned dependencies in a lockfile, not just their identities: reads the code of each package and screens for credential theft, exfiltration, obfuscation, prompt injection and install-time droppers. Each result carries a verdict, a risk level, the ids of the rules that fired and a risk summary. It does not carry file-and-line evidence: for that, run scan_artifact on the package you want to look at. This is the paid counterpart to check_lockfile, which only matches names and versions against advisories. Metered: one credit per package that returns a verdict, nothing for one that errors. Capped at 25 packages per call, in lockfile order, so calling it again with the same lockfile rescans the same first 25. To continue, pass the not_scanned.packages list from the result (name@version strings) as `packages` instead of `lockfile`. Use it before installing a tree you have not vetted.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Deep scan a whole lockfile (metered, one credit per package)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
scan_mcp_serverCheck an MCP server BEFORE you connect to it.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Warn
The description contains "ANOTHER server", wording about other tools or servers.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...conversation out, standing orders about ANOTHER server's tools (cross-server shadowing), and i..."
Description, as the server wrote it Check an MCP server BEFORE you connect to it. Asks the server to introduce itself and list its tools, then analyzes the text it hands an agent: tool names, descriptions, parameter schemas and server instructions. Catches tool poisoning (hidden directives that point the agent at private keys or at an agent config file), parameters whose real purpose is to carry secrets or your conversation out, standing orders about ANOTHER server's tools (cross-server shadowing), and invisible-unicode payloads. Returns a verdict with the exact tool and line as evidence, plus a hash of what was advertised, so a server that changes its tools later does not inherit the old verdict. Metered like scan_artifact: an X-API-Key with credits, or pay per call over x402 at POST https://lazaretto.dev/v1/scan with target type mcp_server ($0.03 USDC on Base, no signup).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Scan an MCP server before connecting (metered)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
verify_attestationVerify a Lazaretto scan attestation that another agent (or a README, or a lockfile) handed you, WITHOUT re-scanning or paying.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify a Lazaretto scan attestation that another agent (or a README, or a lockfile) handed you, WITHOUT re-scanning or paying. Free and anonymous. Returns signature validity and the signed claims, including verdict, risk and subject. For a clear or flagged SHA-256 subject only, checks the current known-bad indicator set and includes `contradicted` when it matches. That field is otherwise omitted; its absence is not a freshness or safety verdict. Package identities are not rechecked here. A valid signature authenticates an earlier claim, not current safety. The artifact's hash or package identity must match `claims.sub` for the claim to apply.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verify a scan attestation (free)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
find_attestationAsk whether anyone has already attested an artifact, BEFORE you install it or pay to scan it.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_attestation" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Ask whether anyone has already attested an artifact, BEFORE you install it or pay to scan it. Free and anonymous. Give a package identity like "chalk@5.6.1", an MCP server endpoint URL, or a sha256 content hash. Returns the signed verdict if one exists, which you can verify offline against https://lazaretto.dev/.well-known/jwks.json, plus freshness: whether the corpus has since contradicted it and whether it was attested under an older rules version. A miss is not a verdict, it only means nobody has scanned this yet. When nobody has attested an npm package identity, the answer falls back to an identity check against published advisories: `answer: "identity_check"` with an `identity_check` object, and `found` still false, because an identity check is unsigned, looks at the identity rather than the code, and absence from the corpus is not a verdict. `identity_check.listed_as_malware: true` comes back as an error result, so a published malware version cannot be read as "nothing found"; `null` there means the corpus could not be consulted, which is unchecked and never clear.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Find an existing attestation (free)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
find_mcp_serversFind an MCP server for a job, free and with no key: describe what you need ("postgres", "send slack messages", "browser automation") and get matching servers from the official MCP …Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_mcp_servers" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "find" and "message": it reads messages.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "find" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Find an MCP server for a job, free and with no key: describe what you need ("postgres", "send slack messages", "browser automation") and get matching servers from the official MCP registry, each with its endpoint, the command to add it to Claude Code, its tools, and what Lazaretto's latest read found. Only servers whose tools we read with nothing matching our tool-poisoning rules, or live servers that ask you to sign in before listing tools (said plainly), are returned; servers we flagged or could not reach are left out. Remote servers only: for a local stdio server, check its tool list with check_mcp_tools. Use it whenever you need a capability you do not have yet.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Find an MCP server for a job (free)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
known_bad_lookupCheck a SHA-256 against Lazaretto's known-bad indicator set (refreshed daily from abuse.ch).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "known_bad_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a SHA-256 against Lazaretto's known-bad indicator set (refreshed daily from abuse.ch). Free and anonymous. A miss only means this exact hash is not in the indicator set; it is not a clean verdict on the artifact.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Known-bad hash lookup (free)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
8 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write8
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__lazaretto__scan_mcp_server"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:06 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 7
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://lazaretto.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including get_free_key (irreversible), check_lockfile (write), scan_artifact (write), scan_lockfile_deep (write), scan_mcp_server (write) and 2 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnscan_mcp_server
The description contains "ANOTHER server", wording about other tools or servers.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...conversation out, standing orders about ANOTHER server's tools (cross-server shadowing), and i..."
- Warncheck_mcp_tools
The description contains "ANOTHER server", wording about other tools or servers.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...conversation out, standing orders about ANOTHER server's tools, and invisible-unicode payloads..."
- Infoscan_artifact
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...skill, or file for malicious behavior (credential theft, data exfiltration, obfuscation,..."
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...he code of each package and screens for credential theft, exfiltration, obfuscation, promp..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools10 changed.~10 changedView diff
- Changed:check_lockfileChanges thingstitle
- Changed:check_mcp_toolsChanges thingstitle
- Changed:find_attestationOnly readstitledescription
- Changed:find_mcp_serversOnly readstitledescription
- Changed:get_free_keyCan't be undonetitle
- Changed:known_bad_lookupOnly readstitle
- Changed:scan_artifactChanges thingstitle
- Changed:scan_lockfile_deepChanges thingstitle
- Changed:scan_mcp_serverChanges thingstitle
- Changed:verify_attestationChanges thingstitledescription
Tools1 added, 1 changed.+1 added~1 changedView diff
- Added:find_mcp_serversOnly reads
- Changed:scan_artifactChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.3.6. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http lazaretto https://lazaretto.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http lazaretto https://lazaretto.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__lazaretto__known_bad_lookup",
"mcp__lazaretto__find_mcp_servers",
"mcp__lazaretto__find_attestation"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__lazaretto__check_lockfile",
"mcp__lazaretto__scan_artifact",
"mcp__lazaretto__scan_lockfile_deep",
"mcp__lazaretto__scan_mcp_server",
"mcp__lazaretto__check_mcp_tools",
"mcp__lazaretto__verify_attestation",
"mcp__lazaretto__get_free_key"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as lazaretto. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 8 rules
- mcp__lazaretto__known_bad_lookup untrusted-input
- mcp__lazaretto__check_lockfile untrusted-input
- mcp__lazaretto__scan_artifact untrusted-input
- mcp__lazaretto__scan_lockfile_deep untrusted-input
- mcp__lazaretto__scan_mcp_server untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__lazaretto__find_mcp_servers private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__lazaretto__find_attestation untrusted-input
- mcp__lazaretto__verify_attestation untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.jamesdfinance-dev/lazaretto/verify?hash=bd59811c29ce294dc19f3c8fd52a947910a8a0f6bad049b70461ed49791d06fc" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash bd59811c29ce, from Nov 17, 2026, 11:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jamesdfinance-dev/lazaretto/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jamesdfinance-dev/lazaretto)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 3, 2026, 21:17 UTC.
Lazaretto MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Lazaretto MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Lazaretto MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Lazaretto MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: get_free_key.
What tools does the Lazaretto MCP server have?
- 10 tools: 1 irreversible, 6 write, 3 read. get_free_key, check_lockfile, scan_artifact, scan_lockfile_deep, scan_mcp_server, check_mcp_tools, verify_attestation, known_bad_lookup and 2 more.
Does the Lazaretto MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Lazaretto MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): scan_mcp_server.
Has the Lazaretto MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 2, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.